Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Roseburg, alleging hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal civil rights laws. The district court granted Roseburg’s motion for summary judgment. In regard to the hostile work environment claim, the court held that Roseburg employee Timothy Branaugh's conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, and Roseburg knew about Branaugh’s misconduct and failed to take effective remedial action. In regard to the disparate treatment claim, the court held that plaintiff demonstrated the necessary prima facie case to survive summary judgment based on Roseburg terminating plaintiff's employment and breaking into plaintiff's locker. The court held that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to Roseburg’s discriminatory intent regarding those challenged actions. Finally, in regard to the retaliatory termination claim, the court held that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Roseburg’s proffered reason for terminating plaintiff was pretextual. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the claims of hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's other claims. View "Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Products" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against ARS, a debt collection agency, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The class consists of some four million people nationwide. At issue is whether the magistrate judge had the authority to exercise jurisdiction to approve the class action settlement without obtaining the consent of all four million class members. If so, at issue is whether the magistrate judge abused her discretion by approving the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court concluded that the magistrate judge had the authority to enter final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c); the court joined three of its sister circuits and concluded that the statute requires the consent of the named plaintiffs alone, not the consent of the four million class members not present before the district court; and section 636(c) does not violate Article III of the Constitution by permitting magistrate judges to exercise jurisdiction over class actions without obtaining the consent of each absent class member. The court concluded that the magistrate judge abused her discretion by approving the settlement because there is no evidence that the relief afforded by the settlement has any value to the class members, yet to obtain it they had to relinquish their right to seek damages in any other class action. Furthermore, ARS and the named plaintiffs likewise presented no evidence that the absent class members would derive any benefit from the settlement’s cy pres award. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Koby v. Helmuth" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between a flight attendant and the airline about her sick leave. Plaintiff claimed an entitlement to use her December vacation leave for her child’s illness without being charged points, under the Washington Family Care Act, Wash. Rev. Code 49.12.270(1). The Department determined that plaintiff was entitled to use her December vacation leave to care for her child in May, and the airline was fined $200 for violating the statute. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment against the airline’s preemption claim under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-188. The court concluded that the state law right and the collective bargaining agreement are inextricably intertwined. Minor disputes are preempted by the RLA and must be dealt with first through a carrier’s internal dispute resolution process, and then a System Adjustment Board comprised of workers and management. In this case, the court concluded that the question whether plaintiff could use her vacation leave in advance of her scheduled time for this purpose is to be determined by the dispute resolution process in the collective bargaining agreement, not by the state claim resolution process. Because the district court erred by rejecting preemption, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke" on Justia Law

Debtors challenged the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision that the claim of Kenneth Barton was not subordinated pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. 510(b), and converted debtors’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings to Chapter 7 proceedings. The court disagreed with BAP and Khan I. See Liquidating Tr. Comm. of the Del Biaggio Liquidating Tr. v. Freeman (In re Del Biaggio), holding that section 510(b) does apply when debtors are individuals. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it refused to subordinate Barton’s claims pursuant to section 510(b). In this case, Barton sought and obtained damages. Even though his damage award for conversion was based on the value of the securities at the time of conversion, his action did not arise out of the purchase of the securities and the risks that the purchase might entail. Rather, his actions arose out of debtors' conversion of the securities many years later. The court rejected debtors arguments that the bankruptcy court clearly erred when it found bad faith, and abused its discretion when it converted their Chapter 13 proceedings to Chapter 7 proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Khan v. Barton" on Justia Law

