Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is a Salvadoran citizen and national who was a former Salvadoran professional soccer player and then government official. The IJ concluded that petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because there were serious reasons for believing he committed serious nonpolitical crimes in both El Salvador and Guatemala; the IJ found petitioner to be non-credible after concluding that his explanation for failing to report his violent interactions with police in his asylum application was highly implausible; the IJ pointed out that petitioner admitted to having lied to the Salvadoran court, and found that petitioner failed to produce relevant evidence corroborating his story about the attacks; and the IJ held that petitioner has not met his burden under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because he had neither demonstrated he would likely be tortured in either El Salvador or Guatemala. The BIA thereafter dismissed petitioner's appeal and largely adopted the IJ's reasoning. The court concluded that the agency's credibility determination was valid; the Guatemalan charges provide a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal; petitioner's law of the case argument is meritless; and, in regard to the CAT claim, the BIA's order commanding petitioner's removal to Nicaragua stands. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Silva-Pereira v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenged the constitutionality of five city ordinances that regulate mobile billboards. One of the ordinances limits the type of sign that may be affixed to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets; the other ordinances prohibit non-motorized, “mobile billboard advertising displays” within city limits. Unlike the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the mobile billboard ordinances in this case do not single out a specific subject matter for differential treatment, nor is any kind of mobile billboard exempted from regulation based on its content. The court explained that an officer seeking to enforce the non-motorized billboard ordinances must decide only whether an offending vehicle constitutes a prohibited “advertising display” because its primary purpose is to display messages, as opposed to transporting passengers or carrying cargo. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately found the ordinances to be content neutral. The court also concluded that none of the ordinances are substantially broader than necessary to accomplish the cities' goals of eliminating visual blight and promoting the safe and convenient flow of traffic. Furthermore, the mobile billboard ordinances leave open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising. Because the mobile billboard ordinances are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the government's significant aesthetic and safety interests, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lone Star Sec. & Video v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brooks and Smith, bail enforcement agents, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against various defendants after they were removed from a court room by a courtroom marshal at the request of a judge. The court concluded that neither precedent nor first principles justify giving courtroom officials absolute immunity when they allegedly use force in excess of what their judge commanded and the Constitution allows. In this case, the marshal was not performing a judicial function and he employed more force than the judge ordered him to use. The court concluded, however, that the marshal was entitled to a qualified immunity defense. Given the chaos in the courtroom and the undisputed evidence that Brooks was intent on disobeying the court’s instructions - and given his extremely vague and insubstantial allegations about his injury - it is simply not “beyond debate” that the marshal employed an unreasonable amount of force. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the marshal's absolute immunity defense and reversed the district court's denial of his qualified immunity defense. View "Brooks v. Clark County" on Justia Law

The plaintiff class and the government entered into a settlement agreement in 1997 which “sets out nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS.” In 2015, the plaintiff class moved to enforce the Settlement, arguing that it applied to all minors in the custody of immigration authorities. The court concluded that the settlement unambiguously applies both to accompanied and unaccompanied minors, but does not create affirmative release rights for parents. The district court erred in interpreting the Settlement to provide release rights to adults. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend on the record before it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of drugs with intent to distribute, as well as being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 57-months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not procedurally err at sentencing where the district court read all relevant materials, understood the proper role of the guidelines, considered the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and decided to vary upward from the Guidelines range based on defendant’s particular circumstances. In United States v. Vongxay, the court held that felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms. The court concluded that its decision in Vongxay forecloses defendant’s Second Amendment argument. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court noted that there are good reasons to be skeptical of the constitutional correctness of categorical, lifetime bans on firearm possession by all “felons.” In this case, although defendant is right that misprision is not a violent crime, he is wrong about it being “purely” passive. The court is hard pressed to conclude that a crime that has always been a federal felony cannot serve as the basis of a felon firearm ban, simply because its actus reus may appear innocuous. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Defendant conspired with former Korn/Ferry employees whose user accounts had been terminated, but who nonetheless accessed trade secrets in a proprietary database through the back door when the front door had been firmly closed. The court concluded that defendant knowingly and with intent to defraud Korn/Ferry blatantly circumvented the affirmative revocation of his computer system access. This access falls squarely within the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, prohibition on access “without authorization.” The court concluded that “without authorization” is an unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction for violations of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA. The court also affirmed defendant's convictions under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(2) -(a)(4), for downloading, receiving and possessing trade secrets in the form of source lists from the former employer's database. The court vacated in part and remanded the restitution order for reconsideration of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees award. View "United States v. Nosal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed two complaints against APWU in federal court, alleging a contractual breach of APWU’s duty of fair representation in the first, and alleging a series of violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Nevada state tort laws in the second. One district court judge dismissed plaintiff's first complaint. The second district court judge dismissed the second complaint, ruling that, because a prima facie claim of disability discrimination against a union necessarily required a showing of a breach of the duty of fair representation, plaintiff's ADA claims were barred by the issue preclusion doctrine. The court endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Green v. American Federation of Teachers/Illinois Federation of Teachers Local 604, and held that a prima facie disability discrimination claim against a union does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair representation. In this case, plaintiff's ADA claims are not barred by issue preclusion. The court also found that plaintiff's second complaint survives APWU's claim preclusion challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garity v. APWU" on Justia Law

When plaintiff testified at her son's trial, LA County Deputy District Attorney Michele Hanisee published all of plaintiff's medical records that she had subpoenaed from Kaiser without redacting them for the sole purpose of discrediting plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint pro se for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law causes of action against Kaiser and Hanisee, as well as County Defendants. The district court dismissed all causes of action against the County Defendants with prejudice and against Kaiser without prejudice. The court concluded that defendants Hanisee and Cooley are not entitled to absolute immunity for Hanisee’s misrepresentations in her declaration supporting the application for the subpoena duces tecum; the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff leave to amend her section 1983 claim against the County; and the County Defendants are not entitled to the claimed state statutory immunity because the claims against them are not malicious prosecution claims. Because the court reversed the dismissal of certain federal claims, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of state law claims against Kaiser. View "Garmon v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was awarded social security disability benefits due to her bipolar disorder. Plaintiff was disabled as of April 15, 2007, but had medically improved to the point she was no longer disabled beginning on March 24, 2009. The court concluded that in closed period cases an ALJ should compare the medical evidence used to determine that the claimant was disabled with the medical evidence existing at the time of asserted medical improvement. Although the ALJ in this case made the appropriate comparison, the court concluded that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding of medical improvement. The ALJ erroneously focused on only temporary periods and isolated aspects of plaintiff's improvement that were not representative of the continuing severity of her symptoms. In this case, plaintiff's improvement was not sustained and was considerably limited in scope. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Attmore v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denial of his petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner pleaded guilty to one felony count of causing bodily injury while driving under the influence and one felony count of unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as admitting a single prior strike conviction and four prison priors. The court found that, in this case, the government was bound by its agreement in open court that punishment could be no greater than 14 years, 4 months in prison, in light of Ricketts v. Adamson. The court concluded that petitioner entered a binding, judicially approved plea agreement and stood convicted; the prosecution breached the court-approved plea agreement by attempting to amend the complaint; and allowing petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea was no remedy at all where the Superior Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law pursuant to Santobello v. New York by failing to order specific performance of petitioner’s plea agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Cuero v. Cate" on Justia Law