Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Glendale installed a public monument in 2013 commemorating the “Comfort Women,” an unknown number of women that South Korea asserts, but Japan disputes, were forced to serve as sexual partners to members of the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II and the decade preceding it. A Japanese-American resident of Los Angeles and a non-profit organization filed suit claiming that the installation of the monument intrudes on the federal government’s exclusive foreign affairs power and is thereby preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine. In plaintiffs’ view, Glendale’s monument disrupts the federal government’s foreign policy of nonintervention and encouragement of peaceful resolution of the Comfort Women dispute. The complaint seeks an order declaring Glendale’s installation of the monument unconstitutional and compelling Glendale to remove the monument from public property. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing where the “inability to unreservedly use” Glendale’s Central Park constitutes an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing. Plaintiffs can also establish that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiffs have not plausibly claimed that Glendale’s actions are preempted where Glendale's installation of the monument concerns an area of traditional state responsibility and does not intrude on the federal government’s foreign affairs power. Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause does not preempt a local government’s expression, through a public monument, of a particular viewpoint on a matter related to foreign affairs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gingery v. City of Glendale" on Justia Law

I.R.C. 469 restricts taxpayers’ ability to reduce their taxable income using passive rental losses. At issue is whether section 469 entitles real estate professionals like petitioner to deduct rental losses without showing material participation in the rental property. The court held that section 469’s text, regulations, and relevant case law all point in one direction: though taxpayers who qualify as real estate professionals are not subject to section 469(c)(2)’s per se rule that rental losses are passive, they still must show material participation in rental activities before deducting rental losses. Congress endeavored to narrow the scope of permissible deductions for passive losses in real estate investments, in part by requiring material participation before losses may be deducted. The court concluded that real estate professionals were not exempted from this requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the government. View "Gragg v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his special motion under the California anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, to strike the second amended complaint filed by Travelers. Defendant maintains that Travelers' claims arise out of his representation of Travelers' insured, VDG, as Cumis counsel, and thus defendant's activity was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, the court concluded that Travelers' causes of action for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, breach of Cal. Civ. Code 2860(d), and concealment do no arise from protected activity because they are not based on an act in furtherance of defendant's right of petition or free speech; Travelers has made a prima facie showing of facts supporting its causes of action so as to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits sufficient to survive the motion to strike; and, because the causes of action at issue arise from defendant's post-settlement conduct, not his communications with VDG in settling the prior lawsuit, California’s litigation privilege, Cal. Civ. Code 47(b), does not bar this suit. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review defendant's challenge to the district court’s striking count two, alleging breach of a defense handling agreement, because the denial was without prejudice, and there is no final order as to this claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hirsh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenge the NMFS's decision to calculate the amount of their initial share of the total allowable catch of Pacific whiting based on their participation in the fishery prior to 2003 and 2004, respectively, rather than on their much greater participation in the years immediately before 2010, when the regulations implementing this program were issued. The court concluded that NMFS's decision to apply the 2004 control date to processors was not arbitrary or capricious; with respect to the proposed decision on the 2003 and 2004 end dates for allocating quota shares, NMFS explained its analysis of dependence; because NMFS adequately took into account “dependence on the fishery” under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16 U.S.C. 1853 (b)(6)(B), and “investments in, and dependence upon, the fishery” under section 1853a(c)(5)(A)(iii), its decision was not inconsistent with those statutory requirements; nor was NMFS’s decision inconsistent with the related standards identified by Pacific Dawn; because NMFS reasonably determined that retaining the 2003 and 2004 end dates would be the least disruptive to current fishing practices, its conclusion was not inconsistent with Objective 14 of the Groundfish Management Plan; and the court rejected Pacific Dawn's argument that NMFS’s decision was inconsistent with its practices in other fisheries, where NMFS had concluded that more recent participation reflected greater dependence on the fishery. Therefore, because NMFS properly considered the relevant factors and reasonably decided to maintain the 2003 and 2004 end dates, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Pacific Dawn LLC v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against USB and Recon challenging the complete foreclosure sale of their residential property. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the trustee’s sale was invalid under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA), ORS 86.770(1), because several assignments of the Trust Deed that took place prior to the 2010 assignment to USB were never recorded. