Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Leslie Feldman and others filed suit challenging Arizona House Bill 2023 (H.B. 2023), which precludes individuals who do not fall into one of several exceptions (e.g., election officials, mail carriers, family members, household members, and specified caregivers) from collecting early ballots from another person. Plaintiff argues that this state statute violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment because, among other things, it disproportionately and adversely impacts minorities, unjustifiably burdens the right to vote, and interferes with the freedom of association. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff filed this emergency interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on her Voting Rights Act claim. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff adduced no evidence showing that H.B. 2023 would have an impact on minorities different than the impact on non-minorities, let alone that the impact would result in less opportunity for minorities to participate in the political process as compared to non-minorities. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that H.B. 2023 imposed a minimal burden on voters’ Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, in finding that Arizona asserted sufficiently weighty interests justifying the limitation, and in ultimately concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that she was likely to succeed on the merits of her Fourteenth Amendment challenge. The court also concluded that ballot collection is not expressive conduct implicating the First Amendment, but even if it were, Arizona has an important regulatory interest justifying the minimal burden that H.B. 2023 imposes on freedom of association. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her First Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff is not only unlikely to prevail on the merits, but, as the district court concluded, her interest in avoiding possible irreparable harm does not outweigh Arizona’s and the public’s mutual interests in the enforcement of H.B. 2023 pending final resolution of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law

After the district court denied attorney Larry Klayman's application to be admitted pro hac vice in the high-profile criminal trial of Cliven Bundy, Bundy sought a writ of mandamus to force the district court to admit Klayman. The court denied relief, concluding that the district court had more than ample cause to turn down Klayman’s application: he is involved in an ethics proceeding before the District of Columbia Bar, and he was not candid with the court about the status of those proceedings; he disclosed that he was twice barred in perpetuity from appearing pro hac vice before judges in the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York, but he failed to list numerous cases—all available on Westlaw or LEXIS—in which he has been reprimanded, denied pro hac vice status, or otherwise sanctioned for violating various local rules; and he has a record of going after judges personally, and shortly after Chief Judge Gloria Navarro denied his application, Bundy filed a frivolous Bivens action against her in her own court. View "Bundy v. US District Court for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Barker filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition; the bankruptcy court issued a notice that the deadline for creditors to file a proof of claim was January 8, 2013. On September 8, 2012, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center sent the notice to the Credit Union by first class mail. In September 2012, Barker filed her Chapter 13 plan, which was sent to the Credit Union that day via first class mail. Barker’s schedules of assets and liabilities listed the Credit Union as a secured creditor holding a $6,646.00 purchase money security interest in a Ford F-150 and as an unsecured creditor holding a $47,402.00 claim. Barker amended the plan several times over the next few months. Each time, Barker sent a notice to the Credit Union; the Bankruptcy Noticing Center notified the Credit Union of each court order. More than four months after the deadline expired, the Credit Union filed claims. The Trustee sent a “Notice of Late Filed Claims” to the Credit Union, which requested a hearing, asserting that a “disgruntled employee” failed to timely file the claims. The court disallowed the claims. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. If a creditor wishes to participate in the distribution of assets under a Chapter 13 plan, it must file a timely proof of claim. The debtor’s acknowledgment of debt in a bankruptcy schedule does not relieve the creditor of this affirmative duty. View "Spokane Law Enforcement Federal Credit Union v. Barker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Hospital and the Union under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, alleging that the Hospital’s failure to allow her to “bump” back to her prior Ward Clerk position violated a 2007 Seniority Agreement and a 2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Plaintiff also alleged that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to pursue her grievance on this issue. Plaintiff settled her suit against the hospital and the district court granted summary judgment to the Union. The court rejected the Union's argument that the Seniority Agreement is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule or was superseded by the 2008 CBA. The court concluded that plaintiff has shown a violation of the Security Agreement and the CBA. The court also concluded that, if plaintiff's evidence is believed, she has shown a violation of the Union’s duty of fair representation. In this case, there is ample evidence showing that the Union acted improperly by failing to put plaintiff's claims through the Union's own formal mechanisms for reviewing the merits of grievances, by including plaintiff in a class action grievance that did not raise her specific claim, and by providing weak or invalid justifications for rejecting her claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative securities class action against defendants in connection with public statements made about Arena’s weight-loss drug, lorcaserin. When Arena filed its application with the FDA, the FDA’s advisory panel published a briefing document that disclosed, for the first time, that Arena had been in a “highly unusual” back-and-forth with the FDA regarding the results of cancer studies on rats (the “Rat Study”). Plaintiff filed suit after news of the Rat Study broke. The district court dismissed the First, Second, and Proposed Third Amended Complaints. The court agreed that once defendants touted the safety and likely approval of the drug based on animal studies, defendants were obligated to disclose the Rat Study's existence to the market. The court concluded that plaintiff has alleged scienter with sufficient particularity to survive a motion to dismiss. In this case, there is no question that plaintiff has alleged that defendants knew that the Rat Study existed, that defendants knew that the FDA’s request for bi-monthly reports and follow-up studies was highly unusual and out-of-process, and defendants went ahead and told investors about their confidence in lorcaserin’s approval based on preclinical animal studies. