Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision declining to consider his application for asylum and denial of withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The parties agree that the court must remand to the BIA on petitioner's claims for withholding of removal and protection under CAT in light of intervening circuit precedent. The court held that Congress has not clearly expressed whether 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), enacted by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) prevents an individual subject to a reinstated removal order from applying for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158. However, the court concluded that the Attorney General’s regulation preventing petitioner from applying for asylum under these circumstances is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme, and is entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Accordingly, the court remanded for the BIA to reconsider petitioner's withholding and CAT claims. View "Perez-Guzman v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Consistent with a letter issued by the ATF, a firearms dealer refused to sell plaintiff a firearm because of her medical marijuana registry card. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the federal statutes, regulations, and guidance that prevented her from buying a gun. The district court dismissed the complaint. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3); plaintiff does have standing to raise her remaining claims challenging 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. 478.11, and the Open Letter; and plaintiff's remaining claims are not moot. The court concluded that by preventing plaintiff from purchasing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. 478.11, and the Open Letter directly burden her core Second Amendment right to possess a firearm; because these laws and guidance do not place a severe burden on plaintiff's core right to defend herself with firearms, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to determine whether these laws and guidance pass constitutional muster; and, applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court concluded that the degree of fit between the laws and guidance and the aim of preventing gun violence is reasonable. Because the Open Letter satisfies each of the United States v. O’Brien conditions, it survives intermediate scrutiny, and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's First Amendment claims. In regard to the Fifth Amendment claims, the laws and guidance survive rational basis scrutiny because they are reasonably related to reducing gun violence. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The SEC filed suit against Peter Jensen and Thomas Tekulve, the former Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the now-defunct Basin Water, Inc., alleging that they had participated in a scheme to defraud Basin investors by reporting millions of dollars in revenue that were never realized. On appeal, the SEC challenged the district court's judgment in favor of defendants. The court reversed the district court’s rulings interpreting Rule 13a–14 of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act), 17 C.F.R. 240.13a-14, and Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 304),15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq. The court concluded that Rule 13a–14 provides the SEC with a cause of action not only against CEOs and CFOs who do not file the required certifications, but also against CEOs and CFOs who certify false or misleading statements. The court also concluded that the disgorgement remedy authorized under SOX 304 applies regardless of whether a restatement was caused by the personal misconduct of an issuer’s CEO and CFO or by other issuer misconduct. The court reversed the district court’s bench trial order, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a jury trial, concluding that the SEC was entitled to a jury trial and did not consent to Jensen and Tekulve’s withdrawal of their jury demand. Nor did the SEC waive its right to a jury trial when it objected consistently and repeatedly before trial to the district court’s decision to hold a bench trial. The court approved the district court’s grant of defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence about the injunction against Basin’s Director of Finance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "SEC v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Mercer, alleging that Mercer had a common policy or practice of failing to inform domestic farm workers of the availability of H-2A work that paid $12 per hour, in violation of the Agricultural Workers’ Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U.S.C. 1831(e) and 1821(f), and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), Wash. Rev. Code 19.86.020. Plaintiffs also alleged that Mercer failed to pay its own domestic workers $12 per hour when they carried out the same tasks as foreign H-2A workers, in violation of AWPA and state wage laws.The district court certified an Inaccurate Information class and an Equal Pay subclass, corresponding to plaintiffs’ claims. In regard to the Inaccurate Information class, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding common questions and in finding that common issues predominated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). In regard to the Equal Pay subclass, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by identifying a common question of fact concerning whether Mercer’s domestic workers were consistently paid $12 per hour for H-2A work. