Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Grand Canyon University (GCU), a private university in Arizona, applied to the U.S. Department of Education to be recognized as a nonprofit institution under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The Department denied GCU’s application, despite GCU having obtained 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) recognition from the IRS as a tax-exempt organization. The Department concluded that GCU did not meet the operational test’s requirement that both the primary activities of the organization and its stream of revenue benefit the nonprofit itself.The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, upholding the denial of GCU’s application. The court found that the Department’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. GCU appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the Department applied the wrong legal standards in evaluating GCU’s application. Specifically, the Department incorrectly relied on IRS regulations that impose requirements beyond those of the HEA. The correct HEA standards required the Department to determine whether GCU was owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation and whether GCU satisfied the no-inurement requirement. The Department’s failure to apply these correct legal standards necessitated that its decision be set aside.The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to set aside the Department’s denials and to remand to the Department for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal standards under the HEA. View "GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY V. CARDONA" on Justia Law

A class of over 500,000 federal student loan borrowers sued the U.S. Department of Education for failing to process their borrower defense (BD) applications. The Department and the plaintiffs reached a settlement, which included automatic debt forgiveness for certain borrowers and streamlined adjudication for others. Three for-profit universities (the Schools) listed in the settlement as having substantial misconduct intervened, claiming reputational harm.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California approved the settlement and denied the Schools' motion to intervene as of right but allowed them to object to the settlement. The Schools appealed, arguing that the settlement caused them reputational and financial harm and interfered with their procedural rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Schools had Article III standing due to alleged reputational harm but lacked prudential standing to challenge the settlement because they did not demonstrate formal legal prejudice. The court found that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the Department was not moot, as the Department's voluntary cessation of issuing pro forma denials did not render the case moot. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the Schools' motion to intervene as of right, concluding that the Schools did not have a significantly protectable interest and failed to show prejudice from the denial of intervention as of right.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention as of right. View "Sweet v. Everglades College, Inc." on Justia Law

Several states challenged Executive Order 14026, which mandated a $15 minimum wage for federal contractors, and the Department of Labor (DOL) rule implementing it. The states argued that the executive order and the DOL rule violated the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) and the major questions doctrine, and that the DOL rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the states' complaint and denied their request for a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that the wage mandate did not violate the FPASA, the major questions doctrine did not apply, and the rule was not subject to arbitrary-or-capricious review under the APA because the DOL had to adopt the policy by executive order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the minimum wage mandate exceeded the authority granted to the President and DOL under the FPASA because the FPASA’s purpose statement does not authorize the President to impose a wage mandate without other operative language in the FPASA. The court also held that the major questions doctrine did not apply because the executive order was not a transformative expansion of authority. Finally, the court found that the DOL acted arbitrarily or capriciously by failing to consider alternatives to the $15 per hour minimum wage mandate, thus violating the APA. View "STATE OF NEBRASKA V. SU" on Justia Law

Dzung Ahn Pham, a former licensed physician, sought to withdraw his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Pham admitted in his plea agreement to conspiring with a pharmacist to prescribe and distribute over 150,000 narcotic pills, knowing he was doing so outside the usual course of professional medical practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. He later argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States, which he claimed required the government to prove that he knew he was not authorized under the CSA to issue the prescriptions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Pham's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court held that the indictment, plea agreement, and colloquy all incorporated the elements of the offense, including the standard of guilty knowledge required for conviction. Pham's admissions during the plea process were found to be consistent with the requirements set forth in Ruan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Pham's admissions to knowingly and intentionally issuing prescriptions outside the usual course of professional medical practice and without a legitimate medical purpose provided the requisite proof that he acted in an unauthorized manner. Therefore, Pham failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, and the district court did not err in denying his motion to withdraw the plea. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plea agreement and colloquy met the standards established by Ruan, and Pham's appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PHAM" on Justia Law

Consuelo Griselda Nerio Mejia challenged the denial of her disability benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA). After an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her application, concluding that despite her severe impairments, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy, Nerio Mejia filed a civil suit. She raised three objections to the ALJ's decision, but the district court only addressed her claim that the ALJ improperly rejected her symptomology testimony, finding that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for doing so. The court reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the case to the SSA for further proceedings.The United States District Court for the Central District of California found that the SSA's position was not substantially justified, making Nerio Mejia eligible for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). However, the district court reduced the fee award, excluding time spent on two additional issues that the court did not address, citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hardisty v. Astrue. The court concluded that fees for work on issues not decided by the court were not compensable under the EAJA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order reducing the fee award. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied Hardisty, which did not address the compensability of fees for undecided issues. The appellate court found that the district court's ruling was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart and the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Ibrahim v. United States Department of Homeland Security. These cases establish that a fully compensatory fee should be awarded when a plaintiff achieves excellent results, even if some issues were not decided. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to award the full amount of fees requested by Nerio Mejia. View "MEJIA V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

