Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an employee of the SSA, seeks review of a Board order dismissing his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Board did not err in dismissing petitioner's IRA appeal because petitioner has not made a non-frivolous allegation under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). Petitioner was employed by the SSA as a Hearing Office Director. Faced with disciplinary proceedings, petitioner filed an IRA with the Board, alleging that he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under the WPA for which he could not be disciplined. The court concluded that the standard for determining whether a petitioner has made a non-frivolous disclosure is analogous to the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss. In this case, disclosures 1–2 are not protected disclosures, because an agency ruling or adjudication, even if erroneous, is not a violation of the law or gross mismanagement under the WPA; disclosures 3–5 are not protected disclosures, because communications concerning policy decisions are explicitly excluded from protection under the WPA; and there is no evidence that the SSA took any personnel action against petitioner as a result of disclosures 3–5. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Daniels v. MSPB" on Justia Law

The three cases in this consolidated appeal involve employees represented by labor unions who seek remedies under state law against their employers. The cases were initially filed in state court, but then removed to federal court on the basis of preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a). In all the cases, the district court denied a motion to remand and held the state law claims preempted. At issue on appeal is section 301 preemption. The court articulated a two-step inquiry to analyze section 301 preemption of state law claims: first, a court must determine whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and second, whether the right is substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA. Where there is such substantial dependence, the state law claim is preempted by section 301. If not, the claim can proceed under state law. In Kobold, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Good Samaritan. In Barr, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to RISG as to Barr’s money had and received claim, but reversed as to plaintiffs’ Or. Rev. Stat. 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims, and remanded to the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the section 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims. In Allen, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion to remand as well as its grant of summary judgment to NWP. View "Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, challenging his 2007 second-degree murder conviction. The court concluded that petitioner correctly alleged that the prosecution concealed evidence that could have bolstered his self-defense claim, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. However, the court concluded that the extremely deferential standard of review does not mandate relief because petitioner was not sufficiently prejudiced. The court also concluded that there was no Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) error in rejecting a claim under Napue v. Illinois. Even when combined with the Brady violations, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Reis-Campos v. Biter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a law firm and debt collection agency, alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(e)(11). Plaintiff alleged that defendant was attempting to collect a debt on behalf of American Express and that by leaving the September 25th voicemail message, defendant violated the FDCPA by failing to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication was from a debt collector in violation of section 1692e(11). The court held that if a subsequent communication is sufficient to disclose to the least sophisticated debtor that the communication was from a debt collector, there is no violation of section 1692e(11) even if the debt collector did not expressly state, “this communication is from a debt collector.” Accordingly, defendant did not violate the FDCPA and the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Davis v. Hollins Law" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the Tribe, filed suit against the Tribe in California state court for employment-related claims. The Tribe timely removed to district court and then moved to dismiss based on tribal immunity. The district court denied the motion based on the ground that the Tribe unequivocally waived its immunity by removing the action to federal court. The court followed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity from suit. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life. Petitioner successfully petitioned to withdraw her guilty plea about five years later when she established that the sentencing court failed to inform her that she would receive a mandatory term of lifetime parole as a direct consequence of her plea. At her subsequent trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and the special circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a burglary. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court then denied petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and issued a certificate of appealability (COA) on the question of specific performance of her plea agreement. The court assumed without deciding that the State promised petitioner release after seven and a half years and that the State breached that promise. Nevertheless, the court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to specific performance of her plea agreement because she voluntarily chose to withdraw her guilty plea, thereby voiding her plea agreement. There is thus no plea agreement to enforce. Under these circumstances, there is no precedent suggesting that petitioner was denied due process by denying her specific performance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fox v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of transporting a stolen vehicle, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing counterfeit credit cards and possessing counterfeiting devices. Defendant was sentenced to 137 months in prison and ordered to pay restitution. The government subsequently conceded that certain detention facility documents were not in the record. Given the government's concession, the court allowed the Assistant U.S. Attorney 48 hours to consider whether to confess error. The government responded by requesting a remand to allow the district court to consider a more fully developed record. At issue on appeal is whether a remand for resentencing should be on an open or closed record. The court concluded that when the government does not have occasion to tender a fully developed argument, the court remands for resentencing on an open record. In this case, defendant specifically objected to the proposed sentence on three separate occasions, the government was on notice of the factual deficiencies in its papers and had opportunities to supplement the record, and the government chose not to do so, preferring to rest on evidence that it later conceded was insufficient to support its position. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Pridgette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for retaliation, alleging that he was terminated for planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to age discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that his termination violated both the First Amendment and the retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court rejected the City's argument that plaintiff's speech was not speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern and so fell outside the First Amendment's protections. In this case, plaintiff's sworn statement and imminent testimony were outside the scope of his ordinary job duties, which means that he was engaged in speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. The court also concluded that the retaliation provision of the ADEA does not preclude a plaintiff such as the one in this case from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Given the substantial difference between the level of scrutiny afforded age discrimination equal protection claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, the court cannot assume that Congress intended the ADEA to affect the availability of section 1983 claims in the same manner in both subject areas. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stilwell v. City of Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, lawful permanent residents who have committed a crime that could lead to removal and are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), filed a class action petition for habeas relief. At issue is whether an alien must be detained without bond even if he has resettled into the community after release from criminal custody. If the answer is no, then the alien may still be detained, but he may seek release in a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) by showing that he poses neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the community. The court concluded that the statute unambiguously imposes mandatory detention without bond only on those aliens taken by the AG into immigration custody “when [they are] released” from criminal custody. And because Congress’s use of the word “when” conveys immediacy, the court concluded that the immigration detention must occur promptly upon the aliens’ release from criminal custody. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's class certification order and preliminary injunction. View "Preap v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendants Smith, Long, Thompson, Manzo, Craig, Leavins (collectly, the "Joint Appellants"), and Sexton each appealed their convictions for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Long and Craig also appealed their convictions for making false statements, and Craig and Leavins appealed their sentences. Furthermore, the Joint Appellants and Sexton raise numerous challenges to the jury instructions. The Joint Appellants and Sexton were all members of the LASD, and were convicted for their roles in interfering with a federal investigation into civil rights abuses at Los Angeles County jails. The court concluded that the district court’s use of the phrase “grand jury investigation,” rather than “grand jury proceeding,” was neither misleading nor an abuse of discretion in these circumstances; the court rejected the claim that a defendant’s unlawful purpose to obstruct justice must be sole or primary; the evidence was sufficient to suggest various motives for the Joint Appellants’ and Sexton’s conduct, so it was appropriate for the court to give an instruction regarding dual purposes; the court rejected the Joint Appellants' challenge to the adequacy of the good faith instruction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an additional innocent intent instruction; in light of the clear instruction regarding the Joint Appellants’ authority to investigate, any error in the instruction regarding whether or not federal agents actually violated California law was undoubtedly harmless; and the court rejected Craig and Long's challenge to the instructions for the false statement counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law