Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mission purchased the assets of South Coast and attempted by an assets-only purchase to avoid South Coast's potential liabilities under South Coast's Medicare provider agreement. These liabilities encompassed potential mandated reimbursement to Medicare for any previous overpayments made to South Coast. The Secretary determined that Mission was not entitled to bill Medicare for patient services at its new facility until that facility had a provider agreement of its own. Mission appealed the Secretary's decision. The court rejected Mission's assertion that former 42 C.F.R. 489.13(d)(1)(i) permitted it to avoid South Coast’s Medicare liabilities. The court cited to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Vernon Home Health, Inc.: “federal law governs cases involving the rights of the United States arising under a nationwide federal program such as the Social Security Act. The authority of the United States in relation to funds disbursed and the rights acquired by it in relation to those funds are not dependent upon state law.” It is equally true that private parties have no power to alter their legal obligations with Medicare under their provider agreements. The court also rejected Mission's argument that it is entitled to the benefit of the retroactivity provision in 42 C.F.R. 489.13(d)(2). The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretations and decisions rendered by the DAB in this case were reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mission Hosp. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

ALDF filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., action seeking to compel the FDA to release redacted data pertaining to information related to ALDF's FOIA request regarding egg-production farms in Texas. The district court ordered the release of information regarding the number of birds per cage at each farm. But the district court held on summary judgment that, under FOIA Exemption 4, the FDA properly withheld the other categories of information. The court agreed and concluded that the release of the redacted information would likely cause "substantial competitive harm" to the affected producers and farmers. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that disclosure of the information was likely to cause commercial undercutting. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying third-party discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "ALDF V. FDA" on Justia Law

Telesocial, a San Francisco start-up, entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) regarding a possible agreement to acquire Telesocial's software application named "Call Friends." This dispute stems from Telesocial's allegations that Orange violated federal and state laws by stealing Telesocial's technology to create its own product called "Party Call." Orange and its employees seek a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. 1651 directing the district court to vacate its order denying Orange’s motion to dismiss, and direct an entry of judgment dismissing Telesocial’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). The court applied the Bauman v. United States factors and concluded that the district court did not commit clear legal error in determining that the NDA did not cover the claims at issue; Orange has the ability on direct appeal to attain the relief it desires; Orange will not be prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; and the district court’s decision does not raise a novel issue that affects the international business community. Accordingly, the court denied Orange’s petition for writ of mandamus. View "Orange, S.A. v. USDC for the Northern Dist. of CA, San Francisco" on Justia Law

Sunnyslope, as the debtor of a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan, exercised the cram down option pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and elected to retain the property at issue. Sunnyslope argued that the value of First Southern’s secured interest should be calculated with the affordable housing restrictions remaining in place. The bankruptcy court and the district court both agreed. First Southern appeals. The court denied Sunnyslope’s motion to dismiss the appeals as equitably moot. The court concluded that valuing First Southern’s secured interest as if the affordable housing restrictions related to subordinated positions still applied was not appropriate under section 506(a). All of the restrictive covenants and other provisions that Sunnyslope seeks to invoke to limit the project to affordable housing and to the reduced rental income that would be collected as a result are derived from positions that were junior and expressly subordinated to First Southern's interest. As a result, the plan of reorganization confirmed by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court must be set aside, because it was based on an improper valuation of First Southern's interest. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "First Southern Nat'l Bank v. Sunnyslope Housing" on Justia Law