This case arises from a copyright dispute revolving around the Usenet. Giganews owns and operates several Usenet servers and provides its subscribers with fee-based access to content stored on its own servers as well as content stored on the servers of other Usenet providers. Livewire provides its subscribers with access to the Usenet content stored on Giganews’s servers. Perfect 10, owner of exclusive rights to tens of thousands of adult images, filed suit against Giganews and Livewire, alleging direct and indirect copyright infringement claims as well as trademark and state law claims. The copyright claims are at issue in this appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not err in requiring Perfect 10 to satisfy the volitional conduct requirement as an element of a prima facie case of direct infringement, and agreed with the district court that Perfect 10 failed to prove volitional conduct with respect to either Giganews or Livewire. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing much of Perfect 10’s direct infringement claim at the pleadings stage, nor did it err in granting summary judgment in favor of Giganews and Livewire on the direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement claims; concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to defendants and denying defendants' supplemental fee request; and held that the district court did not clearly err in refusing to add Perfect 10's sole shareholder and founder, Norman Zada, to the judgment against Perfect 10. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the procedure for contesting parking citations pursuant to the California Vehicle Code. Plaintiff filed a putative class action against various city officials alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for due process violations, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and Monell liability, as well as a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The court rejected plaintiff's claim for violation of procedural due process based on the Code's deposit requirement given the availability of prompt post-deprivation review and correction. The court explained that plaintiff's modest interest in temporarily retaining the amount of a parking penalty is outweighed by the City’s more substantial interests in discouraging dilatory challenges, promptly collecting penalties, and conserving scarce resources. The court also rejected plaintiff's substantive due process challenge, concluding that plaintiff has failed to allege conduct so egregious as to amount to an abuse of power lacking any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. Because plaintiff has not alleged a violation of his constitutional rights, he cannot maintain derivative constitutional claims based on that conduct. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and agreed with the district court's denial of leave to amend based on futility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Yagman v. Garcetti" on Justia Law

The Tribal Lending Entities challenged the district court's decision compelling them to comply with the Bureau's civil investigative demands. The court rejected the Tribal Lending Entities' argument that because the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Title X, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, defines the term "State" as including Native American tribes, the Tribal Lending Entities, as arms of sovereign tribes, are not required to comply with the investigative demands. The court concluded that, in the Act, which is a generally applicable law, Congress did not expressly exclude tribes from the Bureau’s enforcement authority. The court explained that, although the Act defines “State” to include Native American tribes, with States occupying limited co-regulatory roles, this wording falls far short of demonstrating that the Bureau plainly lacks jurisdiction to issue the investigative demands challenged in this case, or that Congress intended to exclude Native American tribes from the Act’s enforcement provisions. Neither have the Tribes offered any legislative history compelling a contrary conclusion regarding congressional intent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M-I, alleging violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681b(b)(2)(A). Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that a prospective employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) when it procures a job applicant’s consumer report after including a liability waiver in the same document as the statutorily mandated disclosure. The court also held that, in light of the clear statutory language that the disclosure document must consist “solely” of the disclosure, a prospective employer’s violation of the FCRA is “willful” when the employer includes terms in addition to the disclosure, such as the liability waiver in this case, before procuring a consumer report or causing one to be procured. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Syed v. M-I, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marcus Labertew, his wife, and John and Jennifer McDermott filed suit against Fred R. Auzenne and Loral Langemeier in state court, claiming that Auzenne and Langemeier defrauded Marcus Labertew and John McDermott. The parties settled the case with a Damron agreement. Plaintiffs dismissed their case pursuant to the agreement, and Langemeier stipulated to a $1.5 million judgment against her, a covenant not to execute against her personally and an assignment by her to plaintiffs of her rights against her liability insurers Chartis and 21st Century. Plaintiffs then applied in state court for writs of garnishment against the insurers, and the insurers removed to federal district court. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction, and that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, Arizona garnishment law applied. In this case, because the Labertews and the McDermotts had missed their ten day window for objecting, the garnishment failed, and under Arizona law the garnishees were discharged. The court concluded that, under Swanson v. Liberty National Insurance Co., the district court had jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding because it is a separate and independent civil action from the suit by the Labertews and McDermotts against Langemeier. The court also concluded that not only is there no federal judgment in this case upon which to execute, but there is also no state judgment against the insurance companies that could be registered and enforced in federal court. The court explained that this is a civil action in which plaintiffs are seeking to obtain, for the first time, a judgment establishing the liability of the insurance companies. Finally, the court concluded that the district court has discretion under Rule 81(c)(2) to order repleading. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded. View "Labertew v. Langemeier" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The IJ determined that petitioner was removeable based on her prior conviction under California Penal Code section 136.1(a), for witness tampering, because it is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. The court granted the petition for review with respect to the application for cancellation of removal, concluding that the IJ and BIA failed to consider the broad definition of “malice” in section 136, which indicates that the offense is not a categorical match to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court declined to reach the question of divisibility sua sponte. The court remanded to the BIA to consider whether section 136.1(a) is divisible and, if so, to conduct the modified categorical analysis. View "Duran Escobar v. Lynch" on Justia Law