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the typicality requirement was met in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder with a special circumstance for committing the murder during the commission of a kidnapping, appealed the denial of his habeas petition. Based on an erroneous jury instruction regarding the element of asportation, the jury also found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder during the commission of a kidnapping. Applying Chapman v. California, the state court found that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under state law. The court concluded that the state court’s harmless-error determination was not an objectively unreasonable application of Chapman where the error did not prejudice petitioner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Rademaker v. Paramo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking monetary and equitable relief against various state and federal officials alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, state law tort claims, and constitutional claims based on her inclusion in the government’s terrorist databases, including the No-Fly List. After determining that plaintiff was a prevailing party, the district court found that the government was substantially justified respecting its pre-Ibrahim II standing arguments, its defense against plaintiff's visa-related claims, and its various privilege assertions. The court disallowed fees associated with those issues and otherwise found the government's conduct was not justified. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart. Plaintiff contends, among other things, that the district court incorrectly found that the government had not acted in bad faith under EAJA section 2412(b) and therefore erred by declining to award market-rate fees. The court held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner, INS v. Jean, the district court erred by making multiple substantial justification determinations. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue. The court also reversed the district court’s various reductions imposed on plaintiff's eligible fees arising from its incorrect substantial justification analysis. However, the court affirmed the district court’s bad faith findings as well as its relatedness findings under Eckerhart, and the district court's striking of plaintiff's objections to the special master’s report on expenses. View "Ibrahim v. US DHS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Nepal, seeks review of the BIA's denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on past persecution and fear of future persecution. In this case, the BIA upheld the IJ's adverse credibility finding based on alleged inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and certain supporting documents, and because petitioner failed to provide additional corroborative evidence, including testimony by his brother. The court held that the inconsistencies identified by the IJ and BIA were either non-existent or procedurally defective because petitioner was not given the chance to explain them. The court noted also that petitioner's in-court testimony was remarkably detailed, consistent with his written declaration, and plausible in light of the U.S. State Department report and other country conditions evidence in the record. The court further concluded that the BIA’s reliance on the absence of testimony from petitioner's brother was error under Ren v. Holder because the IJ did not give petitioner notice and an opportunity to present the corroborative testimony before denying his asylum application. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bhattarai v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty in two separate federal drug distribution cases, the district court, in a consolidated sentencing proceeding, imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for each plea, and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Defendant subsequently moved for modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the consecutive nature of the sentences is not modifiable according to section 3582(c)(2) because it was not “based on” the Guideline range, notwithstanding the fact that it might have been if the district court had chosen to impose a different sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion. View "United States v. Aguilar-Canche" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Hawaiian residents who challenge the recent efforts by a group of Native Hawaiians to establish their own government. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s order denying their request for a preliminary injunction to stop activities related to the drafting and ratification of self-governance documents. Separately, another group of Hawaii residents appeals the district court’s denial of their motion to intervene in plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Before the district court, plaintiffs focused their injunction request on the delegation election. That election, however, has been cancelled, and plaintiffs do not argue that similar elections will occur in the future. The court affirmed the dismissal of the interlocutory appeal as moot, concluding that there is no reasonable expectation that plaintiffs will be subject to the same injury again, given the disavowal of any election. Further, the district court retains jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit, and dismissing the preliminary injunction appeal will not, by itself, insulate defendants’ practices from judicial scrutiny. The court also affirmed the district court's order denying intervention as of right where the court agreed with the district court that the prospective intervenors’ interests would not, as a practical matter, be impaired or impeded as a result of plaintiffs’ litigation. The district court properly reasoned that the prospective intervenors’ claims would raise entirely different issues from those raised by plaintiffs, and that the proposed intervenors could adequately protect their interests in separate litigation. View "Akina v. Hawaii" on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against AT&T under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTA), 15 U.S.C. 45(a), taking issue with the adequacy of AT&T’s disclosures regarding its data throttling program. The district court denied AT&T's motion to dismiss and rejected it's view of the common carrier exemption. The court concluded, however, that the common carrier exemption in section 5 of the FTC Act carves out a group of entities based on their status as common carriers. Those entities are not covered by section 5 even as to non-common carrier activities. Because AT&T was a common carrier, it cannot be liable for the violations alleged by the FTC. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "FTC v. AT&T Mobility" on Justia Law