An Arizona state inmate, Michael Ray Fuqua, who identifies as a Christian-Israelite, requested a religious dietary accommodation to observe Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread. The prison chaplain, Jeffrey Lind, denied this request, arguing that Fuqua did not substantiate his request with appropriate documentation and that his beliefs were theologically inconsistent. Fuqua claimed that this denial forced him to either starve or spend significant money on commissary food, causing him physical and financial hardship.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of Lind on Fuqua’s First Amendment Free Exercise, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claims. The court found that Fuqua failed to show a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that Lind had legitimate reasons for denying the request. The court also held that RLUIPA only authorizes equitable relief, which was moot in Fuqua’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on Fuqua’s First Amendment and Equal Protection claims, finding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Lind’s denial was based on his own theological assessment rather than a neutral procedural rule. This could constitute a substantial burden on Fuqua’s religious exercise and intentional discrimination. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wood v. Yordy, which precludes suits seeking monetary damages under RLUIPA against state officers, and Fuqua’s equitable claims were moot. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "FUQUA V. RAAK" on Justia Law

The United States government initiated a civil forfeiture action to recover funds from Younes Nasri, a Canadian citizen residing in Dubai, alleging that the funds were ill-gotten gains from criminal activities. Nasri, who was indicted on racketeering and drug conspiracy charges, claimed innocent ownership of the assets held in foreign bank accounts. He argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the assets because neither he nor the assets had any ties to the United States.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted the government's motion to strike Nasri's claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the assets. The court also determined that the fugitive disentitlement statute did not violate due process and that Nasri qualified as a fugitive under the statute. Nasri appealed the decision, challenging the court's jurisdiction and the application of the fugitive disentitlement statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that due process requires a court to have control or constructive control over the property in a forfeiture action to establish in rem jurisdiction. The court found that the district court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction over the foreign assets, without sufficient control or possession, violated due process principles. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for the lower court to assess whether it had control or constructive control over the assets to satisfy due process requirements when asserting in rem jurisdiction. View "USA V. NASRI" on Justia Law

Dilesh Sharma pleaded guilty to attempted enticement of a minor for sexual purposes, distribution of child pornography, and receipt of child pornography. The district court calculated Sharma’s guideline sentence by starting with the base offense level for each crime and then applied enhancements, including a two-level enhancement for using a computer and a three-level enhancement for possessing at least 150 images. Sharma was sentenced to 288 months’ imprisonment for the enticement count and 240 months for each child pornography count, to run concurrently, along with a life term of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected Sharma’s objections to the computer-usage and image-number enhancements, which he argued were arbitrary and violated the Due Process Clause. The court found that the enhancements were rationally related to legitimate interests and upheld their application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Sharma’s facial due-process challenges to the enhancements. The court held that the computer-usage enhancement was rational when enacted and remains rational today, as it punishes the faster transmission of child pornography via electronic means. Similarly, the image-number enhancement was found to be rationally related to the legitimate interest of punishing offenders with larger collections of child pornography. The court concluded that Sharma did not meet his burden to show that the enhancements were irrational due to changed circumstances. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that neither enhancement violates the Due Process Clause. View "U.S. v. Sharma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., and Ticketmaster LLC, alleging anticompetitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs had purchased tickets through Ticketmaster’s website, which required them to agree to Ticketmaster’s Terms of Use. These terms included an arbitration agreement mandating that disputes be resolved by an arbitrator from New Era ADR, using expedited/mass arbitration procedures.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the clause delegating the authority to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrator was unconscionable under California law, both procedurally and substantively. The court also held that the entire arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the delegation clause and the arbitration agreement as a whole were unconscionable under California law. The court found that the delegation clause was part of a contract of adhesion and that the terms on Ticketmaster’s website exhibited extreme procedural unconscionability. Additionally, the court identified several features of New Era’s arbitration rules that contributed to substantive unconscionability, including the mass arbitration protocol, lack of discovery, limited right of appeal, and arbitrator selection provisions.The Ninth Circuit also held that the application of California’s unconscionability law to the arbitration agreement was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). As an alternate and independent ground, the court held that the FAA does not preempt California’s prohibition of class action waivers in contracts of adhesion in large-scale small-stakes consumer cases, as established in Discover Bank v. Superior Court. The court concluded that Ticketmaster’s Terms and New Era’s Rules were independently unconscionable under Discover Bank. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "HECKMAN V. LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC." on Justia Law

Orthodox Jewish families and schools challenged California's requirement that private schools be nonsectarian to provide special education under the IDEA. The families argued this requirement violated their Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements for their children with disabilities. The schools claimed the requirement barred them from certification solely due to their religious affiliation.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the case, ruling the schools and one family lacked standing and denying the families' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found the schools did not demonstrate they were "able and ready" to apply for certification and that the nonsectarian requirement did not affect the educational placement of one family's child. However, it held that another family had standing to challenge the requirement.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the schools' and one family's claims for lack of standing but reversed the dismissal of the other families' claims. The court held that the nonsectarian requirement burdened the families' free exercise rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements. It found the requirement was not neutral to religion and applied strict scrutiny, concluding the State failed to show the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The court vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further consideration of the injunction factors. View "LOFFMAN V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law