Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Movant-Appellee Nabors Drilling USA, L.P. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. That filing triggered the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1), which generally applied to protect a debtor after it has filed for bankruptcy protection. The question presented in this case was whether that stay applied to a lawsuit filed by appellant-plaintiff Jeremy Porter, who has asserted a claim under California’s Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”). Porter contended the exception established in 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(4) applied to exempt his PAGA claim from the automatic stay. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the exception does not apply to a claim brought by a private party under PAGA, and therefore granted Nabors’s motion to recognize the automatic stay. View "Porter v. Nabors Drilling USA, L.P." on Justia Law

In this bankruptcy appeal, the issue presented for the Ninth Circuit’s review was one of first impression regarding some key provisions of 11 U.S.C. 1111(b) that apply to Chapter 11 proceedings for those who hold non-recourse liens on real property who are granted recourse against the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Those protected are creditors who have “a claim secured by a lien on property of the estate.” The issue before the Court was whether the creditor continues to have a right of recourse after there has been a non-judicial foreclosure, so that the property is no longer part of the estate and the liens have been extinguished. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP said no and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. View "Mastan v. Salamon" on Justia Law

In 1997, Michael Harris was convicted of eight federal criminal counts related to theft from an employee benefit plan. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison and ordered to pay $646,000 in restitution. He paid only a small fraction of that amount. The government later learned that Harris was a beneficiary of two irrevocable, discretionary trusts established by his parents for his support. In 2015, the government applied for a writ of continuing garnishment for any property distributed to Harris from the trusts. The trustees opposed the application on the ground that Harris had disclaimed his interest in the trusts, with the exception of several checking and investment accounts. The district court granted the writ and ordered the trustees to pay to the United States all current and future amounts distributed to Harris under the trusts. After review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Harris’s interest in the trusts qualified as property under the federal debt collection procedure that applied in this case. “The government is not attempting to compel distributions from the trusts. However, any current or future distributions from the trusts to Harris shall be subject to the continuing writ of garnishment, until the restitution judgment is satisfied.” View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The court filed an order denying Appellant Blixseth's counsel's motion and amended motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner's orders awarding attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs; denying requests for recusal, appointment of a new panel, conversion of the matter to a criminal proceeding, transfer of the matter to the U.S. Attorney, and holding of the awards in abeyance; and denying counsel's suggestion for reconsideration. The court concluded that the Commissioner correctly declined to award attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 against Blixseth and his attorney Michael J.Flynn for preparing appellees' statements regarding Blixseth's pro se response and Flynn's response to the court's order to show cause against Blixseth and Flynn ("fees-on-fees"), and correctly awarded fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. 1927 against Flynn for preparing the statements regarding Flynn's response. The court also concluded that Rule 38 is a damage provision authorizing award of "just damages;" the award of fees and costs under Rule 38 thus must be limited to appellees' direct fees and costs for defending against the frivolous appeal, and may not include the fees and costs incurred regarding the imposition of sanctions; and section 1927 is a fee-shifting provision allowing an award of fees-on-fees. View "Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal based on 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), which makes an immigrant inadmissible if he lacks a valid entry document "at the time of application for admission." Petitioner, a native of Bangladesh, was in the CNMI without admission or parole on November 28, 2009, when the immigration laws of the United States took effect in the CNMI. The court concluded that petitioner was an immigrant who lacked a valid entry document and was deemed by law to have made a continuing application for admission by being present in the CNMI, an application that was considered and denied during his removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Minto v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Cordis invoked the Class Action Fairness Act's (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), provision as the basis for removing to federal court eight products liability suits filed against it in California state court. Although the parties mostly agree that the jurisdictional requirements for removal under CAFA's mass action provision are met, they dispute whether plaintiffs' claims have been "proposed to be tried jointly." The district court held that plaintiffs' consolidation motion did not propose a joint trial of their claims, and remanded to state court. The court granted Cordis' petition for permission to appeal that ruling under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c). The court concluded that plaintiffs' request for consolidation for the purposes of pretrial proceedings, standing alone, does not trigger removal jurisdiction under CAFA's mass action provision. The court further explained that plaintiffs also requested consolidation for purposes of establishing a bellwether-trial process, but nothing they said indicated that they were referring to a bellwether trial whose results would have preclusive effect on the plaintiffs in the other cases. Therefore, the district court correctly held that removal jurisdiction does not exist under CAFA's mass action provision, and it properly remanded the cases to state court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dunson v. Cordis Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants alleging antitrust violations in connection with three categories of defendants' charged rates: unfiled fares, fuel surcharges, and special "discount" fares. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants colluded to fix the prices of certain passenger tickets and fuel surcharges on flights in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's holding that the filed rate doctrine does not preclude plaintiffs' suit. The court explained that the filed rate doctrine is a judicially created rule that prohibits individuals from asserting civil antitrust challenges to an entity’s agency-approved rates. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether the DOT has effectively abdicated the exercise of its authority to regulate unfiled fares. Therefore, the district court did not not err in denying summary judgment to defendants as to those fares based on the filed rate doctrine. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by finding that genuine issues of material fact regarding the DOT's exercise of regulatory authority over fuel surcharges precluded entry of summary judgment for defendants. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to apply the doctrine to discount fares given the questions of fact regarding whether the discount fares constitute the same product as the fares actually filed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's partial denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment. View "Wortman v. All Nippon Airways" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for sexual exploitation and attempted sex trafficking of a minor. The court concluded that, because the conduct charged in the indictment was substantially different from the conduct described in the jury instructions, the district court constructively amended the indictment. In this case, under the indictment, the government was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that defendant affirmatively knew of the victim's age, or, alternatively, that he recklessly disregarded her minority status. In contrast, the jury instructions afforded jurors a third option for convicting defendant: namely, they could convict so long as they determined that defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim. Therefore, defendant's conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a minor must be reversed. The court remanded for resentencing on defendant's single remaining conviction. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joann Davis and Paul Cilley filed suit against the United States and NASA officials, alleging, among other things, a claim for wrongful detention under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents. The court concluded that the federal agent involved in the detention was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for detaining Davis, an elderly woman, in a public parking lot for two hours, while she stood in urine-soaked pants, to question her, incident to a search, about her possession of a paperweight containing a rice-grain-sized bit of lunar material. The court agreed with Davis that, in light of Franklin v. Foxworth, the agent violated the Fourth Amendment because his detention of her was unreasonably prolonged and degrading. In this case, the agent was aware of several facts that color the reasonableness of his actions: he knew that Davis was a slight, elderly woman; Davis had lost control of her bladder and had visibly wet her pants; Davis and Cilley were unarmed and the search warrant had been fully executed; Davis had not concealed possession of the paperweights, but rather had reached out to NASA for help in selling the paperweights; and the agent knew that Davis was experiencing financial distress as a result of having to raise grandchildren after her daughter died, her son was severely ill and required expensive medical care, and Davis needed a transplant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over which California government entity would be responsible for funding the education of K.G. pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The School District contended that the district court erred in granting K.G. relief from its original judgment denying attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the district court did not apply the incorrect legal rule in evaluating whether to grant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) where the district court's determination that K.G.'s delay in pursuing Rule 60(b) relief was understandable in light of the original attorney's poor mental and physical health; K.G. was the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees because K.G.'s prayer was answered in full when the ALJ designated the School District as the responsible agency and granted K.G.'s requested relief; K.G. qualified as a prevailing party under the IDEA, and this victory was not trivial or merely technical; but it was not clear from the district court's award that it took into account forgoing considerations in reducing the fees originally requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Irvine Unified School District v. K.G." on Justia Law