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, holding that ORS 86.770(1) barred plaintiffs' claims. In this case, the only defect the foreclosure process identified by plaintiffs has to do with the content of the notice. The defect is the incorrect listing of the beneficiary in the notice they received. However, plaintiffs do not dispute that: (1) they were in default; (2) they were served in the manner required by ORS 86.740 (requiring, at a minimum, service by certified mail 120 days before the sale) and ORS 86.750 (requiring personal service on grantors who occupy the property 120 days before the sale); (3) they had no financial ability to cure the default and redeem the property; (4) they took no action to challenge the sale prior to it becoming final; and (5) they only challenged the foreclosure sale many months after the foreclosure sale was completed. Therefore, plaintiffs' post-sale claims are barred as their property interests have been terminated and foreclosed pursuant to ORS 86.770(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Woods v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault by strangulation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 113. At issue is whether the jury was properly instructed to disregard defendant’s voluntary intoxication, which requires the court to determine whether section 113(a)(8) is a general or specific intent crime. Also at issue is whether the district court’s instruction to the jury on assault by strangulation violated defendant’s due process rights. The court held that assault by strangulation under section 113(a)(8) is a general intent crime, and defendant's intoxication was thus irrelevant. The court found no plain error in the district court's instruction on the elements of the offense. The district court’s inclusion of the word “wounded” may have been superfluous, but if anything, the inclusion of “wounded” in the instruction required that the government meet a higher burden than was necessary because section (a)(8) does not require proof of a wound or injury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. LaMott" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute between the parties over who has priority ownership of property located in Las Vegas. Nevada has a statute that gives a homeowners’ association lien priority over “all other liens and encumbrances” (subject to some limited exceptions) for up to nine months of unpaid HOA fees. NEV. REV. STAT. 116.3116(2)–(3). After the HOA foreclosed on property that Ashley Spencer bought, Weeping Hollow purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Just over two months after the HOA foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo attempted to foreclose on the property under its 2008 deed of trust. Weeping Hollow filed suit in state court against Spencer, Wells Fargo, and a title insurance company. Wells Fargo removed to federal court. The district court then granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Weeping Hollow’s complaint. After the district court issued its ruling, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an opinion that expressly abrogates the district court’s interpretation of the HOA statute. Under the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding, a foreclosure on an HOA lien extinguishes an earlier-recorded security interest even though the HOA lien was recorded later. The court held that the district court erred in applying the fraudulent-joinder doctrine to this case. Because Spencer was not shown to be fraudulently joined, her presence in the action divests the district court of diversity jurisdiction and the district court must remand the case to state court. Since this case should never have made it into federal court, the court has no reason to address Wells Fargo’s constitutional and state-law arguments. View "Weeping Hollow Ave. Trust v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaughter and for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. In this opinion, the court addressed whether involuntary manslaughter can be considered a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). After Leocal v. Ashcroft and Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, a crime of violence requires a mental state higher than recklessness - it requires intentional conduct. Involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. 1112, requiring a lesser mental state of gross negligence, prohibits conduct that cannot be considered a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3). Under the categorical approach, therefore, involuntary manslaughter cannot be a crime of violence. United States v. Springfield’s opposing rule is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and results of Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz and is no longer good law. Accordingly, defendant's section 924(c) count of conviction for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence is reversed. View "United States v. Benally" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen his asylum and withholding of removal proceedings. The court concluded that the BIA improperly evaluated petitioner’s submission of newly available, material evidence of changed country conditions in Indonesia, particularly in light of his conversion to Catholicism following his 2006 hearing and the change in the basis of his claim for relief; the Board abused its discretion in concluding that the evidence provided with his motion to reopen was “cumulative” of the evidence submitted at the time of the earlier hearing; the BIA erred in its analysis of petitioner's individualized risk, as it failed to consider the evidence relating to that question in the context of his membership in a disfavored group; and, given the Board’s legal errors in rejecting petitioner’s motion to reopen, the court granted his petition for review, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Salim v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a legal permanent resident, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction for attempted criminal threats, under California Penal Code sections 422 and 664, constitutes an aggravated felony for which he is removable. First, attempted criminal threats is categorically a crime of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. 16(a). Second, the California superior court designated the conviction as a felony and imposed a sentence of “at least one year.” Accordingly, petitioner is removable under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) and is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied the petition. View "Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law