Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former student athletes, filed suit against T3Media, asserting claims for statutory and common law publicity-rights, as well as an unfair competition claim under California law. Plaintiffs alleged that T3Media exploited their likenesses commercially by selling non-exclusive licenses permitting consumers to download photographs from the NCAA's Photo Library for non-commercial art use. The district court held that the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., preempted plaintiffs' claims and granted T3Media's special motion to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. In this case, plaintiffs concede that their suit arises from acts in furtherance of T3Media's right to free speech. Therefore, plaintiffs must demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on their challenged claims. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to do so because the federal Copyright Act preempts plaintiffs' claims. The court explained that the subject matter of the state law claims falls within the subject matter of copyright, and the rights plaintiffs assert were equivalent to rights within the general scope of copyright. Because the district court did not err in granting T3Media's special motion to strike, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maloney v. T3Media, Inc." on Justia Law

When debtors filed for bankruptcy in 2013, PNC Bank filed a claim based on a 2007 note. Debtors objected, contending that the claim was barred by California's applicable four-year statute of limitations. PNC argued, however, that the claim was timely because the promissory note's choice of Ohio law incorporated Ohio's six-year limitations period. The bankruptcy judge agreed that Ohio's six-year limitations applied to this case. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. The court concluded that where a choice-of-law provision does not expressly include the statute of limitations, the court has construed it as silent on the issue. The court explained that where no statute of limitations is provided for a federal cause of action, the law of limitations of the forum state is followed. However, in this case, the court reasoned that the application of Section 142 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws compels the conclusion that California's shorter statute of limitations does not apply, because this case presents the sort of "exceptional circumstances" under which the 1988 version of the Second Restatement looks past the law of the forum, and applies a longer foreign limitations period. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. View "PNC Bank v. Sterba" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting undocumented immigrants. Over defendant's objection, the district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(A) for bodily injury because one of the passengers in the trunk of defendant's car sustained injuries. The court took this case en banc to resolve an intra-circuit conflict over the standard of review that applies when the court reviews a district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a given case. The court concluded that as a general rule such decisions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court explained that there is at least one situation in which de novo review is appropriate: determining whether a defendant's prior conviction is for a "crime of violence," as required under some provisions of the Guidelines. Applying de novo review in this case, the court concluded that the district court identified the correct legal standard by applying USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(A). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the standard for bodily injury had been met. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gasca-Ruiz" on Justia Law

The SBA guaranteed a loan between a private bank and Michael Bensal's company, BCI. The private bank filed suit against BCI as the borrower and Bensal as a personal guarantor after BCI defaulted on the loan. The private bank recovered a default judgment and assigned that judgment to the SBA. Bensal later received an inheritance from his father's trust that he did not accept and, instead, disclaimed. Bensal's disclaimer of the inheritance legally passed his trust share to his two children and prevented creditors from accessing his trust share under California law. The SBA filed suit seeking to satisfy the default judgment. The court held that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. 3301-3308, displaces California's disclaimer law. In this case, the court concluded that Bensal's disclaimer constitutes a transfer of property under the FDCPA, and California disclaimer law did not operate to prevent the SBA from reaching Bensal's trust share. The court also concluded that the portion of the default judgment based on the second loan, which was guaranteed by the SBA, was a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SBA v. Bensal" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of armed bank robberies and a firearm offense, appealed pro se from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside enforcement of the fine and restitution ordered as part of his criminal judgment. Defendant's judgment was entered during the time when the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 3613(b), provided that a criminal defendant's liability to pay a fine expired either 20 years after the entry of judgment or upon the death of the defendant. The court agreed with the district court that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MPVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227, and not the VWPA, applied in this case. The court explained that the MVRA's amendment merely increased the time period over which the government could collect those fines and restitution, and did not affect defendant's substantive rights. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Blackwell, Jr." on Justia Law

