Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Ronald Hittle, was the Fire Chief for the City of Stockton, California. He alleged that he was terminated from his position due to his religion, specifically his attendance at a religious leadership event. The City of Stockton, former City Manager Robert Deis, and former Deputy City Manager Laurie Montes were named as defendants. The City had hired an independent investigator, Trudy Largent, to investigate various allegations of misconduct against Hittle. Largent's report sustained almost all of the allegations, including Hittle's use of city time and a city vehicle to attend a religious event, his failure to properly report his time off, potential favoritism of certain Fire Department employees based on a financial conflict of interest not disclosed to the City, and endorsement of a private consultant's business in violation of City policy.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Hittle failed to present sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the defendants' statements and the City's notice of intent to remove him from City service. The court also found that Hittle failed to present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of religious animus by the defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The court concluded that Hittle failed to present sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the defendants' statements and the City's notice of intent to remove him from City service. Hittle also failed to present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of religious animus by the defendants. The court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor was appropriate where the defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Hittle were sufficient to rebut his evidence of discrimination, and he failed to persuasively argue that these non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. View "HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON" on Justia Law

Yuriria Diaz, a former employee of Macy's West Stores, Inc., filed a lawsuit under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for alleged violations of California's labor code. Macy's appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of all Diaz's claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of Diaz's individual PAGA claims, but vacated the order to the extent it compels arbitration of her non-individual claims.Previously, the district court had compelled arbitration of all Diaz's claims, interpreting the arbitration agreement between Diaz and Macy's to include non-individual PAGA claims. The court denied Diaz's request for a stay and closed the case, stating there were no remaining claims before the court.The Ninth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's order as a final decision with respect to arbitration. The court found that at the time of contracting, the parties consented only to arbitration of individual claims relating to Diaz's own employment. The agreement's language was strongly indicative of an intent to exclude any amalgamation of employees’ claims—including non-individual PAGA claims—from arbitration.The court rejected Macy's request that the district court on remand be instructed to dismiss the non-individual claims because under a recent California Supreme Court decision, those claims cannot be dismissed. The court remanded with instruction to treat the non-arbitrable non-individual claims consistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision, anticipating that the parties will, per their agreement, request a stay with respect to those claims. View "Diaz v. Macy’s West Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Steven Duarte, who was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a law that prohibits anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for over a year from possessing a firearm. Duarte, who had five prior non-violent state criminal convictions, was charged and convicted under this law after police saw him discard a handgun from a moving car.Duarte appealed his conviction, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated his Second Amendment rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Duarte, finding that the law was unconstitutional as applied to him, a non-violent offender who had served his time in prison and reentered society. The court held that under the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment as applied to Duarte. The court concluded that Duarte's weapon, a handgun, is an "arm" within the meaning of the Second Amendment, and that the government failed to prove that § 922(g)(1)'s categorical prohibition, as applied to Duarte, is part of the historic tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the Second Amendment right. As a result, the court vacated Duarte's conviction and reversed the district court's judgment. View "USA V. DUARTE" on Justia Law

The case involves pension plan participants, Evelyn Wilson and Stephen Bafford, who alleged that the plan administrator, the Administrative Committee of the Northrop Grumman Pension Plan, violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by not providing pension benefit statements automatically or on request, and by providing inaccurate pension benefit statements prior to their retirements. The district court initially dismissed the case, but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the dismissal, allowing the plaintiffs to file amended complaints.Upon remand, the plaintiffs filed amended complaints, but the district court dismissed their claims again. The plaintiffs appealed once more to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit held that the lower court's prior mandate did not preclude the plaintiffs from pleading their claim for violation of ERISA on remand. The court also held that the plaintiffs stated a viable claim under ERISA by alleging that the plan administrator provided substantially inaccurate pension benefit statements.The court rejected the administrator’s argument that there were no remedies available for the ERISA violations the plaintiffs alleged. As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "BAFFORD V. ADMINISTRATIVE CMTE. OF THE NORTHROP GRUMMAN PLAN" on Justia Law

Five registered gun owners in California challenged a state law, Assembly Bill 173 (AB 173), which permits the California Department of Justice (DOJ) to share information from its databases about firearm and ammunition purchasers and concealed carry weapon (CCW) permit holders with accredited research institutions. The plaintiffs argued that the law violated their right to informational privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and the federal Privacy Act.The district court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the right to informational privacy. The court reasoned that the personal information in the DOJ's databases was not highly sensitive or intimate and that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation that such information would never be disclosed. The court also found that AB 173 did not restrict conduct protected by the Second Amendment, as it did not impede the plaintiffs' ability to purchase, keep, carry, or use firearms. The court further held that AB 173 was not unconstitutionally retroactive, as it did not attach new legal consequences to past conduct. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Privacy Act preempted two California statutes relating to CCW permit applications, as neither statute required the disclosure of social security numbers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing with its findings and reasoning. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the right to informational privacy, the Second Amendment, or the Privacy Act. View "JANE DOE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The case involves Ninoska Suate-Orellana, who was ordered to be removed to Honduras in 2011 after her asylum application was denied. She reentered the U.S. illegally in 2014, and the Department of Homeland Security reinstated her prior removal order. Suate-Orellana filed a motion for reconsideration and termination of the underlying removal order, arguing that the Notice to Appear (NTA) in the original immigration proceedings was deficient under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) because it did not state the time or date of her hearing. The immigration judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Suate-Orellana’s petition for review of the BIA’s dismissal. The court found that Suate-Orellana had exhausted her claim that her NTA was statutorily deficient. The court also held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which bars reopening or review of an order of removal that has been reinstated, is not jurisdictional. The court concluded that the government had forfeited its claim that § 1231(a)(5) barred reopening in this case. The case was remanded to the BIA for reconsideration of the merits of Suate-Orellana’s claim in light of intervening authorities. View "SUATE-ORELLANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

