Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Marilyn Scheer, an attorney with a suspended California law license, contends that the district court erred when it held that her debt to a former client was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(7). In this case, there were no costs or fees assessed for disciplinary reasons. Rather, the debt at issue was effectively the amount that Scheer improperly received from a client, but did not pay back. At its core, the $5775 at issue is not a fine or penalty, but compensation for actual loss. The court concluded that the the debt to her client does not fall within the section 523(a)(7) nondischargeability exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Scheer v. State Bar of CA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., when it failed to return her to a full time position following her medical leave. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s disability discrimination and disparate treatment claims because plaintiff failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not returning plaintiff to full-time work was pretextual. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., does not affect the court's analysis where plaintiff's claims in this case are distinguishable. The court reiterated that its ADA cases, which require a plaintiff who alleges disparate treatment to show that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant, remain good law. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim because plaintiff failed to establish that a full-time position was available. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mendoza v. RCALA" on Justia Law

Chance Gordon, a licensed California attorney, appealed the district court's order of summary judgment for the CFPB on its enforcement action for violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5531, 5536, and Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. 1015.1-11. On January 4, 2012, President Obama, relying on his recess-appointment power, named Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s initial Director. President Obama renominated Cordray as Director on January 24, 2013. The parties agree that while Cordray’s initial January 2012 recess appointment was invalid, his July 2013 confirmation was valid. The court concluded that, while the failure to have a properly confirmed director may raise Article II Appointments Clause issues, it does not implicate the court's Article III jurisdiction to hear this case. That its director was improperly appointed does not alter the Executive Branch’s interest or power in having federal law enforced. The subsequent valid appointment, coupled with Cordray’s August 30, 2013 ratification, cures any initial Article II deficiencies. Because the CFPB had the authority to bring the action at the time Gordon was charged, Cordray’s August 2013 ratification, done after he was properly appointed as Director, resolves any Appointments Clause deficiencies. On the merits, the court concluded that CFPB is entitled to summary judgment on all counts because there is no dispute as to material fact regarding Gordon's liability. Because the district court conscientiously tailored the injunction at issue, it did not abuse its discretion in granting equitable judgment. However, because the district court may have impermissibly entered a monetary judgment against Gordon for a time period prior to the enactment or effective date of the relevant provisions of the CFPA and Regulation O, the court vacated and remanded for further consideration. View "Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of attempted carjacking, appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition, contending that his conviction was tainted because the jurors' verdict was influenced by something other than evidence admitted during the trial. At trial, the victim professed not to be able to identify defendant and testified that he was drunk and angry at the time of the initial identification. While he testified, a woman sat as a spectator shaking her head. Some of the jurors observed that action, and later said that they believed that the woman was the victim’s mother and that she was directing him not to identify defendant. The court concluded that there is no clearly established federal law sufficiently related to the facts of defendant's case upon which he can rely to support his claim. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s decision in defendant's case could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the Supreme Court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators' courtroom conduct of the kind involved here. The general principles that a jury decides a case based on the evidence produced at trial, and that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are fundamental to a fair trial, are not sufficient to support a conclusion that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent in concluding that juror misconduct did not occur in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Turner v. McEwen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to both bringing an unlawful alien into the United States and aiding and abetting an offense against the United States. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of a six-point upward adjustment to his offense level for “recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person" under USSG 2L1.1(b)(6). The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that transporting a person by strapping her inside a dashboard was neither safe nor comfortable but rather “extremely precarious” and dangerous, and that this conduct met the criteria of Application Note 5, which indicates that section 2L1.1(b)(6) applies to a “wide variety of conduct,” including but not limited to the listed examples. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bernardo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry, arguing that he was in a delusional state. Defendant believed he was being chased by Mexican gangs, and with the specific intent solely to place himself into the protective custody of United States officials, illegally reentered the United States. In United States v. Lombera-Valdovinos, the court held that it was impossible to convict a previously deported alien for attempted illegal reentry when he crosses the border with the intent only to be imprisoned because attempted illegal reentry is a specific intent crime that requires proof of intent to enter the country free from official restraint. In this case, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court would have found defendant guilty absent its misapprehension of the specific intent element. Because the district court found defendant guilty under an erroneous legal standard, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Argueta-Rosales" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of attempted illegal reentry. Defendant did not testify at trial but snuck in his recollection of events by using an expert witness as a conduit for his own words. Principally at issue is whether it was proper to allow the government to impeach the expert with statements that defendant made voluntarily but that were not Miranda compliant. The court concluded that the district court properly admitted defendant's statements to the expert to impeach defendant's account of the events at issue. Because defendant does not challenge the district court’s finding that his statements to the Border Patrol officers were voluntary and reliable, the district court did not err by admitting these statements. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the June 21 count where a jury could reasonably find that defendant had taken a substantial step by crossing the border and waiting in line for about an hour and a half to reach the inspection station, and that defendant had the specific intent to enter without the express consent of the Attorney General. The court rejected defendant's claim that the prosecutor vindictively added a second charge; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an adverse-inference jury instruction relating to the destruction of the port-of-entry video; and because the petition for certiorari granted in Mathis v. United States is directly relevant to the court's resolution of defendant's challenge to his sentence enhancement, the court deferred the resolution of this issue pending the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Rosales-Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court agreed with defendant that his prior 1990 conviction for armed robbery under a Massachusetts statute is an offense that does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Under the categorical approach, a conviction under the Massachusetts statute does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause. Given that neither this conviction nor defendant’s 1989 conviction for assault and battery by dangerous weapon qualifies as a violent felony, the district court erred by sentencing him as an armed career offender. View "United States v. Parnell" on Justia Law

Florencio Pacleb filed a class action complaint against Allstate, alleging that he received unsolicited automated calls to his cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Allstate deposited $20,000 in full settlement of Pacleb’s individual monetary claims in an escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to Pacleb, requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to Pacleb in the future and dismissing this action as moot.” The court affirmed the district court's order denying Allstate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even if the district court entered judgment affording Pacleb complete relief on his individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, mooting those claims, Pacleb would still be able to seek class certification under Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., which remains good law under Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. The court also concluded that, even if Pitts were not binding, and Allstate could moot the entire action by mooting Pacleb’s individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, those individual claims are not now moot, and the court will not direct the district court to moot them by entering judgment on them before Pacleb has had a fair opportunity to move for class certification. View "Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant, 16 years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted of felony murder and related charges resulting in a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Miller v. Alabama subsequently held unconstitutional for juvenile offenders mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court refused to appoint a neuropsychological expert under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) on resentencing. The court concluded that, under these circumstances, a reasonably competent attorney would have found the services of the requested expert necessary to provide adequate representation at defendant’s resentencing. By precluding defendant from developing this potential mitigating evidence, the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that a reasonable attorney would have considered an up-to-date neuropsychological evaluation necessary had defendant been a nonindigent defendant. And because a current evaluation could have provided mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence, defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by the failure to appoint a psychological expert before resentencing. Therefore, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court further concluded that defendant has not shown the district court erred by calculating the Guidelines’ recommended base offense level as 43; defendant has not demonstrated that the district court committed prejudicial error when it considered the PSR’s calculation of criminal history points attributed to his juvenile offenses; and, even assuming that defendant’s objection to the district court’s calculation of his criminal history category based on his juvenile offenses was forfeited, as opposed to waived, and assuming the district court committed plain error by attributing criminal history points to three of his juvenile offenses, defendant has not shown prejudice as a result of the error. View "United States v. Pete" on Justia Law