Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate, fell off of a ladder while working his prison job as an electrician’s assistant. A prison medical professional diagnosed him as having an umbilical hernia. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the prison officials to refer him to a surgeon for evaluation and to authorize surgical treatment. Plaintiff consequently received umbilical hernia surgery. Then plaintiff sought damages for the pain he suffered because of the prison officials' refusal to authorize the surgery prior to litigation. The court concluded that the prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity where, even when the facts are viewed most favorably to plaintiff, it is at least debatable that the prison officials complied with the Eighth Amendment. To the extent the officials played any role in the decision to deny the umbilical hernia surgery, the record makes clear that they did so based on legitimate medical opinions that have often been held reasonable under the Eighth Amendment. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in denying injunctive relief relating to his potential inguinal hernia because plaintiff failed to provide evidence suggesting that the prison officials' decision to forgo surgery at this time is medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the officials chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hamby v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Puente filed suit challenging provisions of Arizona’s identity theft laws which prohibit using a false identity to obtain employment. The district court found the laws facially preempted by federal immigration policy and granted a preliminary injunction preventing Arizona from enforcing the challenged provisions. Arizona appealed the preliminary injunction, and defendant Maricopa County individually appealed its liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court concluded that the identity theft laws are not facially preempted because they have obvious constitutional applications. The court rejected all of Puente’s arguments because each one applies to only certain applications of the identity theft laws. Therefore, Puente has not met its burden of showing a clear and manifest purpose to completely preempt these laws. Because Puente has not come forward with a compelling reason why the statute is preempted on its face, the court held that Puente has not raised a serious question going to the merits of its facial challenge. The court also held that it does not have pendent jurisdiction over Maricopa County’s Monell liability. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated the injunction, dismissed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Puente Arizona v. Arpaio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., alleging that he lost $15.02 and one minute due to his employer's, TWEAN, compensation policy that rounds all employee time stamps to the nearest quarter-hour. The district court granted summary judgment to TWEAN. The court discerned no reason to analyze overtime minutes any differently than regular-time minutes, and the district court committed no error by treating them the same. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that TWEAN’s rounding policy violates 29 C.F.R. 785.48(b), the federal rounding regulation, because TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral on its face where TWEAN rounds all employee time punches and where his compensation records demonstrate that TWEAN’s rounding policy is neutral in application. The court found that TWEAN’s rounding policy comports with the federal rounding regulation. The court also concluded that the district court properly classified the one minute of uncompensated time as de minimis and appropriately granted summary judgment to TWEAN on plaintiff's “logging-in” claim. Additionally, the district court did not err by limiting consideration of plaintiff’s rounding claim to the time period after the implementation of the Avaya/Kronos timekeeping system. Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s pre-May 4, 2010 rounding claims; the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the California Labor Code 226 claim; and, because the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to TWEAN as to plaintiff’s individual rounding claim, there is no need to remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Corbin v. Time Warner Entm't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of Egypt and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, challenged the district court’s denial of his naturalization application. The court concluded that the district court's failure to make specific findings with respect to the materiality of plaintiff's statements made to the Sacramento Superior Court regarding his marital status prevents the court from reviewing the district court's determination that he committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon his moral character. Furthermore, because a violation of 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii) is not a per se bar, the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider all relevant factors in making its ultimate determination that plaintiff failed to show he is of good moral character. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hussein v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the IJ's determination that he lacked a reasonable fear of torture and is therefore not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) from his reinstated removal order. The court concluded that the IJ's determination is not limited to the question whether it was “facially legitimate and bona fide.” The court reviewed the IJ's negative reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. In this case, the court held that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in torture sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture under CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Patrick Sogbein was convicted of running a conspiracy to defraud Medicare by providing power wheelchairs to people who did not need them. Sogbein’s wife, Adebola Adebimpe, was convicted of participating in the conspiracy by supplying many of the wheelchairs through a medical equipment company that she owned. The court affirmed the district court's application of a two-level enhancement under USSG 3B1.3 for abusing a position of trust with respect to Medicare. The court held that medical equipment suppliers can have the requisite “professional or managerial discretion” for the abuse-of-trust adjustment to apply, if they are responsible for determining the need for the equipment they provide and personally certify the validity of their claims to Medicare. In this case, the district court’s conclusion that Sogbein and Adebimpe’s abuse of their positions of trust significantly furthered the offense was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Adebimpe" on Justia Law

Bruce Barton filed suit against ADT under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132, seeking claims related to his request for pension benefits. On appeal, Barton challenges the district court's conclusion that the Plan Administrator did not abuse its discretion in denying Barton’s request for pension benefits. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Barton for matters within defendants’ control. The court held that where a claimant has made a prima facie case that he is entitled to a pension benefit but lacks access to the key information about corporate structure or hours worked needed to substantiate his claim and the defendant controls such information, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce this information. The district court correctly held that to recover statutory penalties based on a plan administrator’s refusal to comply with ERISA’s disclosure obligations, a plaintiff must qualify as a plan participant. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to apply the now-clarified burden of proof in this case. View "Estate of Barton v. ADT" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with allegedly making phone calls to authorities at LAX instructing them to evacuate the airport, appealed the district court's order authorizing the BOP to forcibly medicate him to restore his competency to stand trial. In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that the government may involuntarily medicate a defendant charged with a serious crime to restore that defendant to competency to stand trial. The court held that the district court clearly erred in finding that the proposed course of treatment was in defendant’s best medical interests. The court concluded that the fourth Sell factor is lacking, and the district court clearly erred in finding that the proposed treatment was in defendant’s best medical interest. The record demonstrates that the proposed treatment includes dosages higher than are generally recommended and that the use of a long-acting medication does not conform to the standard of care. Furthermore, the court could not credit the expert's testimony that the medication and dosage was appropriate without exploring and answering the questions posed by contradictory evidence in the record. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Onuoha" on Justia Law

Jesse Vasquez was convicted of drug-related crimes for his part in a gang's drug trafficking operations. The district court sentenced Vasquez to life imprisonment because his two prior California felonies qualified him for a mandatory sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. 841. Vasquez then successfully petitioned a California court to reclassify one of his prior California felonies as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47. In this appeal, Vasquez argues that his federal enhancement should be invalidated because he no longer stands convicted of two prior felonies as section 841 requires. The court has previously held that a state granting postconviction relief from a state conviction cannot undermine a federal sentence enhancement based on that conviction. The court has upheld this rule even where a state dismisses or expunges the underlying state conviction the federal enhancement is based on. Therefore, the court affirmed Vasquez's sentence of life imprisonment under section 841. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California-based dentist specializing in tooth implants, filed a class action complaint against Nobel alleging a defect in the NobelDirect implant. On appeal, Nobel challenges the district court's order awarding class counsel more than $2.3 million in attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that defendants have not waived their due process argument where the record demonstrates that defendants raised the issue with sufficient specificity and vigor. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court’s use over defendants’ objection of ex parte, in camera submissions to support its fee order violated defendants’ due process rights. The court remanded for the district court to allow defendants access to the information at issue, to allow plaintiffs to respond to defendants' objections and for defendants to reply, and then the district court can decide the appropriate fee award. The court concluded that the district court’s discount of the lodestar for lack of success was not erroneous because the district court concisely and clearly explained its reduction of the lodestar, and because there was sufficient support for its finding that plaintiffs' claims were related to a common goal. The court agreed that the district court likely overstated its monetary valuation of the settlement. But where, as here, classwide benefits are not easily monetized, a cross-check is entirely discretionary. The court vacated the fee order and remanded. View "Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG" on Justia Law