Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, sought review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under the aggravated felony bar. Petitioner entered the country as a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to his first wife, a United States citizen. Petitioner's status as a conditional permanent resident was automatically terminated in 1997 due to his failure to file the required petition. The court concluded that, because petitioner was admitted as a conditional resident in 1995, he thus constituted, under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), "an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Consequently, petitioner was subject to the aggravated felony bar to waiver. The court denied the petition for review. View "Eleri v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are health care providers who furnish medical services to subscribers of employee health benefits plans. Defendants are health insurers, plan administrators, and/or claims administrators for the relevant employee benefit plans. These two cases involved reimbursement disputes: In DB Healthcare, Blue Cross determined that certain blood tests were investigational and thus excluded from coverage; In Advanced Women's Health Center, Anthem determined that the Center used faulty practices to bill for the tests and so was not entitled to reimbursement. At issue was whether a health care provider designated to receive direct payment from a health plan administrator for medical services was authorized to bring suit in federal court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court held before, and reiterated, that health care providers are not "beneficiaries" within the meaning of ERISA's enforcement provisions. Spinedex Physical Therapy USA Inc. v. United Healthcare of Arizona, Inc. emphasized this rule and held that a non-participant healthcare provider cannot bring claims for benefits on its own behalf but must do so derivatively. The court concluded that the providers in DB Healthcare lacked derivative standing because they do not hold valid assignments. The court also concluded that the Center lacked derivative authority because the claims fell outside the scope of those assigned rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "DB Healthcare, LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of broadcast stations and copyright holders, filed suit against FilmOn X, an operator of a service that uses antennas to capture over-the-air broadcast programming, much of it copyrighted, and then uses the Internet to retransmit such programming to paying subscribers, all without the consent or authorization of the copyright holders. Under section 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 111(c), a "cable system" is eligible for a so-called compulsory license that allows it to retransmit "a performance or display of a work" that had originally been broadcast by someone else—even if such material is copyrighted—without having to secure the consent of the copyright holder. So long as the cable system pays a statutory fee to the Copyright Office and complies with certain other regulations, it is protected from infringement liability. The district court granted partial summary judgment to FilmOn. The Copyright Office determined that Internet-based retransmission services were not eligible for the compulsory license under section 111. The court deferred to the Office's interpretation because it was persuasive and reasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller LLC" on Justia Law

Victor Messina and International Market Ventures (IMV), challenged their liability as relief defendants in the SEC's enforcement action against Phil Ming Xu and various Xu-related entities for federal securities law violations arising out of a fraudulent investment scheme. The SEC alleged that Messina and IMV received $5 million of the tens of millions of dollars Xu unlawfully raised through investor deposits worldwide, but Messina and IMV asserted that they received those funds as a loan. At issue was whether putative relief defendants may divest a district court of jurisdiction to proceed against them using summary procedures simply by asserting a claim of entitlement to the disputed funds in their possession. The court concluded that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine the legal and factual legitimacy of Messina and IMV's claim to the $5 million; the district court acted correctly under its precedent approving the invocation of relief defendant procedures in SEC enforcement actions and did not clearly err in finding that Messina and IMV had no legitimate claim to the funds; the evidence demonstrated that far more than $5 million was raised by Xu and his various entities in the United States, and the district court correctly concluded that the funds sought were proceeds of illegal activity and subject to disgorgement; and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in later ordering disgorgement from Messina and IMV as relief defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SEC v. Messina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Matteo Brunozzi and Casey McCormick, technicians for CCI, filed separate suits alleging that CCI's compensation plan violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207, and Oregon's statutory requirement that an employer pay all wages earned and unpaid after terminating an employee, ORS 652.140. Brunozzi also alleged additional claims under Oregon law. The district court granted summary judgment for CCI. The court held that CCI's pay plan violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. In this case, the diminishing "bonus" device in CCI's pay plan caused it to miscalculate the technicians' regular hourly rate during weeks when they work overtime and allowed CCI to pay the technicians less during those weeks. Consequently, the court reversed as to this issue and also reversed as to plaintiffs' claim under ORS 652.140. Having examined the text, context, and pertinent legislative history, the court found that the Oregon legislature intended the term "reported" in ORS 659A.199 to mean a report of information to either an external or internal authority. In this case, Brunozzi complained to his supervisors on several occasions that he was not being properly compensated for overtime. Therefore, the court reversed as to Brunozzi's retaliation claim under ORS 659A.199. The court also reversed as to Brunozzi's retaliation claim under ORS 652.355 where the act of complaining about inadequate wages was a protected activity. View "Brunozzi v. Cable Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

