Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged the BLM's decision to grant Tule a right-of-way on federal lands in southeast San Diego County. The BLM’s right-of-way grant permits Tule to construct and operate a wind energy project, which plaintiffs claim will harm birds in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703–12, and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Act), 16 U.S.C. 668–668d. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321–70h, in a number of respects in preparing the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The court concluded that the district court properly determined that the EIS’s purpose-and need-statement was adequately broad, such that the agency’s decision was not foreordained; the BLM acted within its discretion in dismissing alternative proposals; the mitigation measures, including the 85-page Protection Plan, provide ample detail and adequate baseline data for the agency to evaluate the overall environmental impact of the Project; and the BLM's investigation took a hard look at the environmental impacts of the Project. The court held that plaintiffs’ argument that the Project will inevitably result in migratory-bird fatalities, even if true, is unavailing because the MBTA does not contemplate attenuated secondary liability on agencies like the BLM that act in a purely regulatory capacity, and whose regulatory acts do not directly or proximately cause the “take” of migratory birds, within the meaning of 16 U.S.C. 703(a). The court further held that the BLM’s regulatory role in this case is too far removed from the ultimate legal violation to be independently unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-06. Finally, in regard to the Eagle Act, the court held that, in the narrow circumstances of this case, the BLM did not, by granting Tule the referenced right-of-way, take “agency actions . . . implemented by the agency itself” that would directly or proximately result in the incidental take of eagles by it or Tule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for federal agencies and officials, as well as Tule. View "Protect Our Communities Found. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his social security benefits. In a case of first impression, the court held that the law of the case doctrine and the rule of mandate apply to social security administrative remands from federal court in the same way they would apply to any other case. In this case, the court concluded that, given the new evidence - highly probative testimony about plaintiff's ability to perform his past work and a new finding supporting that testimony - the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the law of the case doctrine. Given the expansive remand orders in this case, the ALJ did not violate the rule of mandate. The court also held that the ALJ properly categorized plaintiff’s past work and correctly found that he was still able to perform that work as it is generally performed in the national economy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stacy v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court imposed a mandatory life sentence because defendant had two prior convictions for felony drug offenses. The court concluded that, despite the substantial evidence of defendant's possession for purposes of sale, there was insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he tacitly or explicitly made the requisite agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction. View "United States v. Loveland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly calculated the guideline range that applied to defendant at sentencing by using the criminal history category applicable to defendant before consideration of a downward departure under USSG 4A1.3. Therefore, defendant was not eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c). View "United States v. Ornelas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former police officers employed by the City, filed suit against the City under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-19, alleging that the City failed to include payments of unused portions of plaintiffs’ benefits allowances when calculating their regular rate of pay, resulting in a lower overtime rate and a consequent underpayment of overtime compensation. Plaintiffs asserted that the City’s violation of the FLSA was “willful,” entitling them to a three-year statute of limitations. The court concluded that the City’s payment of unused benefits must be included in the regular rate of pay and thus in the calculation of the overtime rate for its police officers as well. Furthermore, because the City took no affirmative steps to ensure that its initial designation of its benefits payments complied with the FLSA and failed to establish that it acted in good faith in excluding those payments from its regular rate of pay, plaintiffs are entitled to a three-year statute of limitations and liquidated damages for the City’s violations. The court concluded, however, that the City has demonstrated that it qualifies for the partial overtime exemption under section 207(k) of the Act, limiting its damages for the overtime violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment partially in favor of plaintiffs. View "Flores v. City of San Gabriel" on Justia Law

