Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A fifth-grade student and her mother filed suit against the school district and its employees because the student allegedly experienced retaliation after the mother complained to the school principal about the student's teacher. The district court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim without prejudice; plaintiffs failed to meet the filing deadline, and the school district filed a proposed judgment of dismissal; plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (SAC) the following day; the district court then entered a final judgment dismissing the First Amended Complaint, citing plaintiff's failure to file the SAC within the time allowed; and plaintiffs moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. The district court found that counsel's neglect was not excusable and the district court, in the meantime, moved for attorney's fees under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Cal. Gov't Code 6259(d). The district court denied the fees. Plaintiffs appeal both the district court’s judgment of dismissal and the order denying relief from judgment. Defendants cross-appeal a portion of the dismissal order and the order denying attorney’s fees. The court concluded that the district court’s decision cannot be supported by the record and thus it abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). The court also concluded that plaintiffs' CPRA claim was neither indisputably without merit nor prosecuted for an improper motive. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "M.D. v. Newport-Mesa Unified School District" on Justia Law

After plaintiff began missing loan payments on a house she bought in Long Beach, ReconTrust initiated a non-judicial foreclosure. In this case, the lender was Countrywide, the borrower was plaintiff and the trustee was ReconTrust. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging that ReconTrust violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(A), by sending her notices that misrepresented the amount of debt she owed. Plaintiff also sought to rescind her mortgage transaction under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), on the ground that defendants had perpetrated fraud against her. The district court twice dismissed plaintiff's rescission claim without prejudice and then granted ReconTrust's motion to dismiss the FDCPA claims. The court held that actions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect “debt” as that term is defined by the FDCPA; the court's holding affirms Hulse v. Ocwen Federal Bank; the court acknowledged that the Fourth and Sixth Circuit declined to follow Hulse; and the notices at issue in this case didn’t request payment from plaintiff, they merely informed plaintiff that the foreclosure process had begun and explained the foreclosure timeline. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FDCPA claim. The court also concluded where, as here, the district court dismisses a claim and instructs the plaintiff not to refile the claim unless he includes certain additional allegations that the plaintiff is unable or unwilling to make, the dismissed claim is preserved for appeal even if not repleaded. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider plaintiff's TILA rescission claim in light of Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp. View "Vien-Phoung Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder and sentenced to death, brought a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted his habeas petition as to the penalty phase and denied it as to his conviction. The court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. Following remand and further proceedings, the district court denied petitioner's remaining claims. Petitioner presents two IAC claims in this appeal. The court concluded that, whether or not these claims have merit, they are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Visciotti IV, so the court may not grant habeas relief. Petitioner also contends that the trial judge’s closure of the courtroom for six-and-a-half days during the death qualification portion of voir dire violated this Sixth Amendment right. The court could not conclude that counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the death qualification voir dire constituted deficient performance. Therefore, petitioner failed to demonstrate cause to excuse his default of the public trial claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Visciotti v. Martel" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d), for continuing crimes that, according to the government, spanned defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Defendant argues that the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031, prohibits consideration of his pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive crimes. The district court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it found that defendant continued his participation after turning 18, and the jury’s special verdict form makes clear that the jury found that defendant, in fact, continued his participation after turning 18. The court held that the district court’s instruction, which comported with the law of most circuits that have addressed this issue, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Camez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native of China, was convicted of visa fraud, making a false statement, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. On appeal, defendant argues that she has been deprived of her constitutional right to an independent federal judiciary because the Northern Mariana Islands District Court (NMI District Court) is not properly established under the Constitution. The court concluded that the NMI District Court was established by Congress pursuant to its authority under Article IV of the Constitution; Congress clearly intended that the NMI District Court have jurisdiction over criminal cases; the language of 48 U.S.C. 1821 and 1822 clearly shows that Congress intentionally created the NMI District Court and gave it jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions; Congress did so based on the authority conferred on it by Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution; and defendant's challenge to the NMI District Court’s authority fails completely in light of Supreme Court precedent that has rejected challenges similar to hers. The court rejected defendant's remaining challenges and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Xiaoying Tang Dowai" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the maintenance of a drug-involved premise and was sentenced to three years of probation. As a condition of probation, the district court required that defendant refrain from unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to periodic drug testing. Congress later enacted an omnibus appropriations bill that included a rider regarding using certain funds to prosecute individuals for engaging in conduct permitted by state medical marijuana laws. Defendant moved the district court to modify his conditions of probation on the ground that the appropriations rider required that he be permitted to use marijuana for medical purposes in compliance with California’s Compassionate Use Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5, during his probationary term. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the congressional appropriations rider at issue here does not impact the ability of a federal district court to restrict the use of medical marijuana as a condition of probation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to modify the conditions of defendant's probation to allow him to possess and use marijuana for medical purposes in violation of federal law, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Nixon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4334. Plaintiff claimed that he was fired from his job after providing notice of his deployment to Afghanistan in the United States Navy Reserve. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the plain text of USERRA does not preclude the compelled arbitration of disputes arising under its provisions. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that the legislative history evinces Congress’s intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement he signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint. View "Ziober v. BLB Resources" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act, Assem. Bill No. 775, which requires that licensed pregnancy-related clinics disseminate a notice stating the existence of publicly-funded family-planning services, including contraception and abortion. The Act also requires that unlicensed clinics disseminate a notice stating that they are not licensed by the State of California. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are justiciable. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction where plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment Free Speech claims. The court explained that, although the Act is a content-based regulation, it does not discriminate based on viewpoint. In this case, the Licensed Notice survives intermediate scrutiny and the Unlicensed Notice survives any level of scrutiny. The court also concluded that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on their First Amendment Free Exercise claim where the Act is a neutral law of general applicability, subject to only rational basis review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NIFLA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendants Kaplan and Strycharske were convicted of charges related to their quest to manufacture homemade hash oil and the resulting fire that severely injured six victims and killed one victim due to complications arising out of her injuries. On appeal, defendants challenged their 36-month sentence and final judgment of restitution in the amount of $2,771,929 on the ground that the district court erred by calculating the restitution award using replacement value instead of fair market value. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that fair market value generally provides the best measure to ensure restitution in the “full amount” of the victim’s loss, but that “replacement value” is an appropriate measure of destroyed property under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(1)(B) where the fair market value is either difficult to determine or would otherwise be an inadequate or inferior measure of the value necessary to make the victim whole. In this case, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in using replacement value to calculate the value of destroyed personal belongings like clothes, furniture, and home appliances. The court rejected Strycharske's contentions that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact when it stated the apartment contained 64 cans of butane and that an open flame was involved; that the district court made a highly inflammatory analogy that prejudiced his sentencing; and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud and mail fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order and a forfeiture money judgment, both in the amount of $2,232,894. The court concluded that, as a preliminary matter, the circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement support the conclusion that defendant entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. The court also concluded that the plea agreement shows that it provided sufficient information from which defendant could have derived an accurate estimate of the amount of restitution for which he was liable; the plain language of the plea agreement clearly states the minimum amounts of restitution that defendant would have to pay rather than the maximum agreed-upon restitution amount, and the district court’s imposition of a larger amount of restitution was not in conflict with the plea agreement; the award of restitution is not an illegal sentence in this case and the district court did not err in ordering restitution for all losses caused by the schemes to defraud, and the order was not illegal; and the court rejected defendant's arguments as to the forfeiture order and concluded that it did not constitute an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Lo" on Justia Law