Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action filed against DSHS by plaintiff. At issue is whether the Due Process Clause compels the state to perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within seven days of a court order requiring evaluation. The district court addressed both initial competency evaluations and the mental health restoration services that follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that services for both categories must be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an individualized determination of clinical good cause. The district court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although Washington appeals only that portion related to initial competency evaluations. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct competency evaluations within a reasonable time following a court’s order. The district court’s seven-day mandate, however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. View "Trueblood V. WSDSHS" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss an information charging him with being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Petitioner argued that his underlying deportation was invalid because his prior conviction for possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of California Health & Safety Code 11378 was not an aggravated felony. The court concluded that petitioner's removal order was validly premised on his conviction for violating Section 11378 where the district court properly applied the categorical approach to section 11378 and petitioner's overbreadth arguments are unavailing. The court correctly concluded that although section 11378 was not categorically an aggravated felony, application of the modified categorical approach resulted in a determination that petitioner was indeed convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner’s reliance on the federal regulation excluding a particular product containing L-meth from inclusion in the federal schedules is not persuasive, because petitioner failed to show a “realistic probability” of prosecution for possession of the excluded product. The court also concluded, for the same reasons, that the district court correctly imposed a sentencing enhancement for drug trafficking. Accordingly, the court affirmed the criminal judgment and remanded for correction of the judgment. View "United States v. Vega-Ortiz" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner of unlawful possession but acquitted him on two charged counts of second degree assault. The jury, however, impliedly acquitted petitioner on the first degree assault, and convicted him instead of the lesser-included offense of second degree assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and, on remand, petitioner pled guilty to second degree assault. Petitioner subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, arguing that he did not validly waive counsel and that the State violated double jeopardy principles on remand. The district court initially dismissed the habeas petition, but then granted a motion for reconsideration, vacated its prior judgment, and granted habeas relief. The court held that a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) filed within twenty-eight days of judgment that raises a new claim, including one based on newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in substantive law, is subject to AEDPA’s second-or-successive petition bar. However, a timely motion for reconsideration that asks the district court to reconsider a previously adjudicated claim on grounds already raised should not be construed as a second or successive habeas petition subject to AEDPA’s additional restrictions. In this case, the court held that petitioner's motion for reconsideration properly asked the district court to reconsider the merits of two claims that were raised in his initial habeas petition. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's post-judgment motion in the first instance without seeking pre-certification by the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). On the merits, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting reconsideration and awarding habeas relief on his waiver of counsel claim. Finally, the district court erred by granting petitioner habeas relief on his double jeopardy claim. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded with instructions. View "Rishor v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of distributing crack cocaine. The court vacated the sentence because it found that the district court erred by imposing a career offender enhancement under USSG 4B1.1(a)(3) in light of his two prior California drug convictions. The court concluded that neither of his two prior convictions was for a crime of violence as defined by the residual clause because the convictions do not qualify under the case law that predated Johnson v. United States. Therefore, the court need not address whether the residual clause in USSG 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. Because defendant has only one qualifying conviction, the career offender enhancement is not warranted. The court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 108 individuals with property near the Boeing facility, filed suit against Boeing and Landau in state court, alleging that for several decades Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its facility in Auburn, Washington, and that for over a decade Landau had been negligent in its investigation and remediation of the resulting pollution. Boeing removed to federal court based on diversity and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court remanded to state court finding that there was not complete diversity and plaintiffs' action came within the single-event exception to CAFA federal jurisdiction. In this appeal, Boeing argued that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they seek “significant relief” from Landau, the in-state defendant, and that Landau’s conduct does not form “a significant basis of the claims asserted,” as required by section 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). The court concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pled both that they are seeking “significant relief” from Landau and that Landau’s alleged conduct forms a “significant basis” for their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Allen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Roca Solida filed suit seeking relief from the United States and from a federal officer for the allegedly unconstitutional diversion of a stream that once flowed through Roca Solida’s church camp property. Through its Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics action, Roca Solida seeks an injunction compelling Sharon McKelvey personally to restore the stream to its route through church property and a declaration that her actions violated Roca Solida’s constitutional rights, but it does not seek damages against her. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, decided that the Bivens claim could proceed, and held that McKelvey was not protected by qualified immunity. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that relief under Bivens does not encompass injunctive and declaratory relief where, as here, the equitable relief sought requires official government action. Bivens is both inappropriate and unnecessary for claims seeking solely equitable relief against actions by the federal government. In this case, only the United States - through its officers - has the power to take the action that Roca Solida seeks: returning the stream to its previous path through Roca Solida’s land. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. McKelvey" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a naturalized citizen from Nigeria, appealed the district court's denial of his request to modify his birth date. There is no official record of petitioner's birth. Petitioner listed the birth date that his mother recalled when he was naturalized in 1987. Petitioner later discovered, upon finding a handwritten record of family birth dates in his father's Bible, that he had been born four years earlier. At issue is whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to modify naturalization certificates issued by the courts prior to October 1, 1991. The court concluded that Congress preserved federal subject matter jurisdiction over such certificates through the uncodified savings clause of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 408, 104 Stat. 4978, 5047, and that the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider motions to amend such certificates in accordance with former 8 U.S.C. 1451(i). The court emphasized the distinction between two categories of certificates: those issued by courts prior to 1991 and those issued by the Attorney General after the Immigration Act of 1990 went into effect on October 1,1991. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded. View "Collins v. USCIS" on Justia Law

After signing a plea agreement admitting to drug distribution, but before sentencing, defendant disappeared and lost contact with his lawyer. The district court proceeded with sentencing in absentia and imposed a prison term of 120 months. Defendant was subsequently arrested and appealed his sentence as violating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause to the Constitution. Assuming for purposes of this opinion that due process and Rule 43 are coextensive, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant in abstentia. In this case, the district court made a fact finding that is supported by the record that defendant had "absented himself" from the proceedings, which is a finding of voluntary absence required by Rule 43. Taken together, the facts in the record support both the district court’s determination that defendant was voluntarily absent from the hearing and its decision to proceed with sentencing. Because defendant concedes that due process provides only the protections of Rule 43 and no more, the district court's actions likewise did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and enforced the appeal waiver, dismissing the appeal. View "United States v. Ornelas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a naturalized citizen, appealed the district court's dismissal of her petition to change the birthday listed on her certificate of naturalization. Because the date of birth on plaintiff's naturalization certificate does not match the date of birth on file with the Social Security Administration, California has not allowed plaintiff to renew her state driver’s license. The court held that, although it is sympathetic to plaintiff's situation, federal courts lack jurisdiction to amend agency-issued naturalization certificates. The court noted that, until 1991, courts had exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Yu-Ling Teng v. District Director" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of West Coast fishermen, filed suit againt Frank Dulcich, Pacific Seafood, and an Ocean Gold entity, alleging antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Defendants appealed the district court's decision granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the acquisition and denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration because plaintiffs' claims are not within the scope of the purported arbitration provision in the Resolution Agreement. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction where plaintiffs have shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits because plaintiffs did not release their claims in a prior settlement, plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the proposed transaction could substantially lessen competition, plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of the equities tips in plaintiffs' favor, a preliminary injunction is in the public interest, and the preliminary injunction is not overbroad. View "Boardman v. Pacific Seafood Grp." on Justia Law