Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Paul Osheske, a Facebook user, purchased a movie ticket on Landmark Theatres' website. Landmark Theatres, operated by Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., shared the name of the film, the location of the showing, and Osheske’s unique Facebook identification number with Facebook without his consent. Osheske filed a class action lawsuit against Landmark, alleging that this disclosure violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Osheske’s complaint, concluding that Landmark Theatres did not qualify as a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court reasoned that the activities of selling tickets and providing an in-theater movie experience did not fall under the VPPA’s definition of “rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the VPPA does not apply to businesses providing a classic in-theater moviegoing experience. The court determined that the statutory text and historical context of the VPPA indicate that the Act was intended to cover the rental, sale, or delivery of video products, not the provision of shared access to film screenings in a theater. Consequently, Landmark Theatres' conduct did not make it a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA. The court also noted that the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper, as the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. View "OSHESKE V. SILVER CINEMAS ACQUISITION COMPANY" on Justia Law

John Holcomb was arrested after his ex-girlfriend, J.J., accused him of sexual assault. During the investigation, officers obtained a search warrant for Holcomb's computer, which led to the discovery of videos depicting child sexual abuse. Holcomb initially consented to the search but later withdrew his consent. A second warrant was issued, allowing a broader search of his computer, which included a provision to search for evidence of "dominion and control" without any temporal limitation. This search uncovered the incriminating videos.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted Holcomb's motion to suppress the videos, finding the "dominion and control" provision overbroad and insufficiently particular. However, upon reconsideration, the court applied the good-faith exception, citing the lack of clear precedent requiring temporal limitations for such provisions, and denied the motion to suppress. Holcomb then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the "dominion and control" provision was invalid due to its overbreadth and lack of particularity. The court also determined that the good-faith exception did not apply because the warrant was facially deficient, and the plain view doctrine did not justify the seizure of the videos. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Holcomb's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. HOLCOMB" on Justia Law

SDVF, LLC registered a default judgment against Cozzia USA LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to enforce and collect the judgment. This judgment was originally entered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. However, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court later vacated the default judgment.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed SDVF's action to enforce the judgment, reasoning that the registered judgment was no longer valid after the underlying judgment had been set aside.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that a registered judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is not valid if the underlying judgment has been vacated. The court explained that the registered judgment relies on the existence of the original final judgment, and once the original judgment is vacated, the registered judgment cannot be enforced. The court also noted that neither Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the court's inherent equitable power allows SDVF to challenge the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's ruling in the Central District of California. Thus, the district court's dismissal of the case was affirmed. View "SDVF, LLC V. COZZIA USA LLC" on Justia Law

Law enforcement had specific information connecting Robert Hamilton to an unlawful shooting. When officers located him two weeks after the incident, he fled. During the chase, officers observed Hamilton reaching for his waistband, leading them to believe he was armed. After tackling and arresting him, officers found a gun, marijuana, scales, and cash on Hamilton.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Hamilton’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his arrest, concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him and that his flight and actions during the chase provided probable cause for arrest. The jury convicted Hamilton of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition but acquitted him of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court also applied a sentencing enhancement for possessing a gun in connection with another felony offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the officers’ initial attempt to stop Hamilton did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because he fled before they could do anything other than order him to stop. The court also found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Hamilton and that his flight and reaching for his waistband provided probable cause for arrest. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the evidence was obtained legally and in applying the sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed Hamilton’s conviction and sentence. View "USA V. HAMILTON" on Justia Law

Alison Mayfield, who is deaf and communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL), was pulled over by officers from the City of Mesa’s Police Department (MPD) for suspected reckless driving. During the traffic stop and subsequent DUI processing, Mayfield requested an ASL interpreter but was not provided one. Instead, officers used a combination of written notes, lip-reading, and gestures to communicate with her. Mayfield was ultimately charged with DUI but pleaded guilty to reckless driving.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed Mayfield’s claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), holding that her claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that she failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Mayfield appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Mayfield’s ADA and RA claims were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a ruling in her favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of her reckless driving conviction. The court found that the district court erred in considering the original DUI charges rather than the ultimate conviction for reckless driving and that the City of Mesa had not met its burden to establish the applicability of the Heck bar.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the relevant question was whether the means of communication used by the officers were sufficient to allow Mayfield to effectively exchange information during the stop and arrest. The court concluded that Mayfield failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that MPD discriminated against her by not providing a reasonable accommodation. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mayfield’s complaint without leave to amend, as amendment would be futile. View "MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA" on Justia Law

Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr., an Idaho death-row inmate, filed a lawsuit alleging that his execution by lethal injection would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Pizzuto sought discovery about the origin, manufacture, and acquisition dates of Idaho's execution protocol drugs. Idaho refused to respond, citing a state secrecy statute that protects the identity of execution drug suppliers. The district court found the information relevant and not protected by privilege, and ordered Idaho to respond to certain discovery requests, applying a "reasonable degree of certainty" standard to determine if the information would identify the drug supplier.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted Pizzuto's motion to compel discovery, finding that Idaho's secrecy statute did not create a federal evidentiary privilege and that the requested information was relevant. The court ordered Idaho to provide certain information, while allowing the state to withhold details that would, to a reasonable degree of certainty, identify the drug supplier. Idaho appealed the district court's discovery order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, as the discovery order fell into a narrow class of cases that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the disclosures, as Idaho failed to provide concrete examples of how the requested information would lead to the identification of the drug supplier. The court emphasized that Idaho's strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws, including the death penalty, must be considered, but found that the state did not show how its interests would be unduly burdened by the ordered discovery. View "PIZZUTO V. TEWALT" on Justia Law

A transgender student, Rebecca Roe, and the Sexuality and Gender Alliance (SAGA) at Boise High School challenged Idaho Senate Bill 1100 (S.B. 1100), which mandates that public school students use restrooms and changing facilities corresponding to their "biological sex." They argued that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and the right to informational privacy. Roe and SAGA sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from being enforced.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that SAGA was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims. The court found that the State's interest in protecting student privacy was an important governmental objective and that S.B. 1100 was substantially related to achieving that objective. The court also determined that SAGA did not show that the State had clear notice that Title IX prohibited segregated access to facilities based on transgender status. Additionally, the court found that SAGA did not demonstrate that S.B. 1100 violated the right to informational privacy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit agreed that SAGA did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its equal protection claim, as the State's interest in protecting bodily privacy was deemed important and the means chosen were substantially related to that objective. The court also held that SAGA failed to show that the State had clear notice that Title IX prohibited the exclusion of transgender students from facilities corresponding to their gender identity. Lastly, the court concluded that SAGA did not demonstrate that S.B. 1100 violated the right to informational privacy, as the statute did not necessarily disclose a student's transgender status. View "ROE V. CRITCHFIELD" on Justia Law

The Social Security Administration (SSA) overpaid a debtor, Cooper, before his Chapter 7 no-asset discharge in bankruptcy. Two years after his discharge, SSA recouped the overpayment by reducing his monthly benefits. Cooper moved to hold SSA in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge injunction.The bankruptcy court denied Cooper's motion, finding that equitable recoupment allowed SSA to recover the overpayment. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed, concluding that the overpayment and ongoing benefits were logically related as they arose from the same disability period and statutory scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the logical relationship test for equitable recoupment requires consideration of the equities, including the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. The court found that recoupment was impermissible where SSA sought to recoup overpayments from a bankrupt beneficiary who engaged in no malfeasance. The court emphasized that recoupment should only apply when it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of a transaction without meeting its obligations.The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BAP to remand to the bankruptcy court. The court clarified that the logical relationship test demands consideration of the equities and the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code in each individual case. View "COOPER V. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION" on Justia Law

In 1990, a group of California state prisoners filed a lawsuit alleging that the State of California violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide adequate mental health care in its prisons. The plaintiffs, who later achieved class certification, prevailed in a 1995 bench trial, and the State was found to be in violation of its Eighth Amendment obligations. Despite efforts to develop and implement remedial plans, the State remained noncompliant with court orders to reduce mental health care provider staffing vacancies to fixed levels.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued several orders over the years to address the staffing issues, including a 2017 order requiring the State to achieve a maximum ten percent vacancy rate for mental health care providers. By 2023, the State had not complied, leading the district court to establish a schedule of prospective fines for continued noncompliance. After finding persistent noncompliance, the district court issued final contempt findings in 2024, resulting in over $110 million in fines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to hold the State in civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the State failed to establish a substantial compliance defense or an impossibility defense. The court also held that the contempt fines were civil in nature and did not require criminal due process protections. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the fines to the extent they exceeded the State’s monthly salary savings and remanded the case for additional findings and analysis regarding the exact amount of fines to be imposed. View "Coleman v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Mahsa Parviz was convicted of making a false statement on a passport application and aggravated identity theft. Parviz lost her parental rights over her biological daughter, C.P., and was permanently enjoined from contacting her. Despite this, Parviz attempted to obtain a passport for C.P. by submitting false statements, including a fraudulent letter from a nurse practitioner, Bret Allen Parker, claiming C.P. was medically unable to appear in person due to a critical condition. This letter was crucial in bypassing the requirement for C.P. to appear in person for the passport application.The United States District Court for the Central District of California convicted Parviz on both counts. Parviz argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove she "used" Parker’s identity to commit passport fraud, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Dubin v. United States. The district court denied her motion for acquittal and sentenced her to 37 months for passport fraud and 24 months for aggravated identity theft, to be served consecutively. Parviz also argued for a sentence reduction for time served in Texas for attempted kidnapping, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show Parviz fraudulently used Parker’s identity, as the letter was central to obtaining the passport. The court also upheld the district court’s interpretation that "without lawful authority" does not require the means of identification to be used without the person’s consent. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to reduce Parviz’s sentence for time served in Texas and in imposing a special condition of supervised release prohibiting contact with C.P. View "USA V. PARVIZ" on Justia Law