Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A defendant attempts to produce and transport a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct when he believes that the victim is a minor, regardless of the victim's actual age. In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempt to produce and transport into the United States a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct (Count 1B); vacated defendant's conviction for attempt to aid and abet travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct (Count 2B) because the statute does not proscribe an attempt to aid and abet such travel; and vacated defendant's sentence as to Count 1B and 2B. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Jayavarman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, for 22 years, contested in administrative proceedings a California Franchise Tax Board ruling that he owed close to $7.4 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which arose from his administrative proceedings. The panel held that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, barred plaintiff's suit because plaintiff could either pay now and litigate later, or the pay-then-protest remedy provided plaintiff a speedy remedy, even if the protest-then-pay remedy had not. The court also held that, if plaintiff pays and then protests, the California state courts would likely allow plaintiff to add constitutional claims to a state court action challenging the tax. View "Hyatt v. Yee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City retaliated against her success in a previous lawsuit by hiring another individual and rejecting plaintiff's application to become City Finance Director. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and held that plaintiff's claims were not barred by claim preclusion, but issue preclusion barred plaintiff from recovering economic damages she already received as a result of the first lawsuit. The panel also held that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's suit was a substantial reason for the City's refusal to consider her for the Finance Director position in 2011. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment claim did not survive summary judgment. Finally, the panel held that plaintiff's claim under the Oregon Whistleblower Act failed as a matter of law. View "Howard v. City of Coos Bay" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the use of excessive force. In this case, a sheriff's deputy fatally shot Andy Lopez, a thirteen-year-old who was holding a toy gun. The panel held that the deputy deployed deadly force while Andy was standing on the sidewalk holding a gun that was pointed down at the ground; the deputy shot Andy without having warned Andy that such force would be used, and without observing any aggressive behavior; and thus a reasonable jury could find that the deputy's use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable. The panel further held that, taking the facts as it was required to do on interlocutory appeal, the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting that the deputy's conduct was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the panel remanded for trial. View "Estate of Andy Lopez v. Gelhaus" on Justia Law

The Upper Skagit filed a Request for Determination as to the geographic scope of the Suquamish's usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations (U&A) as determined by Judge Boldt in 1975. The Upper Skagit sought a determination that the Suquamish's U&A determinations did not include Chuckanut Bay, Samish Bay, and a portion of Padilla Bay where the Upper Skagit has its own court-approved U&A determinations (the Contested Waters). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Judge Boldt did not intend to include the Contested Waters in the Suquamish's U&A determinations. The panel followed the two-step Muckleshoot analytical framework to interpret Judge Boldt's U&A findings, holding that Judge Boldt intended something different from the plain text of his findings and that the Upper Skagit showed that there was no evidence before Judge Boldt that the Suquamish fished or traveled through certain contested areas. View "Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal on the ground that he waived his right to appeal by departing under an order of removal. The panel held that petitioner's departure alone did not constitute a "considered" and "intelligent" waiver of his right to appeal and therefore did not meet the constitutional requirements of a valid waiver. Furthermore, the IJ's failure to inform petitioner that his departure would constitute a waiver of his previously reserved right to appeal to the BIA rendered petitioner's purported waiver invalid. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavez-Garcia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was found guilty of four crimes involving the robbery and murder of the victim in a Las Vegas jewelry store and was sentenced to death. The panel held that the Supreme Court of Nevada's denial of petitioner's claims under Brady v. Maryland and Strickland v. Washington constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent; petitioner was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus with respect to his convictions of burglary, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and murder with the use of a deadly weapon; and petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief as to the escape conviction because he has offered no reason to call the validity of that conviction into question. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Browning v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in favor of MetLife in an action filed by plaintiff to seek life insurance benefits under a benefits plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The panel held that MetLife waived the evidence of insurability requirement because it did not ask plaintiff for a statement of health, even as it accepted her premiums for $250,000 in coverage. In this case, MetLife's purported ignorance of the facts did not negate its obligation to pay the entire $250,000 because, under agency law, the policyholder-employer's knowledge and conduct may be attributed to MetLife. View "Salyers v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the denial of qualified immunity to defendants on plaintiff's due process claim, and dismissed the denial of qualified immunity to defendants on plaintiff's First Amendment claim. Plaintiff, a former school principal, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the school district reduced his salary without due process and retaliated against him for speaking to an attorney about his evaluation. The court held that the district court erred in holding that Toppenish violated due process by failing to comply with procedures required under state law when it reduced plaintiff's salary. The panel explained that federal due process did not necessarily entitle a plaintiff to the same procedures provided by state law. The panel also held that it lacked jurisdiction at this stage to review the denial of qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim because the district court had found genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the claim. View "Roybal v. Toppenish School District" on Justia Law

The framework in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), applied beyond the context of preventing consumer deception. The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of the Associations' motion for a preliminary injunction that sought to enjoin the implementation of the City and County of San Francisco's ordinance that would require warnings about the health effects of certain sugar-sweetened beverages on specific types of fixed advertising within San Francisco. The panel held that, although there was no dispute that San Francisco has a substantial government interest in the health of its citizens, the Associations were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the ordinance was an unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirement that might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. In regard to the remaining steps of the preliminary injunction test, the panel also held that the Associations have demonstrated a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm if the ordinance was allowed to go into effect; the balance of hardships tipped sharply in favor of the Associations; and a preliminary injunction was in the public interest here. View "American Beverage Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law