Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In connection with an attempted purchase of a California residence, Kum Tat filed a motion to compel arbitration of a claim against Linden Ox. The district court denied the motion and Kum Tat filed this interlocutory appeal. The court held that the order denying the motion to compel arbitration was not an order from which section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1), permits an interlocutory appeal. In this case, Kum Tat's motion was neither under section 3 nor 4 of the FAA, and the motion expressly urged application only of California arbitration law and contained no citation to the FAA. Significantly, Kum Tat later emphasized that the motion was not made under the FAA. In the alternative, the court concluded that the district court's order was not clearly erroneous and did not warrant mandamus relief. Here, the district court did not clearly err in reserving for itself the question whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, nor did the district court clearly err in concluding the parties did not form a contract. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Kum Tat Limited v. Linden Ox Pasture, LLC" on Justia Law

After DEA agents seized $99,500 in cash from plaintiff's carry-on bag at San Francisco International Airport, the DEA sent plaintiff a notice on May 1, 2013, informing plaintiff that the money was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881 as a result of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. The notice stated that June 5, 2013 was the deadline to file a contest of the forfeiture. On June 4th, 2013, plaintiff's attorney tendered plaintiff's claim to FedEx for overnight delivery to the DEA, but the DEA did not receive the claim until June 6th. Plaintiff eventually filed a motion for return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), arguing that the DEA had wrongfully deemed his claim untimely and that the district court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction to toll the filing deadline. The district court held that it had equitable jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's motion, but denied plaintiff's motion on the merits. The court treated section 983(e) of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. 983(e), as a claim-processing rule. In this case, the district court correctly determined that it had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's motion for equitable relief because there is no clear jurisdictional limitation to CAFRA. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that he pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion. View "Okafor v. United States" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam suit against his former employer, Serco, under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging, inter alia, that the company submitted fraudulent claims for payment to the United States for work done under a government contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Serco. In Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that a government contract or regulation must expressly designate a requirement as a condition of payment in order to trigger liability under the theory of implied certification. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on relator's FCA claim for submitting false or fraudulent claims for payment under an implied false certification theory of liability. In this case, relator has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the materiality of Serco’s obligations to comply with ANSI-748 or provide valid EVM reports. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for relator given the demanding standard required for materiality under the FCA, the government’s acceptance of Serco’s reports despite their non-compliance with ANSI-748, and the government’s payment of Serco’s public vouchers for its work under Delivery Orders 49 and 54. The court also concluded that relator failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the submission of a false or fraudulent claim. Finally, the court rejected relator's conspiracy claim, FCA claim for wrongful retention of overpayments; and Tameny claim for wrongful termination. View "United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchasers of iPhones and iPhone apps, filed suit against Apple, alleging that Apple has monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market for iPhone apps. The court held that plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing pursuant to Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. The court agreed with the Third and Tenth Circuits and read Rule 12(g)(2) in light of the general policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressed in Rule 1. The court concluded that any error committed by the district court in ruling on Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of statutory standing under Illinois Brick, was harmless. The court explained that Apple is a distributor of the iPhone apps, selling them directly to purchasers through its App Store. Because Apple is a distributor, plaintiffs have standing under Illinois Brick to sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the sale of iPhone apps. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pepper v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayers argue that they did not earn taxable income and are exempt from paying taxes because they have taken vows of poverty. The Bethal Aram Ministries (BAM) is a church formed by taxpayers that provides maintenance to taxpayers. The court concluded that the tax court's determinations are supported by substantial evidence. In this case, the payments were quid pro quo payments for services in setting up corporations sole and limited liability companies and not contributions to BAM. Furthermore, taxpayers have complete dominion and control over BAM and its accounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the tax court's decision that payments received by taxpayers are taxable and that they are subject to self-employment tax. View "Gardner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Pure Wafer, a facility that cleans silicon wafers, filed suit against the City, challenging Ordinance No. 4856-1313. The Ordinance imposes limits on the pollutants that industrial users, like Pure Wafer, are permitted to discharge into the City’s sewer system. Pure Wafer claims that by enacting the Ordinance, the City impaired the obligation of its contract with Pure Wafer and committed at least two different breaches of contract. The district court entered judgment for Pure Wafer and awarded Pure Wafer a permanent injunction. The court concluded that the City has not impaired the obligation of its contract with Pure Wafer in violation of the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, because the Ordinance has not altered the ordinary state-law remedies to which Pure Wafer would otherwise be entitled if it successfully proves a breach of contract. The court explained that the City might very well have breached its contract but that does not necessarily mean it has violated the Contracts Clause. Therefore, the court reversed as to the Contracts Clause claim. The court agreed, however, with Pure Wafer's alternative claim that the City has breached the contractual obligations it undertook in the Development Agreement. In this case, the City agreed to accept such effluent as the parties knew Pure Wafer would need to discharge in order to maintain a viable business, and the City agreed to bear the financial risk that State-initiated regulatory changes would make complying with such promise more costly than it was when the parties entered into the Agreement. Therefore, the court concluded that the City may not force Pure Wafer to absorb the costs needed to bring the City into line with the terms of its Aquifer Protection Permit. The court explained that enforcing the Ordinance against Pure Wafer would eviscerate the benefit of Pure Wafer’s bargain; the City cannot do so without putting itself in breach of the Agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pure Wafer Inc. v. City of Prescott" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal based on his conviction for four counts of shoplifting, as well as his controlled substance conviction. The court held that INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), permits the Attorney General to waive only a ground of inadmissibility; it cannot waive a conviction that bars cancellation of removal. Petitioner was found to be inadmissible not on the grounds of his shoplifting or marijuana possession convictions, but because he entered without inspection. Consequently, the 212(h) waiver provision does not apply to his inadmissibility finding. In this case, petitioner's shoplifting convictions preclude him from seeking cancellation of removal and the court declined to reach his argument that treating a conviction for the possession of marijuana as a bar to cancellation of removal is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Guerrero-Roque v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arizona state prisoner and former pretrial detainee, filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging defendants' alleged policy of allowing female guards to observe daily, from four to five feet away, male pretrial detainees showering and using the bathroom. The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, concluding that Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the fact that plaintiff is a pretrial detainee is enough to distinguish his allegations from precedent concerning convicted prisoners; even if plaintiff were a convicted prisoner, plaintiff's allegations survive section 1915A dismissal because the scope and manner of the intrusions were far broader than those the court previously has approved; the allegations of plaintiff's bodily privacy claim, taken as true, warrant an answer; and plaintiff's allegations for his cruel and unusual punishment claim, taken as true, are sufficient to meet the low threshold for proceeding past the screening stage. The court noted that it may be that the prison’s up close and personal policy of female guards observing male pretrial detainees is necessary to ensure security and provide equal work opportunities in the prison. The court explained that such considerations and their legal effect are just conjecture at this point. And conjecture is not enough to dismiss a complaint under section 1915A. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the widow and children of the late spiritual leader of the Sikh Dharma faith, filed suit against defendants, alleging claims related to the control of two nonprofit entities associated with the Sikh Dharma religious community. Plaintiffs alleged several interlocking conspiracies and fraudulent activities designed to exclude them from certain management positions and to convert millions of dollars in assets from entities under the individual defendants’ control for personal benefit. The district court dismissed the complaint and concluded that plaintiffs' claims were foreclosed by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The court concluded, however, that based on the pleadings, plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the First Amendment’s ministerial exception and can be resolved by application of neutral principles of law without encroaching on religious organizations’ right of autonomy in matters of religious doctrine and administration. For the reasons stated in this opinion and in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Puri v. Khalsa" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry following deportation. The district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), concluding that defendant's prior conviction under section 273.6(d) of the California Penal Code for a violation of a protective order involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence was a categorical crime of violence. The court affirmed defendant's 46 month sentence, holding that a violation of California Penal Code 273.6(d) is a categorical crime of violence for purposes of USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). View "United States v. Acevedo-De La Cruz" on Justia Law