VMG filed a copyright infringement suit against Madonna and others, alleging that the producer of the song "Vogue," copied a 0.23-second segment of horns from an earlier song, known as "Love Break," and used a modified version of that snippet when recording "Vogue." The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and awarded them attorney's fees under 17 U.S.C. 505. VMG appealed. The court agreed with the district court's application of the longstanding legal rule that de minimus copying does not constitute infringement and that a general audience would not recognize the brief snippet in "Vogue" as originating from "Love Break." The court rejected VMG's argument that Congress eliminated the de minimis exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound recording. The court recognized that the Sixth Circuit held to the contrary in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, but found Bridgeport's reasoning unpersuasive. The court held that the de minimus exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound recordings, as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. In regard to the attorney's fees, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion. A claim premised on a legal theory adopted by the only circuit court to have addressed the issue is, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary constitutes legal error. View "VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of crimes related to his involvement in a cocaine trafficking conspiracy, appealed the denial of a motion to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to modify defendant's sentence in 2013. In this case, the district court was correct to find that defendant was responsible for more than 8.4 kilograms of crack cocaine. Defendant’s applicable Guidelines range under the drug quantity table, as modified by Amendment 750, would therefore be the same as the Guidelines range before the Amendment. Therefore, the Amendment did not have the effect of lowering defendant's applicable guideline range and modifying defendant's sentence would not be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Commission. The court also held that the district court did not err when it relied on factual findings from the 2001 sentencing hearing where defendant cites no authority for his contrary assertion that the 2013 court should have ignored factual findings in the 2001 sentencing proceeding because of a possible Rule 32 violation. Finally, the court held that Amendment 782 does not provide a basis for reversing the district court’s denial of defendant's motion because Amendment 782 went into effect after the district court denied defendant's motion in 2013 based on the pre-Amendment 782 drug quantity table. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Spears" on Justia Law

ASA filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Board, alleging that the Board modified its policies to retaliate against the ASA's exercise of its First Amendment free speech rights. The ASA alleged that the Board's retaliatory policy change caused it harm by chilling students’ political speech and depriving the ASA of its income. The district court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim by the ASA for retrospective relief, including money damages, against the Board. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred when it failed to apply Ex Parte Young to the ASA’s claim of ongoing First Amendment retaliation, and its request for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. In this case, the ASA properly alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim, and it identified the Board's changes to its fee-collection policies as the sources of ongoing violations of federal law within the meaning of Young and its progeny. The court also concluded that the district court erred when it dismissed the suit with prejudice on futility grounds. In this case, the ASA adequately and plainly pleaded a plausible claim for First Amendment retaliation on the basis that the Board deprived it of a valuable government benefit. The collection and remittance of funds is a valuable government benefit, and a change in policy undertaken for retaliatory purposes that results in the deprivation of those funds implicates the First Amendment. Finally, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the ASA leave to amend its complaint to conform with the requirements of Young. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents" on Justia Law

North County filed suit against Qwest, a rival local exchange carrier, and, in their official capacities, the Arizona Commission and the Oregon Commission. The commissions are state agencies whose responsibilities include regulating contracts between such carriers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, classifies local exchange carriers into two categories: incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), and competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Qwest is an ILEC, and North County is a CLEC. The parties entered into interconnection agreements (ICAs) in 1997. When subsequent negotiations for extension agreements were not successful, Qwest filed suit to compel arbitration. The district court granted summary judgment to Qwest. Given (1) the language of the 1997 ICAs’ negotiation clause and the way it was interpreted by both state Commissions below; (2) North County’s conduct in the time leading up to the arbitration proceedings; and (3) North County’s lack of any rebuttal argument before this court; the court is satisfied that the state Commissions had authority to arbitrate the 2011 ICAs because the 1997 ICAs themselves gave Qwest the power to invoke the negotiation-and-arbitration mechanism set forth in 47 U.S.C. 252. The court examined six specific provisions of the 2011 ICAs and rejected North County's challenges. View "NCCC v. Qwest" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican native and citizen, petitioned for review of the government's reinstatement of a removal order issued in 2000. Petitioner received notice of removal in 2009 and, since that time, the government revised its policies regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration proceedings. The court concluded that there is nothing in the facts of petitioner’s case justifying remand to ICE for it to reconsider its decision to reinstate her prior expedited removal order; intervening agency memoranda that do not change the law to be applied by an appellate court do not require remand to the agency; nor was ICE required to explain its reasoning when exercising its prosecutorial discretion to reinstate petitioner's removal order; and ICE was not required to wait until all of petitioner's administrative appeals had concluded before reinstating removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Morales de Soto v. Lynch" on Justia Law