Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal agents learned that a previously convicted felon arranged the sale of a World War II-era Russian machinegun, which he acknowledged could not be lawfully transferred. The defendant, though not in physical possession of the weapon, set up the transaction between an undercover federal agent—posing as a firearms and drug trafficker—and a third party who actually had the gun. The agent and the defendant traveled together to complete the purchase, and the defendant was later arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the prosecution. A grand jury indicted the defendant for both possessing or transferring a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the machinegun charge, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen required invalidation of the statute, and also that the statutory exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) applied since the transfer was to a federal agent. The district court denied the motion, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Henry, which held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment, and on earlier cases interpreting the statutory exemption narrowly. At trial, the jury acquitted on the felon-in-possession count but convicted on the possession or transfer count, and the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) for transfers to the United States does not apply to transfers to undercover agents unless the transfer is authorized by the government for its benefit. The court also held that its prior decision in Henry remains binding, and that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment. View "USA V. KITTSON" on Justia Law

Several environmental organizations sued a California county, alleging that the county’s operation of the Lopez Dam and Reservoir had harmed the threatened South-Central California Coast steelhead trout by altering water flows and degrading downstream habitat. The steelhead population in Arroyo Grande Creek depends on high, pulsing freshwater flows for migration and spawning, but the dam’s operational schedule reduced these flows, impeded migration, and facilitated predatory species’ access to the creek. The plaintiffs claimed that these practices violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by causing unlawful “take” of steelhead and also breached California Fish & Game Code section 5937, which requires dam operators to maintain fish in “good condition.” The creek is also home to two other ESA-listed species: the California red-legged frog and the tidewater goby.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a mandatory preliminary injunction, compelling the county to take affirmative actions such as changing flow releases and implementing new habitat protection measures. The court ordered the county to consult with federal agencies about these measures but did not specifically weigh the potential harm to the frog and goby, which the county argued might result from the new water release schedule. Both sides presented competing expert evidence on the impact to all three species.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The appellate court held that when mandatory injunctive relief under the ESA could benefit one protected species while potentially harming another, the district court must consider the balance of equities and public interest as they relate to the other listed species. The court clarified that this balancing does not include economic or developmental interests but is limited to the welfare of other endangered or threatened species. Because the district court had not conducted this analysis, the injunction was vacated for further proceedings. View "SAN LUIS OBISPO COASTKEEPER V. COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a Nevada prisoner sentenced to death, challenged his conviction and sentence based on the claim that the prosecutor impermissibly used peremptory strikes to exclude three Black prospective jurors during jury selection. The underlying facts involve the murder of Ebony Mason in 1994, for which the petitioner was charged after being linked to the crime through witness statements and physical evidence. He was ultimately convicted of murder and related charges after a trial in which three of four Black prospective jurors were excluded by the prosecution.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner’s Batson v. Kentucky claims on direct appeal. It found the prosecutor’s reasons for striking two jurors—Emma Jean Samuels and Angela Smith—were race-neutral, as both had close family members with criminal convictions. The court concluded that, once these two strikes were deemed nondiscriminatory, they did not factor into whether there was a pattern of discrimination, and thus, the exclusion of the first Black juror, Gwendolyn Velasquez, was viewed in isolation, with no prima facie case found. The Nevada Supreme Court therefore did not require the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for striking Velasquez.On federal habeas review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the Batson claims regarding Samuels and Smith, finding no unreasonable application of federal law. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson by excluding from consideration the strikes of Samuels and Smith when assessing whether a prima facie case was established as to Velasquez. The appellate court vacated the denial of relief as to Velasquez and remanded for an evidentiary hearing requiring the State to explain its strike. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of equitable tolling for additional untimely claims and declined to expand the certificate of appealability. View "DOYLE V. ROYAL" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Punjab, India, who practices the Sikh faith and is a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Mann) political party, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture after entering the United States. He claimed to have suffered harm from rival political groups, specifically citing three incidents: a verbal threat to leave the Mann party, two brief physical assaults requiring minor medical treatment, and one night of detention by local police after the second assault. After the first assault, he relocated to live with his in-laws about 35 to 40 kilometers away, where he had no further problems for six months.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner credible but concluded that the incidents did not amount to past persecution and determined he could reasonably relocate within India to avoid future harm. The Immigration Judge denied all forms of relief and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the cumulative harm did not rise to the level of persecution and that the petitioner could avoid future persecution by relocating internally, given his prior successful relocation and evidence that low-level Mann party members faced no legal obstacles to relocation. The BIA also denied protection under the Convention Against Torture, finding the petitioner failed to meaningfully challenge the Immigration Judge’s conclusions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence. The court held that the alleged harms, viewed individually or cumulatively, did not compel a finding of past persecution and that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner could reasonably avoid future persecution by relocating within India. The court denied the petition for review. View "SINGH V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Two members of the Gypsy Joker Motorcycle Club were prosecuted for their roles in the kidnapping and murder of a former club member. The victim had previously been expelled from the club for theft, severely beaten, and later participated in a robbery at one defendant’s home. In retaliation, the defendants and other associates tracked down the victim, forcibly abducted him, and transported him to a remote location where he was tortured and killed. His body was subsequently found in a field. Both defendants held significant roles in the club, with one serving as chapter president and the other as a full member.Following initial arrests on state charges, federal prosecutors obtained an indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The indictment charged both men with murder and kidnapping offenses under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, kidnapping resulting in death, conspiracy to commit kidnapping resulting in death, and for one defendant, racketeering conspiracy under RICO. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, but the two appellants proceeded to trial. A jury convicted both on all counts except the racketeering conspiracy charge for one defendant. The district court sentenced each to concurrent life sentences.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that a VICAR indictment is sufficient if it tracks the statutory language, even without enumerating elements of the predicate state offense. The panel found no error in various evidentiary rulings, including exclusions of certain character evidence and expert testimony, as well as the admission of evidence regarding the club’s nature and culture. The court also upheld the jury instructions on VICAR purpose and consideration of punishment, and rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life sentences, citing binding precedent. View "USA V. DENCKLAU" on Justia Law

