Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action against C.H. Robinson, alleging misclassification claims regarding overtime pay requirements. On appeal, C.H. Robinson challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the Incentive Bonus Agreement at issue was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. In regards to procedural unconscionability, the court concluded that, under California law, the degree of procedural unconscionability of such an adhesion agreement is low. In regard to substantive unconscionability, the court concluded that any argument that the judicial carve-out was not substantively unconscionable has been waived; the waiver of representative claims was not substantively unconscionable where the unenforceability of the waiver of a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Cal. Labor Code 2698-2699.5, representative action does not make this provision substantively unconscionable; and the venue provision, confidentiality provision, sanctions provision, unilateral modification provision, and discovery limitations are not substantively unconscionable. Therefore, the court concluded that the dispute resolution provision is valid and enforceable once the judicial carve-out clause is extirpated and the waiver of representative claims is limited to non-PAGA claims, and the district court erred in holding otherwise. The court reversed and remanded. View "Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired for theft and dishonesty from WinCo after twelve years of employment because she took a stale cake from the store bakery to the break room to share with fellow employees and told a loss prevention investigator that management had given her permission to do so. WinCo also determined that plaintiff's behavior rose to the level of gross misconduct under the store's personnel policies, denied plaintiff and her minor children benefits under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 1161(a), 1163(2), and denied plaintiff credit for accrued vacation days. Plaintiff filed suit for gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., a claim under COBRA; and wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., as well as corresponding state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for WinCo. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's discrimination claims where ample circumstantial evidence, as well as powerful direct evidence of a supervisor's discriminatory comments, raise a material dispute regarding pretext; if WinCo fired plaintiff for discriminatory reasons, she may be entitled to COBRA benefits and thus the district court erred in dismissing that claim; and, likewise, the district court erred in dismissing the wage claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mayes v. WinCo Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

CBD filed suit alleging that EPA violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, when it reregistered certain pesticide active ingredients and pesticide products without undertaking consultation with the Service as required by section 1536(a)(2) of the ESA (Section 7). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136(u), charges EPA with the obligation to register and reregister pesticide active ingredients and pesticide products. At issue are the 31 failure-to-consult Claims for Relief. In regard to the category one sub-claims, the court assumed, but did not hold, that EPA's issuance of a Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) is an agency action that triggers Section 7 consultation. The court need not decide whether the issuance of a RED is a triggering action because the court held that all category one sub-claims were properly dismissed by the district court as either time-barred or jurisdictionally barred. In regard to the category two sub-claims, the court concluded that these claims failed to identify an affirmative agency action that would trigger Section 7 consultation and affirmed the district court's dismissal of these claims. In regard to the category three sub-claims, the court agreed with the district court that the completion of pesticide product reregistration is simply a fact, and therefore it cannot trigger Section 7 consultation. Finally, in regard to the category four sub-claims, the court agreed with the district court that pesticide product reregistration is an affirmative agency action, but disagreed that those claims are barred by the collateral attack doctrine and require further amendments to the Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of attempted murders while he was under the influence of drug and alcohol, appealed the dismissal of his habeas petition. The court concluded that petitioner's petition was only partially exhausted and he should have been allowed to delete the unexhausted claims and proceed on the exhausted claims if his motion to stay and abey the case were denied. The court did not remand the case to allow petitioner the option of deleting his unexhausted claims because the district court should have granted his request to stay his case. Here, petitioner has established good cause because he was not represented by counsel in his state postconviction proceeding; at least one of petitioner's claims is not "plainly meritless;" and the state concedes that he has not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Dixon v. Baker" on Justia Law

Sharemaster filed an application for Commission review of FINRA's final disciplinary sanction. The Commission dismissed Sharemaster's application for review, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter under Section 19(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(d)(2), because there was no longer a live sanction for it to act upon after FINRA lifted the suspension. The court held that the Commission's interpretation of Section 19(d)(2) as limiting its review authority to final disciplinary sanctions that remain live is entitled to Chevron deference. However, the court held that the Commission unreasonably decided that the monetary penalty that FINRA imposed on Sharemaster was not a sanction and thus not a live disciplinary sanction. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. The court remanded to the Commission to determine whether, if Sharemaster prevails on the merits of its argument regarding the applicability of a registered-accountant requirement, the Commission may direct FINRA to reinstate Sharemaster nunc pro tunc. View "Sharemaster v. SEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against various prison officers and officials, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff's claims stem from allegations that he was beaten by prison officers while he was restrained in handcuffs and leg irons. The court reversed and remanded in regard to the excessive force claim because the record demonstrates that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether defendants' use of force resulted in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or suffering; affirmed in regard to the deliberate indifference claim against Officer Zimmer for failure to intervene because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and remanded with instructions to reassign to a different judge. View "Manley v. Rowley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that defendants sent unauthorized text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227; California Business and Professions Code 17538.41; and California Business and Professions Code 17200. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff has Article III standing under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins because plaintiff established a concrete injury-in-fact. On the merits, the court concluded that the FCC has established no rule that a consumer who gives a phone number to a company has consented to be contacted for any reason. Instead, FCC orders and rulings show that the transactional context matters in determining the scope of a consumer’s consent to contact. In this case, the court held that as a matter of law plaintiff gave prior express consent to receive defendants’ text messages where he gave his cell phone number for the purpose of a gym membership contract. Revocation of consent must be clearly made and express a desire not to be called or texted. The court joined its sister circuits and agreed that the TCPA permits consumers to revoke their prior express consent to be contacted by telephone autodialing systems. Here, the court held that, although consumers may revoke their prior express consent, plaintiff's gym cancellation was not effective in doing so here. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff lacked standing to bring his claim under the California Business and Professions Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 45-year-old man, was convicted of production and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) after he took sexually explicit photos of a 16-year-old girl (J.B.). The court adopted the plain meaning of the term "use," and agreed with the district court that the evidence presented by the government sufficiently established that defendant used or employed J.B. to produce sexually explicit images. The court found defendant's theory that he was not the man depicted in the photographs unconvincing where, among other things, J.B. identified defendant as the man in the photographs and testified that no one else took the photos. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. The court concluded that, although defendant's sexual relationship with J.B. was legal in Washington, the production of pornography stemming from that relationship was not. The court rejected defendant's constitutional challenges of overbreadth, vagueness, violation of the Tenth Amendment, and violation of the Commerce Clause. Finally, the court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Laursen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. On appeal, defendant argues that the government failed to meet its burden under the Lopez-Alvarez test to evaluate whether the government has met its burden under the corpus delicti doctrine. The court concluded that the government satisfied the first prong by introducing sufficient corroborating evidence that the core conduct of defendant's crime actually occurred. The court also concluded that the government introduced sufficient corroborating evidence to satisfy the second prong. Therefore, defendant's confession was adequately corroborated under the corpus delicti doctrine. The court explained that, because the confession is sufficiently corroborated, viewing all the evidence (including the confession) in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered into an unlawful agreement to serve as a scout for marijuana traffickers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Niebla-Torres" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the IJ and BIA's conclusion that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and order of removal. Petitioner's removal was based on his 1998 conviction for delivery of a controlled substance (heroin) under Oregon Revised Statutes 475.992(1)(a). The court concluded that section 475.992(1)(a) is overbroad in its definition of “delivery,” and the modified categorical approach may not be applied because section 475.992(1)(a) is indivisible with respect to whether an “attempt” is accomplished by solicitation. Therefore, the court held that a conviction for delivering heroin under section 475.992(1)(a) is not an aggravated felony. The court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Sandoval v. Yates" on Justia Law