Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The court filed an amended opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the denial of habeas relief, and order denying a petition for rehearing en banc. Petitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that the relevant state court decision, relating to petitioner's claims regarding (1) the use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; (2) the use of dual juries; (3) juror bias; (4) counsel's performance during the plea process; and (5) counsel's performance during the penalty phase, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before that court. The court concluded, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a "causal nexus” test, whereby not all mitigating evidence was considered under Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny. Consequently, this decision was contrary to established federal law and the court reversed, remanding with instructions to grant the petition with respect to petitioner's sentence. View "Hedlund v. Ryan" on Justia Law

SCAP petitioned for review of an objection letter sent by the EPA regarding draft permits for water reclamation plants in El Monte and Pomona, California. The court concluded that neither 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) or (F) provides the court subject matter jurisdiction to review the Objection Letter. The court explained that even when a state assumes primary responsibility for issuing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, EPA retains supervisory authority over state permitting programs under 33 U.S.C. 1342(d). In this case, the L.A. Board chose to revise the Draft Permits and retain control of the NPDES permitting process for the Plants, and the permits were issued through the State of California, not EPA. The court concluded that the appropriate avenue for SCAP to seek redress was through the State's review process. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Southern California Alliance of Publicly Owned Treatment Works v. EPA" on Justia Law

Defendants Crooked Arm and Shane appealed their sentences for conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703(a), 707(b), and 18 U.S.C. 371. Crooked Arm and Shane contended that they admitted only to misdemeanor conduct and cannot be sentenced as felons, an argument they cast as an Apprendi claim. The court explained that while Crooked Arm and Shane challenge their sentences in this appeal, the core of their claim actually appears to be a challenge to their felony convictions— the logical predicate of being sentenced as a felon is conviction of a felony. The court has already resolved any challenge to defendants' felony convictions in Crooked Arm I. Because Crooked Arm I disposes of their arguments, Crooked Arm's and Shane's challenges to their felony sentences fail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Crooked Arm" on Justia Law

S.H., the daughter of William and Chantal Holt, was born prematurely while the family was stationed at a United States Air Force (USAF) base in Spain. As a result of her premature birth, S.H. was diagnosed with cerebral palsy after the family returned to the United States. The Holts filed suit against the United States, alleging that officials at a USAF base in California negligently approved the family's request for command sponsored travel to a base in Spain ill-equipped to deal with Mrs. Holt's medical needs. The Holts also argued that S.H.'s injury first occurred upon their return to the United States. The district court awarded damages to the Holts. The court applied the foreign country exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(k), and held that an injury is suffered where the harm first impinges upon the body, even if it is later diagnosed elsewhere. Here, the undisputed facts of this case indicate that the force—the brain injury S.H. suffered at or near the time of her birth—impinged upon her body in Spain. Consequently, Spain is where the Holts' claims arose. The court concluded that S.H.'s cerebral palsy is derivative of the harm she sustained at birth. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "S. H. V. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder, appealed the district court's denial of his motion for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). In Jones v. Wood, the court held that a habeas court must either obtain and review the relevant portions of the record on which the state court based its judgment, or conduct an evidentiary hearing of its own. In this case, the court concluded that the district court failed to obtain and review the relevant portions of the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's claims. Consequently, the district court failed to perform the "independent review" of the basis for the state court's decision that Jones required. The court concluded that the State was clearly wrong in asserting that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) prevents a federal habeas court from reviewing the record and obliges it, instead, to accept the state court's description of facts on faith. Rather, it was clear that in order to provide adequate habeas review as contemplated by AEDPA, the district court was required to review the state court record. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal of the petition and remanded with instructions. View "Nasby v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Mavrix filed suit against LiveJournal for posting 20 of its copyrighted photographs online. The district court granted summary judgment for LiveJournal, holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(c), safe harbor protected LiveJournal from liability because Mavrix's photographs were posted at the direction of the user. In this case, when users submitted Mavrix's photographs to LiveJournal, LiveJournal posted the photographs after a team of volunteer moderators led by a LiveJournal employee reviewed and approved them. The court disagreed with the district court and concluded that the common law of agency does apply to this analysis and that there were genuine factual disputes regarding whether the moderators were LiveJournal's agents. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for trial. The court addressed the remaining issues that the district court addressed because these issues may be contested on remand. On remand, the district court must determine whether LiveJournal met the section 512(c) safe harbor threshold requirement by showing that the photographs were posted at the direction of the user, then LiveJournal must show that it lacked actual or red flag knowledge of the infringements and that it did not financially benefit from infringements that it had the right and ability to control. View "Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of injuries he sustained while he was housed in the county jail. On appeal, the county and Conmed, a private contractor, challenged the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Plaintiff argued that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under RCW 4.96.020. The court held that RCW 4.96.020 is a special statute of limitations as opposed to a typical tolling provision, and thus it is not applicable to claims filed under section 1983. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff filed his federal complaint after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired, and that his section 1983 claims were thus time-barred. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the section 1983 claims. View "Boston v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 53-year-old garbage truck driver, filed suit against USA Waste, his employer of 32 years, alleging wrongful termination based on age discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for USA Waste. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of USA Waste because plaintiff established a prima facie case under both his age discrimination and retaliation theories, and USA Waste failed to introduce any evidence that it had a legitimate reason for firing him. In this case, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, did not require proof of employment eligibility from plaintiff, and USA Waste could not make plaintiff's reinstatement contingent on verification of his immigration status because doing so would violate California public policy. Furthermore, plaintiff's use of an attorney was activity protected by California public policy, USA Waste fired plaintiff because he was represented by his attorney at the Settlement Agreement negotiations, and the district court erred by holding that USA Waste provided a legitimate reason for firing plaintiff. Therefore, the court concluded that USA Waste failed to meet its burden as to plaintiff's claim based on retaliation discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff's oral request for leave to amend the complaint eight months after the filing deadline. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santillan v. USA Waste of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants violated his Second Amendment rights by seizing firearms and ammunition he kept in his home, and then prosecuting him for the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. At issue was the constitutionality of California's ten-year ban on possession of firearms after a conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence. The court concluded that, because it has already upheld the more restrictive federal lifetime ban for persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in United States v. Chovan, the court must uphold the California law as well. The court denied plaintiff relief on his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution where the record reflects that his arrest and prosecution were based on probable cause that he possessed the weapons unlawfully. The court concluded that plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments claims based on violation of plaintiff's Miranda rights were not cognizable under section 1983. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's official-capacity claims against the Police Department, City Attorney's Office, and the California Bureau of Firearms, concluding that the Bureau is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and his remaining claims against the Police Department failed because he has not sufficiently alleged an underlying constitutional violation or otherwise identified an official policy or custom that was the "moving force" behind a potential constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fortson v. L.A. City Attorney's Office" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to unlawful reentry following removal and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, the district court erred when it applied the modified categorical approach to determine that his 2014 conviction under California Vehicle Code section 10851(a) constituted an aggravated felony. The court explained that it need not reach that question here because, even assuming Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder remains good law, the conviction fails to satisfy the modified categorical test at stage three, and therefore is not a qualifying predicate offense. In this case, in light of United States v. Vidal, the judicially noticable documents did not satisfy the requirements of the modified categorical approach because the record of conviction did not establish that he was actually convicted of a qualifying aggravated felony theft offense. Accordingly, the court agreed with defendant's alternative argument, vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. View "United States v. Arriaga-Pinon" on Justia Law