Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In November 2014, the Voters of Maui County passed a ballot initiative banning the cultivation and testing of genetically engineered (GE) plants. The district court granted the GE Parties’ motion for summary judgment filed in the Robert Ito Farm action and granted the County’s motion to dismiss filed in the Atay action. The district court found the Ordinance unenforceable because it was expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, impliedly preempted by state law, and in excess of the County’s authority under the Maui County Charter. SHAKA appealed the district court’s judgment in both cases. The court concluded that SHAKA and other appellants have Article III standing based on the allegations of five individual appellants who allege that GE farming operations on Maui threaten economic harm to their organic, non-GE farms. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying SHAKA’s motion to remand to state court, and in denying SHAKA’s request for Rule 56(d) discovery. The court held that the Ordinance is expressly preempted by the Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 7756(b), to the extent that it bans GE plants that the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates as plant pests. The court held that the ban is not impliedly preempted by the Plant Protection Act in its application to GE crops that APHIS has deregulated, but is impliedly preempted in this application by Hawaii’s comprehensive state statutory scheme for the regulation of potentially harmful plants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and its dismissal in two related actions related to the ordinance. View "Atay v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

After the County approved a county ordinance prohibiting the growth, testing, and cultivation of genetically engineered crops, plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin and invalidate the Ordinance. Two public-interest citizens’ groups, Shaka and MOM Hui, filed motions to intervene. The magistrate judge granted Shaka’s motion to intervene but denied MOM Hui’s, finding that Shaka would adequately represent MOM Hui’s interests. The district court held that the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to rule on MOM Hui’s motion to intervene; any appeal from the magistrate judge’s order needed to be taken to the Ninth Circuit because the magistrate judge, having obtained the consent of the parties, had authority to enter a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1); and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear MOM Hui’s appeal. The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that a prospective intervenor is not a "party" as the term is used in section 636(c)(1). The court concluded that, because the magistrate judge had the consent of the parties and did not need the consent of MOM Hui, the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to rule on MOM Hui’s motion to intervene. Effectively presiding as a district judge over the suit, the court explained that the magistrate judge’s intervention order became immediately appealable to this court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Roberto Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

After Kauai County passed Ordinance 960 to regulate pesticides and genetically engineered (GE) plants, plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Ordinance. Plaintiffs are companies that supply seed for GE plants. The Ordinance requires commercial farmers to maintain “buffer zones” between crops to which pesticides are applied and certain surrounding properties, provide notifications before and after applying pesticides, and file annual reports disclosing the cultivation of GE crops. The Hawaii Pesticides Law, HRS Ch. 149A, and its implementing rules also regulate pesticides, including by imposing notification requirements and conditions of use, such as locations of permissible use. The district court held that the Ordinance's pesticide provisions are preempted by Hawaii state law. The court concluded that the Hawaii Pesticides Law preempts Ordinance 960's pesticide provisions because both address the same subject matter, the State's scheme for the regulation of pesticides is comprehensive; and the legislature clearly intended for the State’s regulation of pesticides to be uniform and exclusive. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to certify the preemption issues to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Hawaii Pesticides Law impliedly preempts Ordinance 960’s pesticide provisions; affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Hawaii law impliedly preempts Ordinance 960’s GE crop reporting provision in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition; and affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to certify. View "Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a child with a disability, sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring the Seattle School District (the district) to place their child in a general education class pending the outcome of the due process challenge. In May 2015, the Bellevue School District produced an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the child that encompassed two stages: The first stage would begin immediately and the second would begin at the start of the 2015–16 school year. Plaintiffs allowed the child to finish the school year in accordance with the first stage of the IEP but did not agree to the second stage. Over the summer, the family moved to Seattle. Just before the start of the 2015–16 school year, the district proposed a class setting for the child that was similar to the second stage of the May 2015 IEP. Plaintiffs objected and sought a “stay-put” placement. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that they had not established a likelihood of success on the merits. The court agreed with the district that a partially implemented, multi-stage IEP, as a whole, is a student’s then-current educational placement. In this case, stage two of the May 2015 IEP was the child's stay-put placement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "N. E. v. Seattle School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six states, filed suit seeking to block enforcement of California's laws and regulations prescribing standards for the conditions under which chickens must be kept in order for their eggs to be sold in the state. Plaintiffs seek to block enforcement before the laws and regulations take effect. