Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City and police officers, alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law. The officers were responding to a report that two armed black males had been seen in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The officers, eventually numbering over twenty, were armed with assault rifles. There was no one meeting the description of the report at the scene, only a large Samoan family celebrating a little girl's birthday. The officers detained the family, searched them for weapons, and searched the family's apartment without a warrant or consent. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, but its jurisdiction is limited to deciding only the question whether, taking all the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The court concluded that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for the seizure of the three teenage boys, for the seizure of Sialoi Sialoi Jr., for the seizure of the remaining plaintiffs, and for the warrantless search of the apartment. Because defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court properly denied their motion for summary judgment. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Sialoi v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition with prejudice after concluding that petitioner had not fairly presented his claims to the Oregon state court first. The court concluded that petitioner fairly presented to the Oregon courts his claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by unduly pressuring him into accepting the no contest plea, and that his decision to enter the plea and waive his right to a jury trial was not knowingly and voluntarily made. In this case, petitioner attempted to present his claims in proper form by filing Section B of a Balfour brief and expressly incorporating his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition by reference under the heading "Argument." That petitioner may have done this under the wrong heading is surely less serious error than the one found excusable in Farmer v. Baldwin. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Carillo-Carillo v. Coursey" on Justia Law

Paso Robles was responsible for providing Luke, a child with autism, with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1487. At the time of Luke’s initial evaluation, Paso Robles was aware that Luke displayed signs of autistic behavior, and therefore, autism was a suspected disability for which it was required to assess him. Paso Robles chose not to formally assess Luke for autism because a member of its staff opined, after an informal, unscientific observation of the child, that Luke merely had an expressive language delay, not a disorder on the autism spectrum. The court held that, in so doing, Paso Robles violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA and, as a result, was unable to design an educational plan that addressed Luke’s unique needs. Accordingly, the court held that Paso Robles denied Luke a free appropriate public education, and remanded for the determination of an appropriate remedy. View "Timothy O. v. Paso Robles USD" on Justia Law

Castaic, debtors, challenged the district court's dismissal of this bankruptcy appeal as moot under 11 U.S.C. 363(m). During the pendency of the appeal, the bankruptcy court dismissed the underlying bankruptcy cases as well. Castaic did not appeal those dismissals, and after 14 days, they became final. Therefore, the court concluded that there is no longer any case or controversy, and the court has no power to grant Castaic any effective relief. The court dismissed the appeal as moot under Article III. View "In the matter of Castaic Partners II, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CCA under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that CCA staffed the Idaho Corrections Center (ICC) with an inadequate number of security guards, in deliberate indifference to the health and safety of prisoners. After the parties settled, CCA agreed to staff ICC with a specified number of security personnel. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The district court subsequently held CCA in contempt for falsifying staffing reports, ordered remedial measures, and awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs. The court concluded that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the district court’s dismissal order. The court also concluded that the extension of the settlement agreement is a compensatory civil sanction. Rather than punishing CCA, this sanction sought to return plaintiffs as nearly as possible to the position they would have occupied had CCA not violated the agreement. By extending the settlement agreement for two years, the district court thus ordered the relief to which plaintiffs were originally entitled under the agreement but that CCA had failed to provide. The court concluded that the remedies remain narrowly drawn, necessary, and the least intrusive means to rectify CCA’s continued Eighth Amendment violations. In regard to attorney's fees, the court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626, allows enhancement of the lodestar figure in appropriate circumstances; while the PLRA limits the hours and the hourly rate used in calculating the lodestar figure, it does not cap the total amount of attorney’s fees awards in cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and it continues to authorize a court to enhance the lodestar figure based on non-subsumed factors; and even when an enhancement is appropriate it may not be based on considerations already subsumed in the PLRA rate. In this case, the district court provided clear reasons, supported by specific evidence in the record, for enhancing the lodestar figure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the contempt order and the order awarding attorney's fees. View "Kelly v. Wengler" on Justia Law

