Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner challenged the denial of his petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner pleaded guilty to one felony count of causing bodily injury while driving under the influence and one felony count of unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as admitting a single prior strike conviction and four prison priors. The court found that, in this case, the government was bound by its agreement in open court that punishment could be no greater than 14 years, 4 months in prison, in light of Ricketts v. Adamson. The court concluded that petitioner entered a binding, judicially approved plea agreement and stood convicted; the prosecution breached the court-approved plea agreement by attempting to amend the complaint; and allowing petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea was no remedy at all where the Superior Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law pursuant to Santobello v. New York by failing to order specific performance of petitioner’s plea agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Cuero v. Cate" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former mortgage loan officer and real estate broker, appealed his convictions and sentence for nine counts of wire fraud and one count of aggravated theft. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a complex mortgage fraud scheme. The court held that lender negligence in verifying loan application information, or even intentional disregard of the information, is not a defense to fraud, and so evidence of such negligence or intentional disregard is inadmissible as a defense against charges of mortgage fraud. The court also held that, when a lender requests specific information in its loan applications, that information is objectively material as a matter of law, regardless of the lenders’ policies or practices with respect to use of that information. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was charged with two counts of child endangerment under Or. Rev. Stat. 163.575 after officers smelled the odor of marijuana from her home but she refused to allow them to search inside the residence. Plaintiff argued that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering her carport and approaching her home’s back door. The trial court agreed and granted plaintiff's motion to suppress. The charges were later dropped. Plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the officers and the City, alleging constitutional violations for false arrest without probable cause and by interfering with her (and her children's) right to familial association. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court joined other federal courts of appeal and held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in section 1983 cases, and rejected plaintiff's suggestion that probable cause to arrest may be supported only by information that was obtained in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the officers’ unlawful entry into her home’s curtilage necessarily tainted the arrest that followed. In this case, plaintiff gives no reason to doubt that the officers indeed smelled what they suspected to be marijuana. Such odor gave the officers probable cause to arrest plaintiff under Oregon law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lingo v. City of Salem" on Justia Law

In 1854 and 1855, Indian tribes relinquished large swaths of land in the Case Area under the Stevens Treaties. In exchange for their land, the tribes were guaranteed a right to off-reservation fishing. In 2001, twenty-one Indian tribes, joined by the United States, filed a "Request for Determination" in district court contending that the State had violated, and was continuing to violate, the Treaties. In 2007, the district court held that, in building and maintaining culverts that prevented mature salmon from returning from the sea to their spawning grounds, Washington had caused the size of salmon runs in the Case Area to diminish and that Washington thereby violated its obligation under the Treaties. In 2013, the district court issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The court concluded that Washing has violated, and continues to violate, its obligation to the Tribes under the fishing clause of the Treaties; the United States has not waived the rights of the Tribes under the Treaties, and has not waived its own sovereign immunity by bringing suit on behalf of the Tribes; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining Washington to correct most of its high-priority barrier culverts within seventeen years, and to correct the remainder at the end of the culverts' natural life or in the course of a road construction project undertaken for independent reasons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendants Grovo and Petersen challenge aspects of their convictions for charges related to their roles in an online bulletin board dedicated to discussing and exchanging child pornography. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants for engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, and for conspiracy to advertise child pornography. The definition of “advertisement” under 18 U.S.C. 2251(d) presents a question of first impression in this circuit. Assuming without deciding that an “advertisement” under section 2251(d) requires some public component, the court held that advertising to a particular subset of the public is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the statute. The court emphasized that the district court's apportioning loss between defendants was sound under United States v. Paroline. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' convictions. The court vacated the district court’s restitution order and remanded to allow the district court to disaggregate the portion of the victim’s losses caused by the original abuse from those attributable to continued viewing of her image, consistent with the rule announced in United States v. Galan. View "United States v. Grovo" on Justia Law

