Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal, the government challenged the district court's suppression of two handguns seized from defendant's patio. It is undisputed that the officers seized the two handguns during a warrantless search of defendant’s home. The “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement does not apply when officers encroach upon the curtilage of a home with the intent to arrest the occupant. In this case, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the officers’ purpose in knocking on defendant’s door was to find and arrest him, and the court saw no reason to disturb that finding. Thus, the officers violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches when they stood on his porch and knocked on his front door. And since this unconstitutional conduct caused the allegedly exigent circumstance - the crashing noises in the backyard - that circumstance cannot justify the search resulting in the seizure of the two handguns. Furthermore, the officers lacked a reasonable ground for believing that there was a danger that would have justified a protective sweep of defendant’s home because, by the time the officers conducted the sweep of defendant’s home, he had already been handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. The court also concluded that the inevitable discovery exception does not apply when officers have probable cause to apply for a warrant but simply fail to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lundin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of a controlled substance. The court concluded that the district court's stated reason for rejecting defendant's plea was inapt. In this case, armed with defendant's admission of guilt and the government's offer of proof, the district court had all it needed to fulfill its duty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), which is to determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded so that defendant may plead guilty pursuant to the terms of his original plea agreement. Although the district court must give defendant the opportunity to plead guilty under the terms of his original plea agreement, that doesn’t mean he is required to so plead. Defendant could choose to hold out for a better deal or to go to trial anew. In regard to defendant's claims of trial errors, the court concluded that the district court's rulings were not within the area of permissible discretion when it prevented defendant from questioning three of the government's cooperating witnesses about the Rule 35 terms of their plea agreements. Finally, the court concluded that, because the assets at issue belonged to the government, they were not available for payment from or on behalf of defendant; the district court had no authority to redirect money earmarked for the Justice Department’s fund; nor could the district judge achieve such a result by amending the original judgment under Rule 35(a), as he attempted to do at the same time he filed the sua sponte order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to a different judge in order to preserve the appearance of justice. View "United States v. Nickle" on Justia Law

Petitioners Linares and Preciado challenged the denial of their applications for cancellation of removal based on the finding that they were ineligible for cancellation of removal because their convictions for identity theft under California Penal Code 530.5(a) and (d)(2) were categorical crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The court concluded that the BIA erred in finding that petitioners' convictions were CIMTs because sections 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are not categorical fraud crimes, nor do they necessarily involve vile, base, or depraved conduct. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. The court did not address the parties' remaining arguments. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Linares-Gonzalez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ramirez-Munoz and Francia-Alvarez, a married couple and natives and citizens of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to deny the motion to reopen their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that petitioners have not established that they are part of a narrowly defined or cognizable particular social group, and the court held that the proposed group of “imputed wealthy Americans” is not a discrete class of persons recognized by society as a particular social group. Nor is the proposed group sufficiently particular that it can be described with passable distinction that the group would be recognized as a discrete class of persons. Further, petitioners' evidence of changed country conditions does not point to either actual or imputed wealthy Americans as the targeted class of victims of increased violence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative consumer class action against Fresh, alleging that Fresh’s label, tube design, and packaging are deceptive and misleading. Plaintiff alleged that the tube design for Fresh's Sugar Lip Treatment product line uses a screw mechanism that allows only 75% of the product to advance up the tube. Each Sugar tube contains a weighted metallic bottom and is wrapped in oversized packaging. The district court granted Fresh's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Although the court concluded that neither the safe harbor doctrine nor the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., preemption bars plaintiff’s supplemental statement claim, this label claim ultimately fails on the merits because plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that the omission of supplemental disclosures about product weight rendered Sugar’s label “false or misleading” to the reasonable consumer. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's package-based claims under various California consumer laws because plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that Sugar’s design and packaging is deceptive. When viewed in the proper context of the high-end cosmetics market, Sugar’s elaborate packaging and the weighty feel of the tube is commonplace and even expected by a significant portion of Fresh’s “targeted consumers.” Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the First Amended Complaint fails to allege a violation of California Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 12606(b). Any further amendment to the complaint would be futile. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ebner v. Frech, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner and her son prevailed at both hearings concerning their due process complaint against the District. At issue on appeal is the district court's award of attorney fees, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415, to petitioner's attorney, Tania Whiteleather. The district court awarded $7,780 in fees, substantially less than the $66,420 requested. The court concluded that the outcome of the administrative hearing was not more favorable to petitioner than the District's settlement offer and petitioner was not substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply the $400 rate without seeking additional rebuttal evidence from the District. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's claim for paralegal fees was barred by collateral estoppel because the district court had already concluded that Dr. Susan Burnett was an education consultant in the expedited hearing appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