Several former employees brought a class action lawsuit against their previous employer, a fast-food chain, challenging three company policies: excessive wage deductions for the Oregon Workers’ Benefit Fund (WBF), failure to pay for interrupted meal breaks longer than 20 minutes, and deductions for non-slip shoes required for work. The WBF overdeductions occurred when the employer failed to adjust employee contribution rates as the state rate decreased, causing employees to pay more than their share. The company also required employees to purchase specific non-slip shoes, from which it received vendor rebates, and allowed the cost to be deducted from wages.In the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the plaintiffs prevailed on the WBF claims, with the court finding at summary judgment that the WBF overdeductions were willful, and that shoe deductions were for the plaintiffs’ benefit, leaving for trial whether the shoes were authorized in writing. The jury awarded substantial penalty wages for the WBF overdeductions, but the district court later reduced the jury’s award relating to shoe deductions, holding that written authorization was a defense. The court also denied class certification for the unpaid break claims, finding individual inquiry necessary, and refused to exclude class members who did not receive mailed notice or to reduce prejudgment interest for alleged plaintiff delay.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on willfulness regarding the WBF overdeductions and on whether the shoe deductions were for the employees’ benefit, requiring both issues be retried by a jury. The appellate court also clarified that written authorization was not a defense to minimum wage and overtime violations relating to shoe deductions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the unpaid break claims and on notice and prejudgment interest issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "GESSELE V. JACK IN THE BOX INC." on Justia Law

Several individuals operated two multi-level marketing businesses, Success by Health and VOZ Travel. Success by Health sold coffee, tea, and nutraceuticals, promising affiliates “financial freedom” through a compensation structure that incentivized recruitment over product sales. VOZ Travel, launched in 2019 to offset losses, purported to sell travel services, but never produced the promised products. Both businesses generated substantial revenues, largely through affiliate recruitment. One of the individuals, James Noland, was already subject to a 2002 permanent injunction prohibiting him and those acting with him from running unlawful multi-level marketing schemes.The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and related consumer protection rules. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction that froze assets and installed a receiver. Summary judgment was entered for the FTC on some claims, and after an 11-day bench trial, the district court found the defendants liable for operating a pyramid scheme, making material misrepresentations, and violating two consumer protection rules. The court imposed monetary damages, a permanent injunction barring participation in multi-level marketing, and, for some defendants, a civil compensatory sanction for contempt of the 2002 injunction. The defendants appealed only the scope and nature of the relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in all respects. The court held that challenges to the preliminary injunction were moot. It found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation and imposition of a civil compensatory sanction based on net revenues, nor in the award of monetary relief under Section 19 of the FTC Act without the need for prior administrative proceedings. The court also upheld the permanent injunction prohibiting future participation in multi-level marketing, finding it appropriately tailored to the defendants’ conduct. View "FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. NOLAND" on Justia Law

