Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Vallejo petitioned for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in 2008. Two years after the bankruptcy court confirmed Vallejo's debt-adjustment plan, a federal jury found that two police officers employed by Vallejo used constitutionally excessive force when they arrested Jason Eugene Deocampo. The district court entered a judgment for money damages against the officers in their personal capacities, and awarded Deocampo his attorney’s fees. The court noted that, under California law, Vallejo is generally obligated to indemnify its employees for claims against them arising from their employment. The court held that where, as here, the plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court did not expressly encompass claims or judgments against the city’s employees, the indemnification statutes do not subject such claims or judgments to adjustment by operation of law nor by the fact of the public employment itself. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the officers’ Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, and agreed with the district court that neither the judgment nor attorney’s fee award was discharged by Vallejo’s bankruptcy proceedings. View "Deocampo v. Potts" on Justia Law

After the County Treasurer and Tax Collector conducted tax sales of the properties debtor owned, debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. Debtor filed an adversary complaint against the County Treasurer and the purchasers of the two properties, alleging that because the County sold the properties for a price that was too low, the tax sales were fraudulent transfers voidable under 11 U.S.C. 548(a). The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., the Supreme Court held that the price received at a mortgage foreclosure sale “conclusively satisfies” the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that transfers of an insolvent debtor’s property be in exchange for a “reasonably equivalent value,” so long as the mortgagee complied with the relevant foreclosure laws of the state in question, which in that case was also California. Because California tax sales have the same procedural safeguards as the California mortgage foreclosure sale at issue in BFP, the court agreed with the BAP and held that the price received at a California tax sale conducted in accordance with state law conclusively establishes “reasonably equivalent value” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 548(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Tracht Gut, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of FERC's determination that various energy companies committed tariff violations in California during the summer of 2000. As part of a deregulation program, California created two nonprofit entities: the California Power Exchange Corporation (“CalPX”) and the California Independent System Operator Corporation (“Cal-ISO”). Both entities were subject to FERC jurisdiction, with CalPX operating pursuant to a FERC-approved tariff and wholesale rate schedule. The Cal-ISO tariff comprehensively regulated California’s power markets, and incorporated the Market Monitoring and Information Protocol (“MMIP”), which set forth rules for identifying and protecting against abuses of market power. The court concluded that FERC’s determination that Shell, MPS, and Illinova (“sellers”) violated the Cal-ISO tariff and MMIP during the Summer Period was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In this case, FERC reasonably interpreted the Cal-ISO tariff and the MMIP according to the plain text of those documents. Therefore, the court rejected the sellers’ claims that the tariff and MMIP did not proscribe the practices identified by the agency. Furthermore, FERC’s interpretation of the Cal-ISO tariff and the MMIP finds support not only in text, but in policy as well. The court concluded that FERC reasonably interpreted the Cal-ISO tariff and the MMIP to prohibit the practices of False Export, False Load Scheduling and Anomalous Bidding. In addition, the agency reasonably concluded that the tariff and MMIP sufficed to put sellers on notice that such practices were not permitted. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably concluded that the sellers engaged during the Summer Period in the practices deemed tariff violations by the orders on review. Finally, the court concluded that FERC’s Summer Period determinations regarding APX and BP were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review in part and dismissed in part. View "MPS Merchant Serv. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights action, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment stemming from a physical altercation with defendant Officer David Rosario. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant Lieutenant E. Rogers deprived him of a fair hearing in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. The district court dismissed the due process claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Eighth Amendment claim was tried and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Rosario. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff's procedural due process claim; because the district court applied the correct (summary judgment) standard, remand is not necessary; the district court properly concluded that plaintiff's unsupported allegations were insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact; because plaintiff failed to rebut defendants’ evidence of non-exhaustion, the district court properly dismissed his procedural due process claim against Rogers; the court rejected plaintiff's evidentiary challenges; the court concluded that defense counsel improperly vouched for the credibility of correctional officer witnesses during closing argument, but on plain error review, the district court’s failure to correct the error sua sponte does not warrant reversal; and the court held that the district court abused its discretion in awarding $3,018.35 in costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, vacated the award of costs, and remanded for further consideration. View "Draper v. Rosario" on Justia Law