ItalFlavors filed suit against Caffe Vergnano, blaming the failure of an Italian cafe venture on Caffe Vergnano's failure to offer support. The parties had entered into an agreement, the Commercial Contract, which appears to be a franchise agreement setting forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties. The second agreement is the Hold Harmless Agreement. Caffe Vergnano filed a petition to compel arbitration and the district granted the petition. The court concluded that the declaration in the Hold Harmless Agreement signed contemporaneously with the Commercial Contract proves that the latter was a mere sham to help Hector Rabellino obtain a visa. Therefore, the court concluded that the Commercial Contract was not a contract and is thus unenforceable. Because the court found that the document the parties described as the Commercial Contract was a sham, the arbitration clause is no more enforceable than any other provision in that document. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Casa del Caffe Vergnano v. ItalFlavors, LLC" on Justia Law

Agnes and Anne Purdy dispute the State’s claim of ownership to rights-of-way for four public trails that cross the Purdys' land, seeking to stop members of the public from trespassing on their property by using the trails. The Purdys acquired ownership of the parcels in question under the Alaska Native Allotment Act, 43 U.S.C. 270–1 et seq. The State filed suit against the Purdys and the United States, contending that the Purdys' allotments are subject to rights-of-way. The State further alleges that, by virtue of public use, it acquired ownership of the rights-of-way under an unusual federal statute known as R.S. 2477. The district court dismissed the quiet title and declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and entered partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The remainder of the action has been stayed pending resolution of this appeal. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the State’s quiet title claim is barred because the United States is a necessary party to that claim but has not waived its immunity from suit pursuant to the Indian lands exception of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the State’s claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201, which sought essentially the same relief as the quiet title claim. Although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the State’s condemnation claim, that claim may not proceed as pleaded. The court remanded as to this claim so that the State may be given an opportunity to amend the claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "State of Alaska Dept. of Nat. Res. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with Hepatitis C, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for injunction relief and damages, alleging constitutionally inadequate medical care and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff is not bound by his deposition testimony and his damages claims against defendants in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; given the failure of plaintiff's requested treatment for Hepatitis C and there is no reasonable expectation that plaintiff will request the same failed treatment again, plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot; plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the Youngsberg v. Romeo professional judgment standard and thus the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim of inadequate medical care; plaintiff has set forth specific facts plausibly suggesting that Dr. Bell employed an explicit racial classification sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny; the district court erred in concluding that no constitutional violation occurred when Dr. Bell failed to offer any compelling justification for the racial classification, let alone a justification that was narrowly tailored; and, because it was not clearly established that a reasonable official would understand that the use of race-related success-of-treatment data as a factor in a medical treatment decision would be unconstitutional, Dr. Bell is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mitchell v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

This case arose when female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed a charge of discrimination with the Division against her employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal employment laws. In this appeal, the Division and the EEOC challenged the district court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Geo. The court held that the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC; assuming that exhaustion requirements from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1481(A), apply in this case, the court held that the EEOC and the Division may maintain their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo; in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or reasonably related” to the initial charge; and that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order. View "Arizona ex rel. Horne v. The Geo Group" on Justia Law