Rosa A. Camacho, a retired Class II member of the Northern Mariana Islands Retirement Fund, claimed that she was entitled to cost-of-living allowances (COLAs) as part of her retirement benefits. When Camacho entered the Retirement Fund in 1980, COLAs were not part of the retirement package. In 1989, the Commonwealth legislature amended the Retirement Fund Act to provide a two percent COLA. Over the years, this provision was repeatedly modified, suspended, and ultimately repealed in 2011. The Commonwealth’s financial difficulties led to a class action and a subsequent settlement agreement in 2013, which entitled participants to 75% of their “Full Benefits,” as defined by statute or guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution.The United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands held that Camacho was not entitled to COLAs under the settlement agreement, reasoning that COLAs were not constitutionally protected benefits at the time she joined the Retirement Fund and were discretionary by statute as of 2013. Camacho appealed, arguing that the statutory introduction of COLAs during her membership created a protected right under Article III, section 20(a) of the Commonwealth Constitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands the question of whether section 8334(e) of the Retirement Fund Act conferred a constitutionally protected accrued benefit in the form of COLAs for Class II members employed when the Act took effect. The Commonwealth Supreme Court answered in the negative, finding that COLAs were legislative policy adjustments and not protected contractual benefits. In accordance with this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit held that Camacho did not acquire a constitutionally protected right to COLAs under section 8334(e). The district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Camacho v. Northern Mariana Islands Settlement Fund" on Justia Law

A dancer who regularly performed at a Portland strip club called Sassy’s alleged that the club’s owners and managers misclassified dancers as independent contractors, thereby violating wage and hour provisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After the dancer filed a lawsuit regarding these alleged violations, one of the club’s partners, who also managed another club called Dante’s, canceled the dancer’s scheduled performance at Dante’s, explicitly citing the lawsuit as the reason. The dancer then amended the complaint to include a claim that this cancellation constituted unlawful retaliation under the FLSA.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision only provides a private right of action for retaliation committed by a current employer, and thus the dancer needed to have been employed by Dante’s at the time of the alleged retaliatory act. The court also found that the wage-related claims were time-barred and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision does not require the retaliator to be the plaintiff’s current employer, nor does it require the plaintiff to have been employed by the retaliator at the time of the alleged retaliation. Instead, the statute covers retaliation by any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the dancer was an employee of Sassy’s under the “economic realities” test and whether the cancellation of the performance constituted retaliation. The court also reinstated the state law claims for further proceedings. View "HOLLIS V. R&R RESTAURANTS, INC" on Justia Law

Robert Hutton secretly installed a hidden camera in the bathroom of his home and, over the course of about a year, recorded several nude videos and images of his 14-year-old stepdaughter without her knowledge. He edited some of the footage to focus on moments when the victim was visibly nude. The victim discovered the existence of these files after seeing a suspicious file name on Hutton’s phone and subsequently reported the matter to the police. A search of Hutton’s residence uncovered additional child pornography, including images of other minors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over a bench trial based on stipulated facts. Hutton was charged with sexually exploiting a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the images were not “lascivious,” that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that he did not “use” the victim within the meaning of the statute. The district court denied these motions, found Hutton guilty, and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Hutton’s arguments de novo where appropriate and for clear error regarding factual findings. The court held that existing Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Hutton’s arguments on all grounds. Specifically, the court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining the images were “lascivious” under the Dost factors, that § 2251(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that Hutton’s conduct constituted “use” of a minor under the statute. The court also held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. United States, which interpreted the term “use” in a different statutory context, did not undermine the Ninth Circuit’s precedent regarding § 2251(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. HUTTON" on Justia Law