Appellants are a sub-class of moderately to severely disabled children who have moved to intervene in a class action brought on behalf of all disabled students in the LAUSD against the LAUSD (the Chanda Smith Litigation). Appellants seek to intervene to challenge the legality of a new policy, adopted by LAUSD in 2012 as part of a renegotiation of the Chanda Smith parties’ settlement. The district court denied the motion to intervene. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and further erred when it found intervention unnecessary to protect appellants’ interest in ensuring the receipt of public education consistent with their disabilities and federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Smith v. LAUSD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two prisoners housed at Taft Correction Institute, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, after they contracted coccidioidomycosis (cocci), alleging that the United States breached its duty to protect them from harm. Taft is the only federally-owned and contractor-operated prison in the country. The district court granted the government’s motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), under the independent contractor exception to the FTCA. The court concluded that plaintiffs have met their burden to show that the independent contractor exception does not bar the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA. The government owed a duty of care to plaintiffs under California law, which generally assumes that landowners have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the ownership and management of property. In this case, the government’s duty was underscored by the special relationship that California recognizes between jailer and prisoner. The court concluded that the BOP’s duty to warn prisoners before transferring them to Taft arose outside of the scope of its contractor relationship with GEO/MTC, and therefore is not barred by the independent contractor exception. Furthermore, the BOP did not delegate all of its duties to GEO/MTC, even once prisoners arrived at Taft. Instead, it retained both the exclusive right to construct new buildings and the exclusive right to make modifications to existing buildings. The BOP also explicitly excluded its contractors from participating in the development of a cocci prevention policy. As to these claims, the independent contractor exception to the FTCA does not bar the district court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Edison v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Golden Eagle, filed a class action against Liberty Mutual for violating the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that when Liberty Mutual purchased Golden Eagle, Liberty Mutual told plaintiffs that they would receive past service credit for the time they worked with Golden Eagle under Liberty Mutual’s retirement plan. The district court granted summary judgment to Liberty Mutual. The court concluded that plaintiffs cannot receive benefits for past service credit with Golden Eagle under the terms of the retirement plan where the district court applied the correct abuse of discretion standard, and Liberty Mutual's interpretation of the plan was reasonable. The court also concluded that plaintiffs are not barred from bringing simultaneous claims under section 1132(a)(3) and 1132(a)(1)(B). In Varity Corp. v. Howe, equitable relief under section 1132(a)(3) is not available if section 1132(a)(1)(B) provides an adequate remedy. In CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, section 1132(a)(3) authorized equitable relief in the form of plan reformation, even though plaintiffs also claimed relief under section 1132(a)(1)(B). Applying Amara’s conclusion that a plaintiff may seek relief under both section 1132(a)(1)(B) and section 1132(a)(3) does not contravene the ruling in Varity. The court further concluded that Liberty Mutual failed to notify plaintiffs in its summary plan descriptions that past service credit with Golden Eagle would not count for benefits accrual, but plaintiffs did not prove harm or reliance on the summary plan descriptions. Finally, the class certification was appropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Moyle v. Liberty Mut. Ret. Benefit Plan" on Justia Law

Drywall entered into a labor agreement with the Union according to which Drywall assigned to a contractors' association authority to bargain on its behalf. After Drywall attempted to terminate the agreement, it discovered that the Union and association had executed a Memorandum of Understanding extending the term of the agreement. An arbitrator held that Drywall was bound by the Memorandum.The district court vacated the arbitration award and held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement was not “plausible” and was, moreover, contrary to public policy. The court held that the district court's decision exceeded its narrow authority to determine whether the arbitrator’s award was based on the parties’ contract and whether it violated an “explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy,” and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision. View "SWRCC v. Drywall Dynamics" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the denial of her application for supplemental security income. At issue is whether the ALJ erred in according “limited weight” to the opinion of a nurse practitioner. The court held that an ALJ errs when he discounts an other source’s entire testimony because of inconsistency with evidence in the record, when the ALJ has divided the testimony into distinct parts and determined that only one part of the testimony is inconsistent. Thus, the ALJ’s determination in this case that the nurse practitioner’s opinion regarding Claimant’s “exertional and postural” limitations was inconsistent with other evidence in the record was an insufficient reason to reject her testimony regarding Claimant’s manipulative and mental limitations. That error was not harmless, because the vocational expert opined that a person with the mental limitations identified by the nurse practitioner could not work. The court concluded that further proceedings are required to reconcile all the record evidence and to consider additional issues. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dale v. Colvin" on Justia Law