Unicolors filed suit against Urban, alleging copyright infringement of the Subject Design. The district court concluded that defendants were liable for copyright infringement. A jury found that Urban willfully infringed Unicolor's copyright in the Subject Design and awarded damages, as well as fees and costs. The court concluded that a district court may grant summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of copying when the works are so overwhelmingly similar that the possibility of independent creation is precluded. The court determined that the works at issue in this case met this standard. The court explained that, because of the decisive objective overlap between the works, no reasonable juror could conclude under the intrinsic test that the works are not substantially similar in total concept and feel. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Unicolor. The court also concluded that it is permissible to infer copying in this case, even absent evidence of access; the district court properly held that Unicolors had a valid registration in the Subject Design; and the jury's verdict finding willful infringement is therefore supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc." on Justia Law

This extensive litigation arose when Arizona clashed with the EPA over its State Implementation Plan (SIP) required under a new regulatory scheme codified in Section 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7491(b). The scheme required each state with emissions impacting protected federal lands to create a SIP describing how the state intended to make reasonable progress toward the national goal to improve air visibility in federal parks and forests. The EPA determined that Arizona could do better in improving visibility even if the SIP listed proposals to manage and reduce emissions from various industrial sources operated within the state. Arizona and several private companies (petitioners) subsequently objected to the EPA's most recent Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), which petitioners claim constituted invalid agency action. The court held that several of petitioners' objections to the FIP were not properly before it because they were not presented to the EPA during the notice-and-comment period. In regard to the remaining objections that were ripe for review regarding regulation of the cement kiln and copper smelters at issue, the court concluded that the EPA's emission-control measures were not arbitrary or capricious and thus constituted valid agency rulemaking. View "Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA" on Justia Law

Debtor was the former owner and operator of two towing companies, Yellow Logistics and Yellow Express. In this case, the bankruptcy court sanctioned the companies for violating the automatic stay by pursuing civil contempt proceedings against debtor based on his failure to pay discovery sanctions in a state court action. The court held that under In re Berg, civil contempt proceedings are exempted from the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code's government regulatory exemption, when, as here, the contempt proceedings are intended to effectuate the court's public policy interest in deterring litigation misconduct. Therefore, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred, and affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), though on a different basis than that discussed by the BAP. View "Dingley v. Yellow Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States and former FBI agent Joe Gordwin after plaintiff was convicted of robbery and sentenced to twenty years in prison based on manufactured and coerced witness testimony. Plaintiff alleged thirteen causes of action and sought punitive damages. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, but dismissed all of plaintiff's claims, including those against Gordwin. Plaintiff then filed this notice of appeal (NOA), which included Gordwin and the United States in the caption, but did not otherwise identify Gordwin or the claims against him in the NOA. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 lists the requirements for taking an appeal as of right in federal court. While no party raised an issue with plaintiff's NOA, the court sua sponte addressed the issue. Consistent with other circuits and the plain language of Rule 3(c)(1)(A), the court held that failing to name an appellee in an NOA is not a bar to an appeal. Therefore, any ambiguity about the identity of the appellees in plaintiff's NOA does not preclude the court's review of plaintiff's claims against Gordwin. The court rejected the literal interpretation of Rule 3(c)(1)(B), which stands in contrast to section 3(c)(1)(A), and applied a functional approach to plaintiff's case, concluding that his argument was more than sufficient to present the issue on appeal. Finally, the court concluded that the district court failed to distinguish between claims against the United States and claims against Gordwin when dismissing the case with prejudice. The court addressed the merits of plaintiff's other claims in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. The court reversed the judgment. View "West v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Nationstar and others, asserting claims relating to defendants' servicing of plaintiffs' home loan. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p; intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); and a violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Nev. Rev. Stat. 598.0915–598.0925, 598.0934. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims of violations of sections 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e pursuant to Ho v. ReconTrust Co. The court reasoned that Nationstar was not engaged in "debt collection" and thus defendants were not "debt collectors" when interacting with plaintiffs. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claim under section 1692f(6) on the ground that Nationstar was not collecting a debt. The court explained that, unlike sections 1692c(a)(2), 1692d, and 1692e, the definition of debt collector under section 1692f(6) includes a person enforcing a security interest. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that Nationstar threatened to take non-judicial action to dispossess plaintiffs of their home without a legal ability to do so. The court noted that such conduct is exactly what section 1692f(6) protects borrowers against. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claims of IIED and of violation of the DTPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Dowers v. Nationstar Mortgage" on Justia Law