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff has properly pleaded scienter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4. The court reversed and remanded. View "Schwartz v. Arena Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a prison official retaliated against him for reporting a correctional officer and the officer's use of excessive force while escorting plaintiff to a holding cell. The district court granted the official's motion for summary judgment. The court rejected the official's claim that Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 3335(a) required him to transfer plaintiff to administrative segregation as soon as plaintiff alleged that the officer assaulted him. The court concluded that plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer retaliated against him and that plaintiff has shown that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court affirmed the jury verdict for the officer in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. View "Shepard v. Wise" on Justia Law

The NMFS used climate projections to determine that the loss of sea ice over shallow waters in the Arctic would leave the Pacific bearded seal subspecies endangered by the year 2095. Plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the NMFS's listing decision regarding the Okhotsk and Beringia distinct population segments (DPS) of the Pacific bearded seal subspecies under the Endangered Species Act's (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g), citizen suit provision, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The district court denied relief with respect to the Okhotsk DPS for lack of Article III standing, but granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their challenge to NMFS’s decision to list the Beringia DPS as a threatened species. The district court vacated the Listing Rule. The court held that, in light of the robustness of NMFS’s rulemaking process, as well as the court's highly deferential standard of review, NMFS’s final rule listing the Beringia DPS as threatened was not arbitrary or capricious, and its listing decision was supported by substantial evidence. Finally, the court concluded that NMFS clearly fulfilled its procedural and substantive obligations under Section 4(i) of the ESA to provide Alaska with a written justification. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, seeks review of the denial of her application for a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of her status to that of a lawful permanent resident. At issue is a question of first impression for the federal courts: Has an alien “reentered” the United States for the purpose of reinstating a removal order, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), when she was previously removed at a border-crossing checkpoint? The court held that that when, as here, an alien is issued an expedited removal order at a U.S. border-crossing checkpoint, that alien has entered the United States for the purpose of the reinstatement provision’s “reentry” requirement. The court applied the plain meaning of the provision in question and, under this definition, petitioner entered the country when she left Mexico and came into the sovereign territory of the United States at the San Ysidro border-crossing station. The court noted that its decision—which is limited to the reinstatement provision’s definition of “reentry”—does not disturb the longstanding common-law definition. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tellez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CarMax, alleging violations of four California consumer protection laws: (1) the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); (2) the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly); (3) common law fraud and deceit; and (4) the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Plaintiff's claims under the CLRA and UCL were both based on CarMax’s alleged violation of California Vehicle Code section 11713.18(a)(6), which requires a car dealer to provide consumers with a “completed inspection report” prior to the sale of any “certified” vehicle. The district court dismissed the fraud and Song-Beverly claims and granted CarMax summary judgment on his CLRA and UCL claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err in exercising diversity-based subject matter jurisdiction over his case. The court concluded that when the potential cost of complying with injunctive relief is considered along with plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages and punitive damages, the district court did not err in finding that the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied. The court held that a report, like the ones in this case, that fails to indicate the results of an inspection in a manner that conveys the condition of individual car components to a buyer is not a "completed inspection report" under California law. The court noted that if CarMax’s generic, and ultimately uninformative, list of components inspected were considered a “completed inspection report,” section 11713.18(a)(6)’s effectiveness in promoting transparency in the sale of certified cars would be substantially diminished. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment to CarMax on the CLRA and UCL claims. View "Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar claim in separate applications that removal would result in hardship to their respective sons, who were United States citizens under 21 years of age at the time of the application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D). While these applications were pending, petitioners’ sons turned 21 and no longer met the statutory definition of “child,” pursuant to section 1101(b)(1). The BIA denied relief. The court concluded that, because the BIA offered a reasonable interpretation of section 1229b, the IJ in each case did not err in considering whether Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar had a qualifying relative for purposes of the hardship requirement as of the time of the decision on the application for cancellation of removal; even assuming that Matter of Isidro-Zamorano and the precedents on which it relies are factually distinguishable from the situations here, the BIA’s interpretation of the hardship requirement in section 1229b(b)(1)(D) would nonetheless be binding; the statutory definition of "child" controls because section 1101(b)(1) includes an explicit definition of the term; the decisionmaking process here did not violate Mendez-Garcia’s and Rivera-Baltazar’s due process rights; the court rejected petitioners' argument that their due process rights were violated because they had “settled expectations” that they could apply for and receive cancellation of removal, and these settled expectations were upset by the change in the status of their qualifying relatives; and the court rejected Mendez-Garcia's claim that his due process rights were violated based on the cap on grants of cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law