After the university found that plaintiff had violated the Student Conduct Code’s prohibition on harassment and intimidation that poses a threat to others, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of his constitutional rights including those protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that California Code of Regulations, tit. 5, 41301(b)(7), which authorizes branches of California State University to discipline students for conduct that “threatens or endangers the health or safety of any person . . . including . . . intimidation [or] harassment,” is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. In this case, plaintiff confronted and videotaped two professors in their offices, questioning them about a poem that had been published in a supplement to the student newspaper. The court held that the regulation supported imposing discipline for plaintiff's conduct. However, the court held that plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against some of the defendants. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "O'Brien v. Welty" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sexual conduct with a minor, appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Applying a highly deferential standard under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the court concluded that, given the inherently disturbing nature of the technical theory counsel adopted, for lack of an available alternative, to defend against the felony murder charge, as well as its counter-intuitive nature, it was reasonable to tailor the defense as an argument to the court in the form of a motion for acquittal, and, when the motion was denied and closing arguments remained, not press the theory to the jury. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel’s conduct was at times constitutionally deficient, he did not fail entirely to advocate for petitioner. Therefore, the state court reasonably determined that counsel's conduct did not constitute abandonment, and that Strickland v. Washington applies to the question of prejudice. The court also rejected petitioner's claims that counsel at sentencing was ineffective for failing fully to prepare and present mitigating evidence concerning his mental health and personal history. The court concurrently filed an order with this opinion. View "Gallegos v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. 1996, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prevent the government from prosecuting them under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., for possessing cannabis for religious or therapeutic use, obtaining cannabis, and cultivating or distributing cannabis consistent with state law. At issue in this appeal is the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on the RFRA claim. The court concluded that, even assuming such use constitutes an “exercise of religion,” no rational trier of fact could conclude on this record that a prohibition of cannabis use imposes a “substantial burden.” Nothing in the record demonstrates that a prohibition on cannabis forces plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and criminal sanction, such that they are being "coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs." The court failed to see how prohibiting a substance that plaintiffs freely admit is a substitute for peyote would force them to act at odds with their religious beliefs. In light of Holt v. Hobbs, plaintiffs in this case have produced no evidence establishing that denying them cannabis forces them to choose between religious obedience and government sanction. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the AIRFA because the Act does not create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Navajo Nation filed suit seeking immediate return of human remains and associated funerary objects taken from its reservation. Between 1931 and 1990, the National Park Service removed 303 sets of human remains and associated funerary objects from Canyon de Chelly National Monument, a sacred site on the Navajo Reservation. In the mid-1990s, the Park Service decided to inventory the remains and objects pursuant to the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. 3001-3013, with the ultimate goal of repatriating the remains and objects to culturally-affiliated tribes. The district court dismissed the suit as barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the Navajo Nation’s claims because the Park Service’s decision to inventory the remains and objects was a final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. By deciding to undertake NAGPRA’s inventory process, the Park Service conclusively decided that it, and not the Navajo Nation, has the present right to “possession and control” of the remains and objects. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Navajo Nation v. USDOI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Palomar College Police Officer Christopher Dillard under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of unlawful seizure and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Dillard qualified immunity on summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liability. At issue was whether a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk, searching a suspect for weapons, based solely on the perceived domestic violence nature of the investigation. The court held that, although the domestic violence nature of a police investigation is a relevant consideration in assessing whether there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous, it is not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. In this case, the court held that Dillard violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure by detaining him for the purpose of performing a Terry frisk. However, the court held that Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established at the time that the perceived domestic violence nature of an investigation was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The court further held that Dillard used excessive force when he tased plaintiff in order to force him to submit to the Terry frisk against his consent. Nonetheless, given the unsettled state of the law regarding the use of Tasers at the time, Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity. It was not clearly established at the time of Dillard’s actions that an officer who mistakenly but reasonably believed he had the right to conduct a Terry frisk could not deploy a Taser in dart mode to overcome a suspect’s resistance to the frisk. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Thomas v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and the ADAC, seek permanently to enjoin defendants from categorically denying drivers' licenses to DACA recipients. Defendants had instituted a policy that rejected the Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients under the DACA program as proof of authorized presence for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction. The court agreed with the district court that DACA recipients are similarly situated to other groups of noncitizens Arizona deems eligible for drivers’ licenses. Consequently, Arizona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the court's previous opinion in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer indicated is likely the case. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the court need not and should not come to rest on the Equal Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for plaintiffs, so long as there is a viable alternate, nonconstitutional ground to reach the same result. In this case, the court concluded that Arizona’s policy classifies noncitizens based on Arizona’s independent definition of “authorized presence,” classification authority denied the states under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.1101, et seq. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order that Arizona’s policy is preempted by the exclusive authority of the federal government to classify noncitizens. View "Arizona Dream Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law