Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defeated faction of the Tribe filed suit arguing that the Department erred in several of its decisions related to choosing the leadership authority for the Tribe by failing to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the Tribe’s recent adoption of a new constitution moots this appeal. Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to deciding live cases or controversies. This rule forecloses the court's ability to reach the merits in this case, because there is no chance that a remand to the Bureau of Indian Affairs would make any difference whatsoever. View "Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. USDOI" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of her motion to reopen. Petitioner's motion to reopen argued that exceptional circumstances prevented petitioner from attending the hearing. The court concluded that, while petitioner's explanation does not reveal great sophistication, planning, or resources, it is not inherently unbelievable or incredible, and therefore the IJ and the BIA erred in disregarding petitioner's explanation. The court held that a car’s mechanical failure does not alone compel granting a motion to reopen based on “exceptional circumstances.” In this case, petitioner's explanation, taken as true, does not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioner took an unnecessarily long route to court, giving her little margin for error; she did not use the $500 she had to reach the court on time but used it instead to tow her car to a mechanic and prepaid for the repair; and she failed to contact her lawyer or the court to inform them of the problem. The court held that mechanical failure coupled with decisions to leave insufficient time to account for routine delays and to pay for car repairs instead of transportation to court, does not constitute exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Garcia Arredondo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two murders and sentenced to death, challenged the district court's denial of his habeas petition. The court concluded that the Arizona Supreme Court did not act unreasonably in rejecting petitioner’s Sixth Amendment confrontation claim where his argument is foreclosed by Williams v. New York, which held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar courts from considering unconfronted statements during sentencing proceedings; the court rejected petitioner's claims in relation to the prosecution's rebuttal evidence and concluded that the district court did not err in finding that he suffered no constitutional violation when the prosecution introduced substantial evidence of petitioner's prior crimes during the penalty-phase hearings; any (E)(2) vagueness challenge fails because both the trial court and Arizona Supreme Court applied the narrowed definition of the (E)(2) aggravator to petitioner’s case; the application of the (E)(2) aggravator was in no way contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; neither the state trial court’s decision to give the (E)(6) narrowing instruction, nor the Arizona Supreme Court’s (E)(6) analysis, was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement; and petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Pow! Mobile (the Company), not a party here, is a mobile content provider that marketed a “reverse auction” game called “Bid and Win.” Both Mobile Messenger and m-Qube (defendants) are “billing aggregators” who serve as financial intermediaries between customers and content providers. Plaintiff filed a class action alleging that defendants have engaged in a scheme “that causes Washington consumers to become unknowingly and unwittingly subscribed to premium text message services.” The district court held that defendants are not intended third-party beneficiaries entitled to enforce the arbitration clause at issue and denied defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the Terms and Conditions in this case create a direct obligation from the subscriber to the Company’s suppliers. The signatory to the Terms and Conditions agrees to waive all claims against the Company’s suppliers. Therefore, the Company’s suppliers are intended third-party beneficiaries of the Terms and Conditions. Thus, if defendants are suppliers of the Company, they may enforce the arbitration clause. The court remanded for the district court to make determinations in the first instance regarding assent to the Terms and Conditions, and whether defendants are Pow! Mobile’s suppliers. View "Geier v. m-Qube Inc." on Justia Law

ONDA filed suit challenging a wind-energy development on the ground that the BLM's environmental review of the project did not adequately address impacts to the greater sage grouse. The court concluded that the BLM’s review did not adequately assess baseline sage grouse numbers during winter at the Echanis site, where the wind turbines are to be installed. Because this error was not harmless, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the BLM and others as to this issue. However, the court concluded that ONDA did not exhaust its argument regarding genetic connectivity where ONDA did not bring the issue to the BLM's attention during the environmental review process. Accordingly, the issue was not exhausted and is not subject to review. View "ONDA v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants after the shooting death of Bernie Villegas. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could draw the following factual conclusions: (1) the officers, responding to a call about a suspected drug dealer armed with a shotgun and loitering in the visitor parking area of an apartment complex, came upon Villegas already holding a long gun; (2) Villegas was ordered to put his hands up, and as he was complying, the officers ordered him to drop his gun; (3) without providing a warning or sufficient time to comply, or observing Villegas pointing the long gun toward the officers or making any move toward the trigger, Officer Bennallack resorted to deadly force. Viewing the facts in this light, the court concluded that the deadly force was not objectively reasonable. Thus, the district court erred in holding that Bennallack’s use of deadly force was justified as a matter of law and in granting summary judgment on that basis. The court concluded, however, that it was not clearly established at the time that using deadly force in this situation, even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Bennallack is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for his use of deadly force. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to this claim. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the state law claims and remanded them for further proceedings. View "C. V. v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' denial of a discretionary nunc pro tunc designation of a state prison for service of his federal sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3621(b). The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claims that the BOP violated the Constitution, exceeded its statutory authority, or acted contrary to established federal law. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred by dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that the BOP acted contrary to 18 U.S.C. 3621(b)(4), which directs the BOP, when designating a prisoner to a facility in which to serve his sentence, to consider “any statement by the court that imposed the sentence.” In this case, it is undisputed that the BOP relied on a letter from a judge who not only was not the sentencing judge, but who had been formally recused from the case due to an actual conflict – namely, his connection to the victim of the crime. The court concluded that the BOP acted contrary to section 3621(b)(4) and due process by relying on the letter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to grant the petition with directions for the BOP to reconsider the nunc pro tunc designation request. View "Rodriguez v. Copenhaver" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retiree with significant trading experience, received $500,000 following her husband’s death. After consulting with Jennifer Huang, her long-time commodity trading advisor, and James Kelly, an account executive at her futures commission merchant (FCM), Peregrine, plaintiff decided to place the funds in a new account with Peregrine. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit claiming that Kelly and Peregrine disregarded her account instructions and permitted Huang to conduct unauthorized trades in the account, in violation of 7 U.S.C. 6b(a) and 17 C.F.R. 166.2–166.3. The ALJ ruled in favor of plaintiff, but the CFTC reversed. Applying a substantial evidence standard, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the CFTC’s decision that Kelly made no material misrepresentation or omission, that there was no unauthorized trading, and that the record does not support a finding of fraud. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chenli Chu v. US Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civil-service employee at a naval base, filed a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics action after he was involved in a budgetary investigation against base administrators for employment-related due process and First Amendment violations. Plaintiff also filed suit against the investigator for Fourth Amendment violations. The court held that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., precludes employment-related Bivens claims by Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentality Program (NAFI) employees like plaintiff, for whom Congress has provided other safeguards. The court also concluded that plaintiff suffered no Fourth Amendment violation because he impliedly consented to the storage of his belongings by voluntarily passing through an internal checkpoint in a passage-restricted military installation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint. View "Farkas v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims alleging breach of contract and claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., against BAH and others. Under California law, a breach of a written contract must be brought within four years of the date of the alleged breach, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 337. The court concluded that plaintiff's cause of action accrued in September 2003 and the filing of his complaint was untimely. Therefore, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is time barred. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff a third opportunity to amend his complaint. Finally, the court held that the employer’s stock rights plan did not qualify as an employee pension benefit plan subject to ERISA under 29 U.S.C. 1002(2)(A) because its primary purpose was not to provide deferred compensation or other retirement benefits. Because, in this case, the stock rights plan was not designed or intended to provide retirement or deferred income, it is not covered by ERISA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rich v. Shrader" on Justia Law