A group of retirement and pension funds filed a consolidated putative securities class action against PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (collectively, PG&E) and some of its current and former officers, directors, and bond underwriters (collectively, Individual Defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that all the defendants made false or misleading statements related to PG&E’s wildfire-safety policies and regulatory compliance. Shortly after the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint, PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, automatically staying this action as against PG&E but not the Individual Defendants. The district court then sua sponte stayed these proceedings as against the Individual Defendants, pending completion of PG&E’s bankruptcy case.The district court for the Northern District of California issued a stay of the securities fraud action against the Individual Defendants, pending the completion of PG&E's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The court reasoned that the stay would promote judicial efficiency and economy, as well as avoid the potential for inconsistent judgments. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by entering the stay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the Moses H. Cone doctrine because the stay was both indefinite and likely to be lengthy. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the stay as to the Individual Defendants. The court held that when deciding to issue a docket management stay, the district court must weigh three non-exclusive factors: the possible damage that may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity that a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and judicial efficiency. The appellate court vacated the stay and remanded for the district court to weigh all the relevant interests in determining whether a stay was appropriate. View "PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASS'N OF NEW MEXICO V. EARLEY" on Justia Law

A man named Douglas Bradford was convicted of first-degree murder in a "cold case" that was solved 35 years after the crime occurred. The case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The trial judge excluded exculpatory evidence of another viable suspect, Joseph Giarrusso, who had dinner with the victim on the evening of the murder and was the last known person to see her alive.The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, ruling that the exclusion of the evidence was consistent with the rules of evidence and therefore did not violate the Constitution. The court also found that the evidence related to Giarrusso was not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about Bradford's guilt.Bradford appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the exclusion of the evidence violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the exclusion of the evidence was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. The court also found that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, ordering Bradford's release unless the state of California notifies the district court within thirty days of the issuance of the court’s mandate that it intends to retry Bradford without excluding the evidence pertaining to Giarrusso, and commences Bradford’s retrial within seventy days of issuance of the mandate. View "BRADFORD V. PARAMO" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a law student, Douglas Pell, who was studying at an unaccredited law school and was required to pass the First Year Law Students Exam (FYLSX) as a prerequisite to bar admission. Due to personal circumstances, Pell was unable to take the exam until his sixth opportunity. Despite passing on his first attempt, he was denied credit for 39 hours of courses he had completed after his first year of law school because he did not pass the FYLSX within the first three opportunities. Pell petitioned the State Bar of California for a hearing to excuse his delay and waive the forfeiture of his credits, but his petition was denied without explanation. Instead of petitioning the California Supreme Court to review the State Bar's decision, Pell filed a complaint in federal court.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Pell's case, agreeing with the State Bar that Pell had not suffered a cognizable deprivation under federal law. The court held that the California Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of admission, and challenges regarding the FYLSX or its authorizing statute must be brought by original petition to the California Supreme Court. The State Bar's denial of Pell's petition for a hearing and a waiver of his credit forfeiture was taken in the Bar's advisory role and did not result in a cognizable deprivation of a protected right or property interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Pell's federal claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, as the State Bar's actions did not cause Pell to suffer a cognizable deprivation under federal law. However, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also reversed the dismissal of Pell's state law claim under California's Unruh Act and remanded the case to the district court to exercise its discretion over whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction or dismiss the claim without prejudice so that it may be pursued in state court. View "Pell v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc., which operates a nightclub in San Jose, California, had its license suspended for thirty days by the city following a shooting outside the club. The city held an administrative hearing and found that Diamond had operated its venue in a way that caused the shooting and created a public nuisance, violating San Jose's entertainment business licensing provisions. Diamond filed a complaint in federal court, alleging First Amendment and due process violations.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which dismissed Diamond's claims and granted summary judgment for the City of San Jose. The district court ruled that the challenged provisions did not implicate First Amendment rights and that the city had satisfied due process requirements.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Diamond's facial attack on the city's public entertainment business licensing provisions failed because the provisions did not give city officials unbridled discretion that created a risk of censorship. The court also held that Diamond failed to state a procedural due process claim, as the licensing scheme provided Diamond with notice, an opportunity to be heard, the ability to present and respond to evidence, and a pre-deprivation appeal, followed by post-deprivation review by the California Superior Court. View "Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc. v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law