Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After petitioners disagreed with how the Tribal Council was governing internal tribal affairs, they submitted a recall petition to the Tribe's Election Committee. The Council subsequently disciplined petitioners for press releases that the Tribe described as inaccurate, false, and defamatory. The Council voted to withhold petitioners' per capita distributions and to ban them temporarily from tribal lands and facilities. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. 1303, against the members of the Council. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that petitioners' punishment of exclusion was not a detention sufficient to invoke federal habeas jurisdiction. The court held that, reading the ICRA's habeas provision in light of the Indian canons of construction and Congress's plenary authority to limit tribal sovereignty, the district court lacked jurisdiction under section 1303 of the ICRA to review this temporary exclusion claim. The court also explained that any disputes about per capita payments must be brought in a tribal forum, not through federal habeas proceedings. View "Tavares v. Whitehouse" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 600 month sentence and conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to import methamphetamine, and distribution of methamphetamine. The court concluded that district courts should apply the Ninth Circuit's two-step approach when considering a motion to suppress wiretap evidence where the reviewing district court judge must review de novo whether the application for a wiretap contains a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. If the wiretap application meets these requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c), then the district court judge should review for abuse of discretion the issuing judge's conclusion that the wiretap was necessary. In this case, the district court judge erred when it applied an abuse of discretion standard to both determinations made by the issuing judge. Based on a de novo review of both affidavits, the court concluded that they adequately explained why the interception of wire communications was necessary to investigate this conspiracy and the target subjects, and that they contained a full and complete statement of facts to establish necessity under section 2518(1)(c). The court also held that the district court's application of 21 U.S.C. 851 to enhance defendant's sentence did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights; the district court failed to comply with section 851(b) and the error was not harmless; and two additional procedural defects warranted remand. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by applying an upward adjustment under USSG 3B1.1 or in denying a downward adjustment under USSG 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was acquitted of murder, she filed suit against Detective Karen Thompson and Doe Defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Thompson violated her constitutional rights to compulsory process and a fair trial by intimidating and attempting to dissuade a key witness from testifying on behalf of the defense, and that Thompson and Doe Defendants conspired to violate her civil rights by orchestrating criminal charges against the key witness. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff adequately alleged misconduct by Thompson that rises to the level of substantial interference with a defense witness in contravention of the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; plaintiff pleaded a sufficient causal connection between Thompson's misconduct and the witness's unavailability; the fact that plaintiff was eventually acquitted does not render the witness's testimony immaterial, nor does it bar plaintiff's section 1983 action stemming from violations of her rights during the underlying criminal investigation and prosecution; the witness's testimony was material to plaintiff's defense because evidence of third-party culpability would have cast some doubt on the government's evidence at plaintiff's trial; and, likewise, plaintiff sufficiently alleged a plausible claim for civil conspiracy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Park v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 365 month sentence and conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court concluded that the government failed to prove a justification for the warrantless stop and subsequent pat down, and thus the search of defendant's person was unlawful; the evidence discovered during the pat down, the glass pipe and $1450 in cash, should have been suppressed; a Fourth Amendment search waiver cannot provide a justification for a search of a probationer where the officers were unaware of the waiver before they undertook the search; the government failed to prove a valid justification for the search of defendant's car and any evidence seized from the car, including methamphetamine in baggies, should have been suppressed; but the search of defendant's home was lawful and the evidence seized was admissible. The court further concluded that the district court's error in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found on defendant's person and car was harmless as to the conspiracy conviction. However, the court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this evidence did not contribute to the jury's verdict on Count 5, and thus the court vacated defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute and remanded. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to give a multiple conspiracies instruction under either an abuse of discretion or a de novo standard of review. Finally, the court concluded that the district court failed to make an express or explicit ruling, as required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, to resolve the disputed issues and thus the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Job" on Justia Law