Marcus Katz contributed stock to MK Hillside, a partnership between him and his wholly owned corporation. After the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) to MK Hillside on January 2, 2008, finding that MK Hillside was a sham, lacked economic substance, and was formed and used principally to avoid taxes, Katz petitioned the tax court contesting the finding and asserting the statute of limitations. The IRS determined that 26 U.S.C. 6501(e)(1)'s six-year statute of limitations applied because Katz’s omission of the $198,000 credit from a collar termination on his 1999 return constituted more than 25% of the gross income reported on the return. The tax court denied summary judgment, holding that a trial would be necessary to determine whether Katz in fact omitted substantial income from his 1999 return. To avoid a trial, the parties agreed to a Stipulation of Facts and a Second Stipulation of Settled Issues. Based on those stipulations, the tax court held that the period for assessing tax on the 1999 MK Hillside partnership items was open as to Katz. The court concluded that, because the tax court had jurisdiction to consider Katz's argument, it necessarily had jurisdiction to reject it, at least for purposes of the partnership proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "MK Hillside Partners v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition, seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion raising a claim for relief predicated on Johnson v. United States. The court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the claim he asserts in his proposed section 2255 motion relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Therefore, the court granted the application. The court clarified an issue regarding the running of the statute of limitations. The court concluded that the filing of a second or successive application in this court tolls the 1-year statute of limitations, and that the limitations period remains tolled until the court rules on the application. The one caveat is that, to trigger tolling, the application must allege the claim or claims for which authorization to file a second or successive motion is ultimately granted. View "Orona v. United States" on Justia Law

Student and Guardian seek reimbursement from the district for the cost of Student's private education, claiming that the district failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1491o (IDEA), and thus failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) for Student. The district court affirmed the ALJ's denial of reimbursement. In regard to the June 2009 individualized education program (IEP), the court agreed with the lower courts that any procedural failure on the part of the district was caused by Guardian, and that, in any event, the Jordon Intermediate School placement was a FAPE. In regard to the June 2011 IEP, the court concluded that the IDEA does not require the school district to conduct all assessments possible. In this case, the district court did not violate the IDEA by failing to assess Student for anxiety and failing to determine the baseline for Student's speech and language goals. Finally, the Buena Park placement offer was a FAPE in the LRE for Student. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baquerizo v. Garden Grove USD" on Justia Law

Rolando Mora-Huerta, a Mexican national, was denied a visa application by a consular officer on the ground that he was a “gang associate” who intended to enter the United States to engage in unlawful conduct. Plaintiff, Mora's wife and a United States citizen, filed suit challenging the consular officer's decision. The court held that, under Marks v. United States, and the court's recent en banc decision in United States v. Davis, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kerry v. Din is the controlling opinion. Under the Din concurrence, the facially legitimate and bona fide reason test has two components. First, the consular officer must deny the visa under a valid statute of inadmissibility. Second, the consular officer must cite an admissibility statute that “specifies discrete factual predicates the consular officer must find to exist before denying a visa,”or there must be a fact in the record that “provides at least a facial connection to” the statutory ground of inadmissibility. Applying that opinion to this case, the court concluded that the consular officer gave a facially legitimate reason to denying Mora's visa because he cited a valid statute of inadmissibility and a bona fide factual reason that provided a facial connection to the statutory ground of inadmissibility: the belief that Mora was a gang associate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cardenas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the agencies' decision to change how they operated the Albeni Falls Dam during the winter months. The environmental assessment (EA) here concludes that no environmental impact statement (EIS) is required because the proposed action will not “result in any new significant impacts to the human environment.” The court concluded that NEPA only requires the preparation of an EIS when a proposed federal action is major. In this case, actions taken with respect to winter dam management since 1995 reinforce the conclusion that there was no change to the status quo. Because the period when the agencies held winter lake levels constant did not change the operational status quo, neither does the decision to revert to flexible winter operations. The court also concluded that, because the decision adopting flexible winter operations does not trigger NEPA’s requirement to publish an EIS, this and petitioner’s other challenges to the EA’s finding of no significant impact are moot. The court rejected petitioner's challenge to the BPA's failure to prepare a supplemental EIS. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Idaho Conservation League v. BPA" on Justia Law