Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a lawyer in California, filed suit challenging California’s procedures for attorney discipline. Plaintiff alleged that California violated her constitutional rights by not providing her meaningful judicial review in a fee dispute between herself and a client, and that the rules governing the California State Bar’s disciplinary procedures are facially unconstitutional. The court agreed with the State Bar that plaintiff's as-applied challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, the court concluded that the State Bar misreads this Court’s statute-of-limitations decision in Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, which only applies to facial challenges involving property rights. In this case, plaintiff's facial claims are not time-barred because she filed her claim well within the two-year statute of limitations. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff's facial claims based on California’s state constitution fail because they have already been rejected by the Supreme Court of California. The court concluded that, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, People v. Kelly did not overrule In re Rose, which stated that it is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by the federal courts in interpreting their state constitutions. Plaintiff's First Amendment claims are unsupported because the court was aware of no case holding that the First Amendment provides a freestanding right for an individual to have a state court hear her dispute in the absence of some asserted state or federal cause of action, statutory or judge-made. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims also fail where California's change in its attorney discipline procedures are not so significant as to create a due process violation. While the regulation of lawyers in California is unlike California’s regulation of any other professionals, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this regulatory scheme violates Equal Protection. California’s decision to regulate lawyers principally via a judicially supervised administrative body attached to the State Bar of California, the organization of all state-licensed lawyers, is rational and so constitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scheer v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Millennium filed suit against Ameritox, alleging claims of trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code section 17200. Millennium and Ameritox compete in the medication monitoring industry, and sell urine-testing services to healthcare providers who treat chronic pain patients with powerful pain medications. The district court granted Ameritox summary judgment. At issue is whether a product’s visual layout is functional, defeating a claim for trade dress infringement. The court concluded that, under the Au-Tomotive Gold two-step test, the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Ameritox on Millennium’s trade dress claim. In regard to the first step, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether Millennium's claimed trade dress has any utilitarian advantages. Under the second step, because Millennium has presented evidence that the graphical format served in part a source identifying function, Millennium has presented enough evidence to allow a jury to assess the question of aesthetic functionality. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Millennium Labs. v. Ameritox, Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Shortly after the indictment was returned, the United States initiated its effort to extradite defendant from Canada for trial. After almost five years, Canada approved the extradition. The district court found 32.5 months of the delay was attributable to Canada, 26.4 months of the delay was attributable to the United States, and 16 months resulted from defendant’s fighting the extradition. With respect to the delay attributable to the United States alone, the district court held that the United States “pursued extradition with reasonable diligence” and that any prejudice caused by the delay was not severe enough to have denied defendant his right to a speedy trial. After weighing the Barker v. Wingo factors, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The court noted, however, that the U.S. Attorney's offices would do well to adopt systems of controls that would track the status of extradition requests so as to ensure the timely submission of extradition materials to the Justice Department and foreign governments. Such a system would likely have avoided much of the initial 9.6 month delay present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City's policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold” individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff accidentally triggered the burglar alarm when she stayed the night on her office couch. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded, however, that a reasonable jury could find that the police officers responding to the alarm used excessive force when they deliberately unleashed a police dog that they knew might well “rip[] [the] face off” any individual who might be present in the office. Because a reasonable jury could find that the force used was excessive, and the City concedes that the use of the force involved was in conformance with its policy, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lowry v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of drug trafficking charges, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs found in his car. Unable to contest the existence of reasonable suspicion, defendant challenges the legality of the stop by contending that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer who pulled him over deliberately lied when stating the reason for the stop, and the reason the officer gave was not itself supported by reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that so long as the facts known to the officer establish reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the stop is lawful even if the officer falsely cites as the basis for the stop a ground that is not supported by reasonable suspicion. In light of the information obtained during the stop, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to seize defendant's car. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Magallon-Lopez" on Justia Law

After James McIndoe died from complications related to mesothelioma, McIndoe's legal heirs filed suit against defendants, arguing that McIndoe’s exposure to asbestos-containing materials aboard their ships contributed to his death. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court agreed with the district court that McIndoe’s heirs cannot sustain an action for strict products liability premised upon the notion that the warships in question are themselves “products” under maritime law. The court also concluded that, although plaintiffs have established that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether McIndoe was exposed to asbestos-containing materials originally installed upon such ships, plaintiffs have established no genuine issue of fact regarding whether any such exposure was a substantial factor in McIndoe’s injuries. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot prevail on their general negligence claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc." on Justia Law

After petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to violating California Penal Code 32, accessory to a felony, he was ordered removed. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” and therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 101(a)(43)(S). The BIA dismissed petitioner's appeal and announced a new interpretation of “obstruction of justice” that requires only “the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” Contrary to the prior construction, this interpretation of INA 101(a)(43)(S) requires no nexus to an ongoing investigation or proceeding. The court agreed with petitioner that the agency's revised interpretation of the statute raises serious constitutional concerns about whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The court remanded to the agency so that it can either offer a new construction of INA 101(a)(43)(S) or, in the alternative, apply In re Espinoza-Gonzalez's interpretation to the instant case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence for one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a). Defendant forced into prostitution a Chinese woman who had been tricked into flying to Saipan on promises of a work visa and a legal job, when in fact the victim received only a tourist visa, was effectively imprisoned, and was told repeatedly that she had nowhere to turn and must engage in prostitution. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not erroneous. In this case, the district court did not err in failing to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that the coercion was the but-for-cause of the victim's sex act. The court also concluded that the commerce element of section 1519(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement and thus the district court did not err in failing to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that defendant knew her actions affected interstate or foreign commerce. The court further concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of an effect on interstate commerce; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to admit evidence that the victims engaged in prostitution after the indictment period, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level enhancement under USSG 3A1.1(b)(1) because defendant knew the victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Backman" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the issuance of a 2009 Finding Of No Significant Impact based on a 2009 Environmental Assessment for redevelopment of a four-block site owned by the United States Navy in downtown San Diego. On appeal, the Coalition challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Federal Defendants, as well as the denial of the Coalition's motion for summary judgment against the Federal Defendants. In San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this court held that while “security considerations may permit or require modification of some . . . NEPA procedures,” such modifications do not absolve an agency for its legal duty to fulfill NEPA’s requirements, such as public contribution to the NRC’s decision-making process. The court determined that the NRC’s categorical dismissal of the possibility of a terrorist attack was unreasonable and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, given the government’s assessed general risk of terrorism, the location of the redevelopment project, and the military commands to be housed in the Navy Broadway Complex, the court rejected the Federal Defendants’ arguments against applying Mothers for Peace I and find that they must address the risk of a possible terrorist attack in their NEPA analysis. The court further concluded that Federal Defendants did not abuse their discretion in determining that there was no significant impact from the possible environmental effects of potential terrorism at the Navy Broadway Complex, and a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is thus not required. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SDNBCC v. USDOD" on Justia Law

The government appealed defendant's sentence for illegal reentry, contending that the district court miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines range applicable to defendant because the district court concluded that defendant's 2009 burglary conviction under California Penal Code 459 did not qualify as a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C.16(b). After the government filed its appeal, the court held in Dimaya v. Lynch that the definition of violence that appears in section 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. The court held that section 16(b), as incorporated in USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is void for vagueness because the court was bound by Dimaya's holding and because the government offers the same arguments in favor of section 16(b)'s constitutionality that the court rejected in that decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Hernandez-Lara" on Justia Law