Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Nation and the State executed a gaming compact in 2002 pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. After the Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and became effective in 2003, the Nation purchased an unincorporated parcel of land within the outer boundaries of Glendale, Arizona, pursuant to the federal Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act (LRA). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Nation seeking to enjoin the Nation's plan to conduct Class III gaming on Parcel 2. The district court granted summary judgment to the Nation. The court concluded that, under the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statutory text, the Nation plainly had “land claims” for damage to its reservation lands; were the court to find the term “land claim” to be ambiguous, and proceeded under Chevron to apply the DOI’s definition of the term, then the court would find that the Nation also had a claim concerning the impairment of title or other real property interest or loss of possession of its reservation land; and the district court did not err in determining that the LRA was a “settlement” of the Nation’s land claims. The court also concluded that the district court properly rejected plaintiffs' claims of judicial estoppel and waiver; the duly-executed Compact negotiated at length by sophisticated parties expressly authorizes the Nation to conduct gaming on its “Indian Lands,” subject to the requirements of section 2719 of IGRA; because Parcel 2 complies with the requirements of section 2719, and the Compact expressly allows the Nation to conduct Class III gaming there, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Nation on plaintiffs’ breach of Compact claim; the Nation's choice to conduct Class III gaming in accordance with the express terms of the Compact does not deviate from the agreed common purpose of the Compact, and therefore does not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ non-Compact claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Tohono O'odham Nation" on Justia Law

Daniel Chavez served a prison sentence for attempted sexual abuse and then entered probation. Chavez was ordered to enroll in a sex offender treatment program as a condition of his probation. The program required him to admit his guilt before treatment began and while his appeal was pending. Chavez maintained his innocence and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Chavez was rejected from the treatment program and his probation officer sent him back to prison for violating the terms of probation. The Oregon Attorney General conceded error and the Oregon Court of Appeals remanded his case for retrial. Meanwhile, Chavez filed a pro se in forma pauperis (IFP) civil rights complaint in federal district court against his probation officer and therapist. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. At issue was whether a district court can sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint on the basis of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which requires dismissal if the action “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The court held that the term “immune” as used in the statute includes both absolute and qualified immunity. In this case, because Chavez’s complaint did not clearly foreclose the possibility of qualified immunity, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavez v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Appellants and appellees are two teams of named plaintiffs and their respective lawyers who disagree over the proper direction for a consumer class action settlement. In Radcliffe I, the court held that appellees created a conflict of interest by conditioning incentive awards for the class representatives on their approval of the proposed settlement agreement. On remand, appellants moved the district court to disqualify appellees’ counsel from representing the class based on that conflict. The court agreed with the district court that California does not apply a rule of automatic disqualification for conflicts of simultaneous representation in the class action context, and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellees’ counsel will adequately represent the class. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the qualification motion. View "Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her 210 month sentence after pleading guilty to sex trafficking of children. The court concluded that an enhancement under USSG 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) is applicable in this case even though defendant did not engage in a sex act with a minor because her offense involved the commission of sex acts; the district court did not engage in impermissible double-counting by applying an enhancement under USSG 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) where defendant unduly influenced two homeless runaway 15-year-old girls and threatened to throw them out on the street if they did not engage in sex acts in exchange for providing them shelter; and the district court permissibly declined to depart downward for reduced mental capacity where defendant's reduced mental capacity resulted in part from the voluntary use of illegal drugs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Basa" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro 60(b) after the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as time-barred. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief under a theory of “actual innocence.” In this case, petitioner failed to cite any cases where actual innocence was held to constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes. Assuming arguendo that the “Schlup gateway” is available to support a Rule 60(b) motion, petitioner has fallen well short of raising sufficient doubt about his guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Further, the declarations petitioner seeks to offer as evidence of actual innocence are not "new" for purposes of Rule 60(b) because they were available when he filed his initial habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in finding that petitioner was not abandoned by his counsel, Gregory Mitts, where Mitts was grossly negligent in his representation; the district court did not make findings with respect to whether petitioner was reasonably diligent; and, therefore, the court remanded for the district court to determine this issue in the first instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. Yates" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy appellate panel's (BAP) denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court overruled In re Salter and held that the BAP is not a court established by Act of Congress under subsection (a) of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), so it does not have jurisdiction to entertain a mandamus petition. Accordingly, the court vacated the decision of the BAP and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Ozenne v. Chase Manhattan Bank" on Justia Law

Developers filed suit against the City, contending that the City’s refusal to rezone land to permit higher-density development violated, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Developers maintain that the City’s refusal stemmed from intentional discrimination against Hispanics and created a disparate impact. The court held that Developers presented plausible claims for relief for disparate treatment under the FHA and under the Equal Protection Clause where the City Council denied Developers’ request for rezoning despite the advice of its own experts to the contrary and in the context of what a reasonable jury could interpret as racially charged opposition by Yuma residents. Further, this was the only request for rezoning that the City had denied in the last three years. Because the complaint passes the plausibility bar given these circumstances, the court reversed and remanded. The court also reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, rejecting the district court’s view that other similarly-priced and similarly modeled housing available elsewhere necessarily precluded a finding that there was a disparate impact. The court vacated the denial of the second summary judgment as moot and remanded for the district court to address the motion in the first instance. View "Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, appealed the BIA's determination that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure because he lacked good moral character pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(1), as a "habitual drunkard." Petitioner is a chronic alcoholic and has a ten-year history of alcohol abuse. The court held that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a person’s medical disability lacks any rational relation to his classification as a person with bad moral character, and that section 1101(f)(1) is therefore unconstitutional. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two governmental organizations that provide legal representation to capital defendants and prisoners, filed suit raising numerous challenges to the Attorney General's regulations implementing the certification procedure for fast-tracking federal habeas cases for capital prisoners. On summary judgment, the district court sustained most of plaintiffs’ challenges, found the regulations arbitrary or capricious in several respects, and enjoined the regulations from going into effect. The court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss because plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this action. The court declined plaintiffs’ request for a limited remand to allow their clients an opportunity to intervene. The court stated that the Attorney General has not yet made any certification decisions, and, thus, challenges to the procedures and criteria set forth in the regulations are not yet ripe for review. View "Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. USDOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law