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this case as parens patriae where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties because plaintiffs' alleged harm to the egg farmers in plaintiffs' states is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of parens patriae; plaintiffs' allegations regarding the potential economic effects of the laws, after implementation, were necessarily speculative; and plaintiffs’ reliance on cases granting parens patriae standing to challenge discrimination against a state’s citizens is misplaced where the laws do not distinguish among eggs based on their state of origin. The court also concluded that plaintiffs would be unable to assert parens patriae standing in an amended complaint. Because plaintiffs could allege post-effective-date facts that might support standing, the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action without prejudice. View "State of Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court unanimously held in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez that the BIA permissibly construed section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a), when it concluded that an alien seeking cancellation of removal had to satisfy the years-of-residence requirement on his own, without relying on a parent’s residential history. In this case, petitioner argues that Martinez Gutierrez announced a new rule of law and that, under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, its holding should not be applied retroactively to him. The court concluded, however, that petitioner's citation of Nunez-Reyes v. Holder in support of his argument for prospective application of Martinez Gutierrez is not persuasive. The court explained that this case is different from Nunez-Reyes where the court is not overruling its own firmly rooted precedent and the record offers no evidence that applying Martinez Gutierrez retroactively will risk the sort of broad injustice that concerned the court in Nunez-Reyes. Therefore, the court concluded that Chevron Oil is not applicable in this case and that Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder offers a much closer analogy to this case. Garfias-Rodriguez held that in this situation the proper approach to the issue of retroactivity is set forth in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC. Applying the Montgomery Ward factors, the court held that Martinez Gutierrez should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Lemus v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. After the district court made it clear that the base offense level for defendant's crime would be 34, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, based on his attorney’s erroneous advice that his base offense level would be 14. The district court denied defendant's motion, and sentenced him to 235 months in prison. The court held that common sense, the plain language of the guidelines, and the Sentencing Commission’s commentary, all show that U.S.S.G. 2G1.1(a)(1) only applies to defendants who are subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(1). In this case, defendant was not subject to 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(1)’s mandatory minimum and thus the district court erred in applying section 2G1.1(a)(1) to him. Because the error was not harmless, the court reversed the district court's base offense level determination, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Wei Lin" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, seeks bail pending a decision by the district court on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Defendant contends that he should be released on bail because if he prevails on his habeas petition, he will likely receive a reduced sentence of only 71 months, a period of confinement he has already served. In the habeas petition, defendant contends that his sentence is unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States because his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was enhanced under the similar residual clause of the Guidelines’ career-offender provision. The court explained that its precedent holds that a district court’s order denying bail pending resolution of a habeas petition is not a final decision subject to review under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and is not otherwise appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Nor is the order subject to interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) because a bail determination cannot materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Therefore, the court construed this appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s refusal to grant defendant's motion for bail. In this case, the district court did not commit clear error in denying the request for bail where defendant has failed to show either a high probability of success on the merits of his habeas petition or special circumstances that would warrant his release on bail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "United States v. McCandless" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, she was sentenced to a 172 months in prison. The United States Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the sentencing range for defendant's crime and she moved to reduce her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) permits such reductions when the Commission has lowered the applicable Guidelines range after sentencing. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. When granting a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), a court cannot reduce the sentence to a term “that is less than the minimum of the amended [G]uideline[s] range.” There is an exception to this rule for a defendant who originally received a below-Guidelines sentence as the result of “a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities.” The court held that the government's conduct in this case did not amount to a motion and the commentary to Guidelines 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) buttresses this conclusion. The court also rejected defendant's arguments regarding the canon of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Finazzo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after his earlier California conviction for the same conduct. At issue is whether the district court erred by denying his motion to compel information he contends will support a motion to dismiss the federal indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that defendant failed to either make the requisite showing of materiality under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or adequately challenge the government’s representation that it does not have any Brady material. In this case, defendant's proffer is insufficient to compel the government to provide the information he seeks and thus the district court did not err in denying his request for that information. View "United States v. Lucas" on Justia Law