Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), a defendant may discharge a restitution judgment based on a private settlement between the victim and the defendant. Restitution is a criminal sentence that cannot be extinguished by a victim’s disclaimer of benefits. A district court may redirect restitution payments to the federal Crime Victims Fund when a victim later disclaims restitution without making a direct assignment to the Fund. The statute provides leeway for the court to fashion this practical solution. In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion seeking full satisfaction of a restitution judgment entered after conviction for bank fraud and submitting a false loan application. View "United States v. Hankins" on Justia Law

The district court erred in dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction plaintiff's administratively exhausted Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, claim following the United States' second removal. In this case, plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against his medical providers, alleging that his mother had died of postpartum hemmorhage shortly after giving birth to him. The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims arising from Dr. Bencomo's actions, dismissed those claims without prejudice, and once again remanded the state claims against the individual defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's initial failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Dr. Bencomo whom plaintiff reasonably did not know was covered by the FTCA deprived the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's FTCA claim even after plaintiff dismissed his initial suit against Dr. Bencomo, and then exhausted his administrative remedies before amending his complaint in state court to add Dr. Bencomo again. View "D. L. V. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order denying Christopher Sherrod's application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The panel joined its sister circuits in holding that an 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction does not qualify as a new, intervening judgment. Therefore, Sherrod must obtain authorization from this court to proceed on a second or successive section 2255 motion. In this case, Sherrod has failed to make a prima facie showing under section 2255(h) of newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law. Therefore, the panel denied his application. View "Sherrod v. United States" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son died of Hepatosplenic T-cell lymphoma (HSTCL), an exceedingly rare and aggressive form of cancer, they filed suit alleging negligence and strict liability concerning the manufacture and distribution of drugs used to treat inflammatory bowel disease (IBD). The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to Teva, holding that the district court erred by excluding plaintiffs' causation experts' testimony. In this case, the district court looked too narrowly at each individual consideration under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), without taking into account the broader picture of the experts' overall methodology. The district court improperly ignored the experts' experience, reliance on a variety of literature and studies, and review of the son's medical records and history, as well as the fundamental importance of differential diagnosis by experienced doctors treating troubled outpatients. Furthermore, the district court overemphasized the fact that the experts did not develop their opinions based on independent research and the experts did not cite epidemiological studies. The panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Teva in regard to the duty to warn claim because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the prescribing physician's conduct would have changed with warnings from Teva and GSK. The panel declined to affirm the district court on four alternative grounds and reversed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. View "Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California Penal Code 28225 on Second Amendment grounds, alleging that California's allocation of $5 of a $19 fee on firearms transfers to fund enforcement efforts against illegal firearm purchasers was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the collection and use of the fee fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, the fee survived intermediate scrutiny because of the State's important interest in promoting public safety and disarming prohibited persons, and because there was a reasonable fit between these important objectives and the challenged fees. Because section 28225 did not violate the constitution, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Bauer v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence from a stop of a tractor-trailer driven by defendant. The panel held that it did not matter that a Nevada administrative scheme that allowed law enforcement officers to make stops of commercial vehicles and conduct limited inspections without reasonable suspicion was valid on its face, because the objective evidence established beyond doubt that this stop was a pretext for a stop to investigate information of suspected criminal activity short of that necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion. The panel explained that the consent to search that was obtained after defendant had been detained for approximately an hour was the fruit of the unlawful stop. The evidence found pursuant to the consent search was also fruit of the unlawful stop. View "United States v. Orozco" on Justia Law

If the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant. Before a presumptively innocent defendant may be shackled, the court must make an individualized decision that a compelling government purpose would be served and that shackles are the least restrictive means for maintaining security and order in the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit construed defendants' appeal as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority and found that it had jurisdiction to consider them. The en banc court held that there was still a live controversy over the shackling policy and the case was not moot because of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness. The en banc court clarified the right to be free from shackles and held that it applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or sentencing, with a jury or without. Although the en banc court held that the policy was unconstitutional, the court withheld the issuance of a formal writ of mandamus. View "United States v. Sanchez-Gomez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's final order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for removal. The en banc court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner was a habitual drunkard; the statutory "habitual drunkard" provision is not unconstitutionally vague under the criminal law standard or any lesser vagueness standard that might apply in a non-criminal context; the statutory "habitual drunkard" provision does not violate equal protection principles because the denial of cancellation of removal to habitual drunkards is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in public safety. View "Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions" on Justia Law

M.N. filed a due process complaint alleging that the District committed procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ denied all claims and the district court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion reversing the district court's judgment, holding that neither the duration of the hearing, the ALJ's active involvement, nor the length of the ALJ's opinion can ensure that the ALJ was thorough and careful in its findings of fact; plaintiffs' claim that the District committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing to adequately document its offer of the visually impaired (TVI) services was not waived; the District committed two procedural violations as to the individualized education plan (IEP); the District's failure to specify the assistive technology (AT) devices that were provided infringed M.N.'s opportunity to participate in the IEP process and denied the student a free appropriate education (FAPE); the panel remanded for a determination of the prejudice the student suffered as a result of the District's failure to respond to the complaint and the award of appropriate compensation; in regard to substantive violations, the panel remanded so the district court could consider plaintiffs' claims in light of new guidance from the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); and M.N., as the prevailing party, was entitled to attorneys' fees. View "M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the EPA's conditional registration of the pesticide NSPW-L30SS, an antimicrobial materials preservative that uses nanosilver as its active ingredient. The Ninth Circuit held that the EPA failed to support the public-interest finding with substantial evidence under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(7)(C). The panel explained that the EPA's finding that current users of conventional-silver pesticides will switch to NSPW and/or that NSPW will not be incorporated into new products relied on unsubstantiated assumptions. Accordingly, the panel vacated the EPA's conditional registration of NSPW. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law