Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a class of underwriters, filed suit seeking overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The Ninth Circuit applied the analysis used by the Second Circuit and held that, because the mortgage underwriters' primary job duty does not relate to the bank's management or general business operations, the administrative employee exemption under 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1) and 29 C.F.R. 541.200(a) does not apply. Therefore, the underwriters in this case were not entitled to overtime compensation. View "McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Savings Bank" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order staying Seneca's action against Strange Land in a parallel state court proceeding. The panel held that the district court correctly chose to analyze the abstention motion under the Colorado River framework where Seneca sought remedies beyond declaratory judgment. Applying the factors in assessing the appropriateness of a Colorado River stay, the panel held that the district court abused its narrow discretion, essentially transforming the strong presumption against abstention into a presumption in favor of abstention where state law issues predominate. The panel explained that nothing about this case was "exceptional" so as to warrant disregarding the "virtually unflagging obligation" of a federal court to exercise its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the panel remanded. View "Seneca Insurance Co. v. Strange Land, Inc." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, convicted of robbery and murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief with respect to petitioner's conviction, but reversed with respect to the death sentence. The panel held that, even if the State had not waived its defense, admission of psychiatric testimony during the penalty phase violated petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), and that the violation had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's decision to impose the death sentence. In this case, the psychiatrist failed to seek or obtain permission from defense counsel to visit or evaluate the client. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims. View "Petrocelli v. Baker" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's adverse credibility finding where the IJ determined that petitioner gave equivocal testimony about the reasons for errors in marriage records; petitioner's testimony regarding the critical events underlying her claims for relief were very vague; and the documents submitted by petitioner did not adequately corroborate her testimony. Furthermore, the IJ had no obligation to give petitioner an additional opportunity to bolster her case by submitting further evidence. View "Yali Wang v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, sought habeas relief, raising an instructional error claim regarding California Jury Instruction Criminal 2.15, which allowed the jury to infer guilt of murder from evidence that defendants were in possession of recently stolen property plus slight corroborating evidence. Petitioner quit pursuing his petition because he believed that he "co-submitted" another habeas petition with his codefendant. The codefendant was granted habeas relief. The district court subsequently granted petitioner's motion to reopen his original habeas proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and granted petitioner habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the 60(b) motion was not inconsistent with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) bar on second or successive petitions, AEDPA's statute of limitations, or AEDPA's exhaustion requirement; the district court did not err in reviewing petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion and it did not abuse its discretion in reopening the case under Rule 60(b)(6); and habeas relief was warranted. View "Hall v. Haws" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his confession, holding that the booking exception can apply to questioning even after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel. In this case, the booking exception applied to the questioning of defendant where the questions asked were biographical questions and were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. View "United States v. Zapien" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew its memorandum disposition filed December 14, 2016, denied a petition for rehearing en banc as moot, and filed this opinion reversing defendant's conviction for illegal reentry.After defendant was convicted of conspiracy to export defense articles without a license and was removed from the United States, he returned and was convicted of illegal reentry. The panel held that defendant was not originally removable as charged, and so could not be convicted of illegal reentry. In this case, because the statute was overbroad and indivisible, defendant's conviction under 22 U.S.C. 2778 could not serve as a proper predicate for removal—either as an aggravated felony or a firearms offense. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner claimed that there was improper outside influence on the jury. The en banc court held that the state appellate court's decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, and Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229. In denying relief because petitioner's evidence did not prove prejudice, the state court acted contrary to Mattox and Remmer; it was error to rely on the very same statement from Juror 10's declaration both to raise the presumption of prejudice and to rebut it; and the state court denied petitioner a hearing on prejudice under the wrong legal standard. Accordingly, the en banc court remanded with instructions to hold a hearing to determine the circumstances of Juror 10's misconduct, the impact on the jury, and whether it was prejudicial. View "Godoy v. Spearman" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the FMCSA's statutory authority to issue permits for U.S. long-haul operations to Mexico-domiciled trucking companies. The panel held that the Teamsters and the Drivers Association have constitutional standing; the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 encompasses the Teamsters' and the Drivers Association's claims; and the Teamsters and the Drivers Association also have third-party organizational standing. The panel also held that the grant of a long-haul operating permit to a Mexico-domiciled carrier and the denial of the Teamsters' challenge to that grant were final agency actions; the panel has Hobbs Act jurisdiction over the petition for review of the decision to grant Trajosa a permit; whether to grant long-haul authority based on the results of the pilot program was "committed to agency discretion by law" and was thus unreviewable; and therefore the panel may not review the FMCSA's decision to grant Trajosa an operating permit. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. USDOT" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's 21 month sentence after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The panel held that the district court did not err by applying a 16 level enhancement after determining that defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-102 was a crime of violence for purposes of USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because it entailed the use or threatened use of physical force. The panel also held that defendant waived his ability to contest the revocation of his supervised release and thus the appeal must be dismissed. View "United States v. Perez-Silvan" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law