Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At both his first trial and his subsequent re-trial, defendant testified that before being stopped at a checkpoint, he had given a ride to three teenagers he did not know as a favor to his cousin’s husband, Christian Rios Campos. Rios was a known drug smuggler who recruited juveniles, and defendant's primary defense was that the teenagers had planted the drugs in the car without his knowledge. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion for discovery relating to the constitutionality of the San Clemente checkpoint, and the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for discovery on Rios’s drug smuggling operation. The court agreed with defendant that the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery that could have revealed an unconstitutional seizure and led to the suppression of the evidence that illicit drugs were found in defendant's car. In this case, whether the primary purpose of the checkpoint has evolved from controlling immigration to detecting“ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” is a question that is subject to discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court also reversed the district court’s denial of discovery of the government’s investigation into Rios’s drug smuggling operation. After reviewing documents submitted by the government, the court disagreed both with the district court’s characterization of the documents and with its application of the law. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of defendant's discovery motion, vacated the conviction, and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress; rejected defendant's challenge to a jury instruction; and concluded that defendant's knowledge of the type and quantity of the drugs found in his car is not an element under 21 U.S.C. 841. View "United States v. Soto-Zuniga" on Justia Law

The Union filed suit against Aviation Safeguards for violations of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151–165. The district court granted Aviation Safeguards’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Union’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that equitable tolling principles apply to the Union’s unlawful interference and coercion claim; remanded and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for the Union on its claim for unlawful interference and coercion under RLA 152, Third and Fourth; held that the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Union’s status quo claim under RLA 152, Seventh, 155, and 156; remanded this claim for the limited purpose of determining whether this claim is timely and, if the claim is timely, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on its status quo claim; held that Aviation Safeguards unlawfully refused to mediate; and remanded and directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on its failure to mediate claim under RLA 152. View "Herrera v. Command Security" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Wood plaintiffs, who were recipients of health coverage under Arizona's Medicaid demonstration project, filed suit against the Secretary challenging her approval of a new Arizona project that raised copayments for medical visits and medications and that permitted healthcare providers to refuse non-emergency services based on an inability to pay. At issue on appeal is whether the members of the class action were the prevailing parties for purposes of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The court applied the factors in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., holding that under the EAJA, the Wood plaintiffs are the prevailing party in their procedural Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), challenge against the Secretary. The court noted that the dispositive question is not whether the plaintiff ultimately obtained some form of substantive relief, but rather whether there is a lasting alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. The court concluded that there was a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties, to the benefit of the Wood plaintiffs. Finally, the court concluded that the retention of jurisdiction for practical and equitable reasons did not undermine the reality that the Wood plaintiffs were a prevailing party. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court to consider whether the government’s position was “substantially justified” under the EAJA. View "Wood v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal of the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The court applied Medina-Nunez v. Lynch and In re Reza-Murillo, holding that the BIA properly concluded that petitioner was not “admitted in any status” for purposes of cancellation of removal when he was listed as a derivative beneficiary on his mother’s asylum and Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Title II of Pub.L. 105-100, applications and received work authorization in the United States under 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c). Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition in part because it lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's contention that he was "admitted in any status" and denied it in part. View "Fuentes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was in the custody of Maricopa County for a nonviolent offense when she gave birth to her son. After her release, she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 & 1983, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated when, among other things, she was shackled and restrained during labor and postpartum recovery. The district court granted summary judgment for the County Defendants and the Medical Center on all of plaintiff's claims, and taxed costs against her. The court addressed an issue of first impression: whether the U.S. Constitution allows law enforcement officers to restrain a female inmate while she is pregnant, in labor, or during postpartum recovery. The court held that, in this case, the answer to that question depends on factual disputes a properly instructed jury must resolve. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the County Defendants on most of plaintiff's shackling claims. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants on the remaining claims, and affirmed summary judgment on all claims against the Medical Center. The court vacated the cost award to the County Defendants and remanded, but the court affirmed the cost award to the Medical Center. View "Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the EPA's rule approving Arizona’s Five Percent Plan for airborne particulate matter around Maricopa County. The court upheld the EPA’s determination that the control measures in Arizona’s Five Percent Plan did not need to be updated, and that the 135 exceedances were exceptional events that are excluded from consideration under the EPA’s regulation and guidance documents. The court concluded, however, that it will not defer to the EPA’s interpretation of the contingency measures requirement because, under the plain language of 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(9), contingency measures are measures that will be taken in the future, not measures that have already been implemented. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review. View "Bahr v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, owner of a locksmith business, filed suit against Yelp, alleging that Yelp is responsible for causing a review from another site to appear on its page, providing a star-rating function that transforms user reviews into Yelp’s own content, and “caus[ing] [the statements] to appear” as a promotion on Google’s search engine. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230(c), “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.” In this case, the threadbare allegations of fabrication of statements are implausible on their face and are insufficient to avoid immunity under the CDA. The court also concluded that Yelp’s rating system, which is based on rating inputs from third parties and which reduces this information into a single, aggregate metric is user-generated data. Nor do plaintiff's arguments that Yelp can be held liable for “republishing” the same content as advertisements or promotions on Google survive close scrutiny. The court concluded that, just as Yelp is immune from liability under the CDA for posting user-generated content on its own website, Yelp is not liable for disseminating the same content in essentially the same format to a search engine, as this action does not change the origin of the third-party content. The court noted that proliferation and dissemination of content does not equal creation or development of content. View "Kimzey v. Yelp!" on Justia Law