LMA filed suit against its excess insurance carrier, National Union, based on National Union's refusal to either contribute $3.75 million toward the settlement of claims brought by a third party or take over the defense. At issue was whether the district court erred in applying the rule in Diamond Heights Homeowners Association v. National American Insurance Co., instructing the jury, denying National Union's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), and awarding fees and costs. In Diamond Heights, a California appellate court ruled that an excess liability insurer has three options when presented with a proposed settlement of a covered claim that has met the approval of the insured and the primary insurer. The excess insurer must (1) approve the proposed settlement, (2) reject it and take over the defense, or (3) reject it, decline to take over the defense, and face a potential lawsuit by the insured seeking contribution toward the settlement. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the rule in Diamond Heights where National Union has not presented convincing evidence that the California Supreme Court would not follow Diamond Heights, and Diamond Heights is not distinguishable on its facts. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit prejudicial error in defining the standard of proof applicable to LMA's breach of contract claim; National Union's challenge to the bad faith claim failed because a jury could rationally conclude based on these facts that National Union acted unreasonably by refusing to take over the defense or approve the reasonable settlement, knowing full well of its obligations under California law; and the court affirmed the district court's award of fees and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and denied National Union's motion for certification. View "Teleflex Medical Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the EPA's federal implementation plan (FIP) under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, for the Navajo Generating Station in Arizona. The FIP was promulgated under the EPA's Tribal Authority Rule (TAR) that governs CAA requirements on tribal lands. The court concluded that the federal government's partial ownership of the Station does not eliminate any deference to the EPA's interpretation of the CAA and its implementing regulations; the EPA reasonably interpreted the TAR and the Regional Haze Regulations to conclude that the emission reductions deadline in 40 C.F.R. 51.308(e)(2)(iii) does not apply to FIPs for regional haze that are promulgated in place of tribal implementation plans (TIPs); the court deferred to the EPA's determination that the FIP alternative was "better than BART" for nitrous oxide emissions; and the EPA's decision not to determine best available retrofit technology (BART) for particulate matter was a reasonable exercise of the EPA's discretion under the TAR. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Yazzie v. USEPA" on Justia Law

The Tribe petitioned for review of the EPA's federal implementation plan (FIP) under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, for the Navajo Generating Station in Arizona. The FIP was promulgated under the EPA's Tribal Authority Rule that governs CAA requirements on tribal lands. The Tribe claimed that it was not adequately consulted about its interests before the plan was promulgated and objected to a proposed closure of the Station in 2044. The court concluded that no authority allowed it to treat this as a duty to consult, stemming from the general trust relationship with the Indian tribes. In this case, the record showed that the EPA did, in fact, consult with the Hopi Tribe throughout the rulemaking process. Furthermore, while the EPA did not participate in the Technical Working Group (TWG) negotiations, the DOI did. The court also concluded that the record belies the Tribe's contention that the EPA failed to analyze each of the five best available retrofit technology (BART) factors. Because the TWG proposal was an alternative to BART, the court concluded that there was no error in the EPA not analyzing the BART factors under the TWG alternative. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "The Hopi Tribe v. USEPA" on Justia Law

The court published an order previously denying the government's motion for a stay of a restraining order pending appeal. The order became moot when this court granted the government's unopposed motion to dismiss its underlying appeal. No party has moved to vacate the published order. The court voted to determine whether it should grant en banc reconsideration in order to vacate the published order denying the stay, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes in favor of en banc reconsideration. Therefore, vacatur of the stay was denied. Judge Reinhardt concurred. Judge Bybee, with whom Judges Kozinski, Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta joined, dissented. View "Washington v. Trump" on Justia Law

The court certified the following questions to the California Supreme Court: 1) Under section 980(a)(2) of the California Civil Code, do copyright owners of pre-1972 sound recordings that were sold to the public before 1982 possess an exclusive right of public performance? 2) If not, does California's common law of property or tort otherwise grant copyright owners of pre-1972 sound recordings an exclusive right of public performance? View "Flo & Eddie v. Pandora Media" on Justia Law