Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a law student, Douglas Pell, who was studying at an unaccredited law school and was required to pass the First Year Law Students Exam (FYLSX) as a prerequisite to bar admission. Due to personal circumstances, Pell was unable to take the exam until his sixth opportunity. Despite passing on his first attempt, he was denied credit for 39 hours of courses he had completed after his first year of law school because he did not pass the FYLSX within the first three opportunities. Pell petitioned the State Bar of California for a hearing to excuse his delay and waive the forfeiture of his credits, but his petition was denied without explanation. Instead of petitioning the California Supreme Court to review the State Bar's decision, Pell filed a complaint in federal court.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Pell's case, agreeing with the State Bar that Pell had not suffered a cognizable deprivation under federal law. The court held that the California Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of admission, and challenges regarding the FYLSX or its authorizing statute must be brought by original petition to the California Supreme Court. The State Bar's denial of Pell's petition for a hearing and a waiver of his credit forfeiture was taken in the Bar's advisory role and did not result in a cognizable deprivation of a protected right or property interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Pell's federal claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, as the State Bar's actions did not cause Pell to suffer a cognizable deprivation under federal law. However, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also reversed the dismissal of Pell's state law claim under California's Unruh Act and remanded the case to the district court to exercise its discretion over whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction or dismiss the claim without prejudice so that it may be pursued in state court. View "Pell v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc., which operates a nightclub in San Jose, California, had its license suspended for thirty days by the city following a shooting outside the club. The city held an administrative hearing and found that Diamond had operated its venue in a way that caused the shooting and created a public nuisance, violating San Jose's entertainment business licensing provisions. Diamond filed a complaint in federal court, alleging First Amendment and due process violations.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which dismissed Diamond's claims and granted summary judgment for the City of San Jose. The district court ruled that the challenged provisions did not implicate First Amendment rights and that the city had satisfied due process requirements.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Diamond's facial attack on the city's public entertainment business licensing provisions failed because the provisions did not give city officials unbridled discretion that created a risk of censorship. The court also held that Diamond failed to state a procedural due process claim, as the licensing scheme provided Diamond with notice, an opportunity to be heard, the ability to present and respond to evidence, and a pre-deprivation appeal, followed by post-deprivation review by the California Superior Court. View "Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc. v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

In 2022, the California Legislature directed Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) to extend operations at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, despite PG&E's previous plans to cease operations. However, the deadline for a federal license renewal application for continued operation had already passed. PG&E requested an exemption from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to this deadline, which the NRC granted. The NRC found that the exemption was authorized by law, would not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that special circumstances were present. The NRC also concluded that the exemption met the eligibility criteria for a categorical exclusion, meaning no additional environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act was required.Three non-profit organizations, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Working Group, petitioned for review of the NRC's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an NRC exemption decision. The court held that it did have jurisdiction, as the substance of the exemption was ancillary or incidental to a licensing proceeding. The court also concluded that the petitioners had Article III standing to bring the case, as they alleged a non-speculative potential harm from age-related safety and environmental risks, demonstrated that Diablo Canyon would likely continue operations beyond its initial 40-year license term, and alleged members’ proximity to the facility.On the merits, the court held that the NRC’s decision to grant the exemption was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court also held that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in invoking the National Environmental Policy Act categorical exclusion when issuing the exemption decision. The court concluded that the NRC was not required to provide a hearing or meet other procedural requirements before issuing the exemption decision because the exemption was not a licensing proceeding. The court denied the petition for review. View "SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE V. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION" on Justia Law

A group of telecommunications carriers, including Assurance Wireless USA, L.P., MetroPCS California, LLC, Sprint Spectrum LLC, T-Mobile USA, Inc., and T-Mobile West LLC, sued the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) over a rule change. The CPUC had altered the mechanism for charging telecommunications providers to fund California’s universal service program. Previously, the program was funded based on revenue, but due to declining revenues, the CPUC issued a rule imposing surcharges on telecommunications carriers based on the number of active accounts, or access lines, rather than revenue.The carriers sought a preliminary injunction against the access line rule, arguing that it was preempted by the Telecommunications Act, which requires providers of interstate telecommunications services to contribute to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) universal service mechanisms on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis. The carriers argued that the access line rule was inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was inequitable and discriminatory.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the preliminary injunction. The court found that the carriers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their express preemption claims. It held that the access line rule was not inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was not inequitable or discriminatory.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the carriers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. It held that the access line rule was not inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was not inequitable or discriminatory. The court concluded that the carriers had failed to show that the access line rule burdened the FCC's universal service programs or that it unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged any provider. View "ASSURANCE WIRELESS USA, L.P. V. ALICE REYNOLDS" on Justia Law