The government obtained warrants authorizing it to seize roughly $100 million from bank accounts controlled by appellants, and asserted that the funds were proceeds from a criminal activity and thus subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 981. Appellants argued that, although they learned of the seizure shortly after it occurred, they did not receive notice pursuant to section 983(a)(1)(A) of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C.. 983(a)(1)(A), within 60 days of the seizure. The court concluded that section 983(a)(1)(A)(i) limited the applicability of the 60-day notice deadline to "nonjudicial" civil forfeiture proceedings. The court concluded that, because this case involved judicial forfeiture proceedings, this section does not apply. The court explained that the government could not have pursued nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings even if it had wanted to because the value of the property far exceeded $500,000. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Omidi v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se, filed suit against Chase, alleging claims for, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings, and a violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, as well as violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from damages allegedly suffered when she unsuccessfully attempted over a two-year period to modify the loan on her home. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase. The court concluded that the facts plainly demonstrated a viable UCL claim based on the ground that plaintiff was the victim of an unconscionable process. In this case, Chase knew that plaintiff was a 68 year old nurse in serious economic and personal distress, yet it strung her along for two years, kept moving the finish line, accepted her money, and then brushed her aside. During this process, plaintiff made numerous frustrating attempts in person and by other means to seek guidance from Chase, only to be turned away. The court also concluded that the district court erred in failing to acknowledge plaintiff's claim for breach of contract and remanded with instructions to permit plaintiff to amend if necessary and to proceed with her complaint. The court also remanded with instructions to permit plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege a right to rescind under Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. View "Oskoui v. J.P. Morgan" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to receipt of child pornography and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home computers pursuant to a search warrant. The district court concluded that the investigating agent did not deliberately or recklessly mislead the magistrate judge by omitting material information from the warrant application. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in finding that the agent did not act with at least reckless disregard for the truth because he omitted facts required to prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading, and had the omitted information been included, the application would not have supported probable cause. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded. View "United States v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for being a removed alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that the district court's failure to consult defendant's counsel before responding to a jury note, regarding defendant's removal date, violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 and the Sixth Amendment. The court concluded that the error was constitutionally harmful because much of the government's documentary evidence concerning defendant's prior removal contained demonstrable errors, and because defense counsel, had she been consulted, would have specifically requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the government was required to prove the removal date beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and strike the special finding. On remand, the court explained that the government may elect to retry the removal date issue before a sentencing jury, or it may request that the district court resentence defendant under the two-year sentencing provision in section 1326(a). Upon remand, the court instructed that the case shall be reassigned to a different district court judge. View "United States v. Bladimir" on Justia Law

Defendants challenged the district court's grant of plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss their action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from Richard Zanowick's exposure to asbestos, leading to terminal mesothelioma. Defendants claimed that the district court should have dismissed the action with prejudice due to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). After Richard died, Rule 25(a)(1) required plaintiffs to file a motion to substitute a new party for Richard, and plaintiffs failed to do so. In the meantime, Richard's wife and her children filed a new suit in state court. After the Rule 25(a)(1) deadline had expired, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the federal action voluntarily without prejudice. The court concluded that Rule 25(a)(1) permitted the district court to allow a late substitution if requested, and it did not require the district court to dismiss the federal action with prejudice. The court reasoned that, based on the record before the district court, both decisions were well within the district court's ambit. Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal without prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Zanowick v. Baxter Healthcare" on Justia Law

This appeal relates to a last-minute addition to the anti-retaliation protections of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, to extend protection to those who make disclosures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other laws, rules, and regulations. 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). At issue was whether, in using the term "whistleblower," Congress intended to limit protections to those who come within DFA's formal definition, which would include only those who disclose information to the SEC. If so, it would exclude those, like plaintiff here, who were fired after making internal disclosures of alleged unlawful activity. The Second Circuit, viewing the statute itself as ambiguous, applied Chevron deference to the SEC's regulation. The court agreed with the district court, and followed the Second Circuit's approach, that the regulation was consistent with Congress's overall purpose to protect those who report violations internally as well as those who report to the government. The court explained that this intent was reflected in the language of the specific statutory subdivision in question, which explicitly references internal reporting provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. Therefore, the court concluded that the SEC regulation correctly reflected congressional intent to provide protection for those who make internal disclosures as well as to those who make disclosures to the SEC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Somers v. Digital Realty Trust" on Justia Law