Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the petition for habeas relief based on lack of exhaustion claims. In this case, the district court dismissed claims challenging petitioner's murder conviction and death sentence, finding that, although he presented them to the California Supreme Court, he subsequently waived them by means of a handwritten, pro se filing. The panel held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that petitioner's handwritten form constituted a valid waiver of his right to proceed and that the State failed to carry its burden to the contrary. Therefore, the district court erred by dismissing the claims as unexhausted and the court remanded so that the district court could adjudicate the claims on the merits. View "Kirkpatrick v. Chappell" on Justia Law

A textual and historical analysis of the Second Amendment demonstrates that the Constitution does not confer a freestanding right on commercial proprietors to sell firearms. The en banc court affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that the County violated plaintiff's Second Amendment rights, as well as those of his potential customers, when it denied plaintiff conditional use permits to open a gun shop. The panel held that plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the County's ordinance impedes any resident of Alameda County who wishes to purchase a firearm from doing so, and thus he failed to state a claim for relief based on infringement of the Second Amendment rights of his potential customers. The panel reasoned that plaintiff could not state a Second Amendment claim based solely on the ordinance's restriction on his ability to sell firearms. View "Teixeira v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

A tribe qualifies to have land taken into trust for its benefit under 25 U.S.C. 5108 of the Indian Reorganization Act if it (1) was "under Federal jurisdiction" as of June 18, 1934, and (2) is "recognized" at the time the decision is made to take land into trust. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Interior and the Ione Band of Miwok Indians in a case involving a dispute over a proposed casino in the County. The panel held that the Interior's reading of the ambiguous phrase "under Federal jurisdiction" was the best interpretation and the Interior did not err in adopting that interpretation for purposes of deciding whether the Ione Band was "under Federal jurisdiction" as of 1934. Finally, the Interior did not err in allowing the Band to conduct gaming operations on the Plymouth Parcels under the "restored tribe" exception of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2719(a). View "County of Amador v. USDOI" on Justia Law

Threats to sue fall within the purview of the constitutionally protected right to file grievances. Both the filing of a criminal complaint by a prisoner, as well as the threat to do so, are protected by the First Amendment, provided they are not baseless. Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Washington State Penitentiary (WSP), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was disciplined for threatening to initiate civil litigation and file a criminal complaint against prison officials. The Ninth Circuit held that because plaintiff had alleged cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims regarding his threats to sue, and qualified immunity did not attach, it was improper to dismiss the complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(c). However, in regard to plaintiff's threat to file a criminal complaint, even though it was a constitutionally protected right, qualified immunity attached. Therefore, dismissal of that aspect of the complaint was proper. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Entler v. Gregoire" on Justia Law

TDY filed a complaint under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1), seeking contribution from the government for its equitable share of the cleanup costs. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of judgment in favor of the United States, which allocated 100 percent of past and future CERCLA costs to TDY. The panel agreed with the district court that some deviation from the allocation affirmed in Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1049, and Cadillac Fairview, 299 F.3d at 1022–23, was warranted by distinguishing facts. However, the panel held that encumbering a military contractor with 100 percent of CERCLA cleanup costs that were largely incurred during war-effort production was a 180 degree departure from the panel's prior case law, and the out-of-circuit authority that the district court relied upon did not warrant such a sharp deviation. In this case, the district court did not adequately consider the parties' lengthy course of dealings and the government's requirement that TDY use two of the hazardous chemicals at issue. Accordingly, the court remanded for additional proceedings. View "TDY Holdings v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction for a class of non-citizens in removal proceedings who are detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). In this case, the government has already determined that the class members were neither dangerous nor enough of a flight risk to require detention without bond. Nonetheless, the class members remain detained because they are unable to afford bond in the amount set by the immigration officials. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim. The panel reasoned that the government's current policies failed to provide adequate procedural protections to ensure that detention of the class members was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. The panel concluded that due process likely requires immigration officials when considering bond determinations to consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Furthermore, plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; the balance of the equities favored plaintiffs; and the public interest benefited from the injunction. View "Hernandez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgments for defendants in two adversary proceedings seeking recovery of fraudulent transfers. The panel applied the dominion test and held that defendants were initial transferees under 11 U.S.C. 550(a)(1) and thus not entitled to the safe harbor under section 550(b)(1) for subsequent transferees. Therefore, the Committee could recover the funds from both the corporate cheat and those parties to whom he first made payments from the corporate account. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of WallDesign" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant used excessive force when he tased and fatally shot her husband. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and remanded, holding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. The panel held that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal; viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the husband did not have a clearly established right violated by defendant's use of the taser when the husband was likely under the influence of drugs and was violently resisting arrest; and, in regard to defendant's subsequent use of deadly force against the husband, the husband held no clearly established right not to be shot by defendant. In this case, it was not obvious that defendant's use of deadly force was excessive and there were strong reasons supporting the reasonableness of the shooting. View "Isayeva v. Barry" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government properly exercised its authority to regulate hovercraft use on the rivers within conservation system units in Alaska. The panel held that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. 3101 et seq., does not limit the Park Service from applying the hovercraft ban on the Nation River in Yukon-Charley because, under the panel's Katie John precedent, Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), the United States has an implied reservation of water rights, rendering the river public lands. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Sturgeon v. Frost" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition where petitioner challenged his conviction for second degree murder and attempted murder. Petitioner was fourteen years old at the time he was found guilty of the crimes. The panel held that the government relied on a coerced waiver of the right to counsel to secure the conviction because petitioner did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive such right. Because admission of petitioner's confession was not harmless, the panel granted relief under 42 U.S.C. 2254. View "Rodriguez v. McDonald" on Justia Law