A group of individuals, including a minor, filed a class action lawsuit against Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. for alleged misrepresentations related to the mobile application Game of Thrones: Conquest (GOTC). The plaintiffs claimed that Warner Bros. engaged in false and misleading advertising within the game. In response, Warner Bros. moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the GOTC Terms of Service, which users agree to by tapping a “Play” button located on the app’s sign-in screen. The district court denied Warner Bros.' motion, finding that the notice of the Terms of Service was insufficiently conspicuous to bind users to them.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The lower court had found that Warner Bros. failed to provide reasonably conspicuous notice of its Terms of Service, thus denying the motion to compel arbitration. The district court focused on whether the context of the transaction put the plaintiffs on notice that they were agreeing to the Terms of Service, concluding that the app did not involve a continuing relationship that would require some terms and conditions.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding that Warner Bros. failed to provide reasonably conspicuous notice. The court found that the context of the transaction and the placement of the notice were both sufficient to provide reasonably conspicuous notice. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable due to its ban on public injunctive relief. The court concluded that the unenforceability of the waiver of one’s right to seek public injunctive relief did not make either this provision or the arbitration agreement unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "KEEBAUGH V. WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC." on Justia Law

In February 2022, Workers United sought to represent 90 employees at a Starbucks Reserve Roastery in Seattle. Due to rising COVID-19 cases, the Regional Director ordered a mail-ballot election, which took place in April 2022. Starbucks refused to recognize and bargain with the union, arguing that the Regional Director should have ordered an in-person election. The Regional Director overruled Starbucks' objection and certified the election results. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Starbucks' refusal to recognize and bargain with the union constituted unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.The NLRB's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Starbucks argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement application because the NLRB had severed the question of whether to adopt a compensatory remedy. The court rejected this argument, holding that the NLRB's order was final and reviewable under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).Starbucks also claimed that the Regional Director abused his discretion by ordering a mail-ballot election instead of an in-person one. The court rejected this argument as well, holding that the Regional Director had correctly applied the NLRB's own law in deciding to hold a mail-ballot election. The court affirmed the NLRB's finding that Starbucks had violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain. The court granted the NLRB's application for enforcement of its order directing Starbucks to recognize and bargain with the union. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. SIREN RETAIL CORPORATION DBA STARBUCKS" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over Montana's laws authorizing recreational wolf and coyote trapping and snaring. The plaintiffs, Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force and WildEarth Guardians, alleged that these laws allowed the unlawful "take" of grizzly bears, a threatened species, in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, limiting wolf trapping and snaring in certain parts of Montana to a specific period in 2024.The defendants, the State of Montana, the Chair of the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission, and the Governor, appealed the decision. They argued that the district court had erred by considering new arguments and materials submitted with the plaintiffs' reply brief, by applying the wrong preliminary injunction standard, and by finding a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to grizzly bears.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part and vacated it in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering new arguments and materials, as the defendants had an opportunity to respond. The court also held that the district court applied the correct preliminary injunction standard and did not abuse its discretion in finding serious questions going to the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.However, the court found that the injunction was geographically overbroad and remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the geographic scope. The court also held that the injunction was overbroad because it prevented the State of Montana from trapping and snaring wolves for research. The court vacated that part of the injunction and remanded the case for the district court to make proper modifications to the scope of its order. View "FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT CITIZEN TASK FORCE V. STATE OF MONTANA" on Justia Law

The case involves a consumer class action against Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. and Nutramax Laboratories Veterinary Sciences, Inc. (collectively, “Nutramax”), alleging that Nutramax violated the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act by falsely marketing its pet health product, Cosequin, as promoting healthy joints in dogs. The plaintiffs, Justin Lytle and Christine Musthaler, claimed that Cosequin provided no such health benefits. The district court certified a class of California purchasers of certain Cosequin products who were exposed to the allegedly misleading statements.The district court had certified the class based on the proposed damages model of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jean-Pierre Dubé, to find that common questions predominated as to injury. Nutramax appealed, arguing that the district court erred in relying on an unexecuted damages model to certify the class and that the element of reliance was not susceptible to common proof.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that there was no general requirement that an expert actually apply to the proposed class an otherwise reliable damages model in order to demonstrate that damages are susceptible to common proof at the class certification stage. The court also rejected Nutramax’s contention that the district court incorrectly concluded that the element of reliance was susceptible to common proof. The district court properly found that classwide reliance may be established under the CLRA through proof that a misrepresentation is material. View "LYTLE V. NUTRAMAX LABORATORIES, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes's pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year's imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.Fejes appealed the FAA's decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ's decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)'s reach.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes's petition for review of the NTSB's order affirming the FAA's revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes's argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes's conduct. The court also rejected Fejes's argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA's revocation of Fejes's pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "FEJES V. FAA" on Justia Law

A scientist with physical disabilities, Dr. Andrew Mattioda, sued his employer, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He alleged that he suffered a hostile work environment after informing his supervisors of his disabilities and requesting upgraded airline tickets for work travel. He also claimed he was discriminated against due to his disability by being passed over for a promotion.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim and granted summary judgment in favor of NASA on his disability-discrimination claim. The court concluded that Dr. Mattioda failed to allege a plausible causal nexus between the claimed harassment and his disabilities. It also held that NASA provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Dr. Mattioda for an available senior scientist position.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim, affirming that a disability-based harassment claim is available under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that Dr. Mattioda plausibly alleged a hostile-work-environment claim based on his disability. However, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for NASA on the disability-discrimination claim, agreeing that NASA had provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Dr. Mattioda for the senior scientist position. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MATTIODA V. NELSON" on Justia Law