Safe Cig challenges an almost $1.5 million default judgment awarded in NewGen's favor as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court acted within its statutory authority to give NewGen the opportunity to correct its allegations. In this case, the amended complaint remedied the deficiencies of the original complaint, alleging the parties were of diverse citizenship; alleged that NewGen was an LLC organized in Wisconsin and that its sole member was a citizen of Wisconsin when the complaint was filed; and alleged that Safe Cig was an LLC organized in California with five members, each of which was a citizen of California at the time the complaint was filed. The court also concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the amended complaint corrected any defect in the pleadings. Because the only real challenge to jurisdiction concerned the sufficiency of the pleadings, the amended allegations - which were undoubtedly legally sufficient - resolved the only question ever raised regarding the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The court further concluded that the district court’s decision to enter default judgment was not an abuse of discretion where none of the district court's factual findings were in clear error. Finally, the court upheld the district court's damage award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NewGen v. Safe Cig" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Mohamed and Gillette, former Uber drivers, filed suit alleging on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of other drivers that Uber violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and various state statutes. Gillette has also brought a representative claim against Uber under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) alleging that he was misclassified as an independent contractor rather than an employee. The district court denied Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of the claims. The court concluded that the district court improperly assumed the authority to decide whether the arbitration agreements were enforceable. The question of arbitrability as to all but Gillette’s PAGA claims was delegated to the arbitrator. Under the terms of the agreement Gillette signed, the PAGA waiver should be severed from the arbitration agreement and Gillette’s PAGA claims may proceed in court on a representative basis. All of plaintiffs’ remaining arguments, including both Mohamed’s challenge to the PAGA waiver in the agreement he signed and the challenge by both plaintiffs to the validity of the arbitration agreement itself, are subject to resolution via arbitration. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hirease’s joinder in the motion to compel. View "Mohamed v. Uber Technologies" on Justia Law

Federal agents, acting pursuant to the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-22, secured a wiretap order for a San Diego phone number based on evidence that Ignacio Escamilla Estrada (Escamilla) was using the number in a drug smuggling and distribution conspiracy. At some point during a seven-day period, the agents realized that Escamilla was not using the phone. Agents continued listening, however, believing at least initially that the people speaking on the phone might have been part of the Escamilla conspiracy. Appellant Michael Carey was eventually identified as a speaker in some of the phone calls, and he was then charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court denied Carey's motion to suppress. The court saw no reason to depart from principles requiring cessation of a wiretap once the government knows or reasonably should know that the person speaking on the tapped line is not involved in the target conspiracy. Once the officers know or should know they are listening to conversations outside the scope of the wiretap order, they must discontinue monitoring the wiretap until they secure a new wiretap order, if possible. Applying this rule, the court noted that Carey does not challenge the validity of the wiretap order as to Escamilla, so the agents were justified in initially listening to the conversations at issue. But because the order did not authorize agents to listen to Carey or his associates, the government may only use evidence obtained in accordance with the “plain hearing” doctrine discussed above. The record does not indicate what evidence was obtained before the agents knew or should have known that they were listening to calls outside of the Escamilla conspiracy. The court vacated and remanded to allow the parties to present more evidence on remand to determine whether any evidence should be suppressed under the proper legal standard. View "United States v. Carey" on Justia Law

Castellino hired Picerne, a general contractor, to construct an apartment complex on Castellino's property. After Castellino defaulted on its obligations and failed to pay Picerne and its subcontractors, Picerne filed a demand for arbitration and a mechanic’s lien against the apartment complex. The parties eventually entered into arbitration and, on the same day the superior court confirmed the arbitration award, Castellino filed a Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy. On appeal, Picerne contends that the bankruptcy court erred in denying its motion for post-discharge attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, Picerne could “fairly or reasonably contemplate” that it would have a claim for attorneys’ fees if it prevailed in the state litigation before Castellino filed its petition for bankruptcy. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that the claim was discharged when the bankruptcy court confirmed Castellino’s plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Picerne Constr. v. Castellino Villas" on Justia Law

MLTF substantially prevailed in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, action filed against the Government. MLTF filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E), requesting that the court award it fees consistent with the current billing rates for its attorneys. The district court (Ware, C.J.) granted the motion in part, awarding MLTF attorney fees calculated at $200 an hour, which was well below the current billing rates for its attorneys. The district court (Rogers, J.), upon the Government’s motion to consider the issue de novo, determined that the first judge had not erred in awarding only $200 an hour. The court concluded that notwithstanding MLTF’s failure to designate for appeal Judge Ware’s underlying fee order, MLTF’s intent to appeal the underlying fee award is apparent from both the factual circumstances and MLTF’s extensive briefing on the issue; the Government also cannot demonstrate prejudice; and thus the court chose to exercise its discretion and consider the appeal on the merits of Judge Ware's underlying fee award. On the merits, the court concluded that, consistent with its burden, MLTF provided substantial evidence of the prevailing market rate for the applicable periods. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's fee award and remanded for a recalculation of the appropriate rate. Finally, the court concluded that MLTF falls within the class of litigants entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and MLTF may request attorney fees on appeal in accordance with Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Hiken v. Dep't of Defense" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former FWS employee, filed suit contending that she was discriminated and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and retaliated against in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. 1201 et seq. The district court dismissed the WPA claim for lack of jurisdiction based on plaintiffs failure to present the claim to the MSPB. The court held that the statutory scheme governing the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-4545, 92 Stat. 1111, and the WPA did not authorize plaintiff to file her WPA claim in district court without first presenting it to the MSPB. The court also held that, although a federal district court can exercise federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, that general grant of jurisdiction does not apply where it is fairly discernible that Congress intended a statutory review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review. Therefore, the scheme precluded the district court from exercising original jurisdiction over plaintiff's WPA claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand to the MSPB. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kerr v. Jewell" on Justia Law