Defendant, a urologist, appeals his felony conviction for conspiracy to commit adulteration in violation of 21 U.S.C. 331(k) with the intent to defraud or mislead. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his reuse of single-use plastic needle guides during prostate biopsy exams. The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that a physician's use of a consumable, single-use device on a paying patient satisfies the "held for sale" element under section 331(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 331(k); in this case, defendant's use of the guides in the course of treating his urology patients constituted a "sale" under section 331(k); and thus the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction that defendant conspired to commit adulteration in violation of section 331(k) and to support the special finding that he intended to defraud his patients, the public, the FDA, and the Medical Board; the district court properly rejected defendant's proposed jury instructions because his proposed “theory of the case” instructions merely duplicated what the jury was already told, and there was no plain error in the district court’s refusal to give the “practice of medicine” instruction; the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment where it contained the elements of defendant's fraud in adequate detail and any error in omitting the materiality element was harmless; and defendant waived challenges to the jury instructions and special verdict form as they relate to the felony conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

In 1963, USPS and Bellevue’s predecessor-in-interest entered into a twenty-year initial lease with five options to renew the lease and an option to purchase certain property. When USPS attempted to exercise the purchase option, Bellevue refused to honor it. The district court granted summary judgment for USPS and ordered specific performance of the sale of the property. The court applied Washington’s heightened evidentiary standard for specific performance and held that USPS has shown clearly and unequivocally that it has a contractual right to purchase the property. Even under Washington law’s high standard for awarding specific performance, USPS successfully provided “clear and unequivocal evidence” that it exercised its options to extend the term of the lease in strict compliance with the terms of the lease, and that the lease therefore continued to exist through the time it also properly exercised its purchase option. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that the 1963 lease remained valid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to USPS and compelling specific performance for the sale of the property. View "USPS v. Bellevue Post Office" on Justia Law

Aerotec is a small, independent company that provides maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services for Honeywell's auxiliary power units (APUs). Aerotec filed suit alleging causes of action under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a), and Arizona state law. Aerotec alleges that Honeywell leverages its monopoly power over the APU parts market to unfairly smother competition in the repair services market. The court concluded that Aerotec’s chain of logic and evidence is too attenuated to support liability for tying under section 1, and none of the indicia that the court would ordinarily review in an exclusive dealing claim are present in the record. The court rejected Aerotec's monopolization claims under section 2, concluding that Aerotec's refusal to deal claim fails based on its vague requested remedy that the court order Honeywell to provide parts, data, and prices like it did before 2007. Furthermore, reasonable access to the essential facility exists and Aerotec cannot establish an essential facilities claim. The court rejected Aerotec's claim that Honeywell engages in unlawful conduct by simultaneously charging a low (but above-cost) price for its repair bundles and raising the wholesale price of replacement parts. Finally, the court rejected Aerotec's claim that Honeywell engages in secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Aerotec Int'l v. Honeywell Int'l" on Justia Law