Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of seven felony counts related to a robbery and burglary using a deadly weapon, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming violation of his due process right to a fair and impartial jury, where a police vehicle followed Juror No. 2, a known holdout against a guilty verdict, for approximately seven miles, on the second day of deliberations, in a highly publicized trial involving multiple police victims. The court held that the state court's decision was contrary to Mattox v. United States because the state court improperly limited its inquiry to whether the external contact amounted to a “communication” and did not investigate the prejudicial effect of the police tail. Therefore, the court reviewed de novo the question whether the extrinsic contact could have influenced the verdict and prejudiced petitioner. The court concluded that, because the trial court prevented petitioner from offering evidence to demonstrate prejudice, remand for an evidentiary hearing and further fact finding was necessary. View "Tarango v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

A.G. and her parents filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131–12134, as well as tort claims under Arizona state law. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims for defendants. Defendants cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s order vacating taxation of costs. The parties settled on other claims, including claims under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1491. First, the court clarified federal legislation addressing special education for disabled children. The court concluded that the district court improperly dismissed A.G.’s meaningful access and reasonable accommodation arguments. The court concluded that a triable factual dispute exists as to whether the services plaintiffs fault the school district for failing to provide were actually reasonable, necessary, and available accommodations for A.G. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the school district on plaintiffs’ section 504 and Title II claims and remanded for further consideration. In regard to the state law claims, the court concluded that plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim was correctly dismissed because there is no material issue of fact concerning the school district's conduct. Plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim was also correctly dismissed where the district court found the facts alleged by plaintiffs did not rise to the predicate level typically required for such a claim in Arizona. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on claims for assault and battery where plaintiffs introduced evidence that creates an issue of fact as to whether the school district defendants physically escorted and restrained A.G. when she was not a danger to herself or others and despite knowing of her tactile sensitivity. Finally, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim where plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether A.G. was a danger to herself or others when school district staff restrained her. The order denying costs to defendants is vacated. View "A.G. V. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against Commerce Planet in order to enjoin it's deceptive marketing of a product called “OnlineSupplier.” The FTC alleged that Commerce Planet violated section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). Commerce Planet and two individual defendants settled. The remaining defendant, Charles Gugliuzza, was enjoined from engaging in similar misconduct and ordered to pay $18.2 million in restitution. In this opinion, the court addressed Gugliuzza's arguments contesting the validity of the restitution award. The court concluded that the district court had the authority to award restitution under section 13(b) of the FTC Act; the court saw no basis for holding that courts are categorically precluded from imposing joint and several liability in actions brought under section 13(b); because joint and several liability is permissible, restitution awards need not be limited to the funds each defendant personally received from the wrongful conduct; and, in this case, the judgment entered against Gugliuzza does not actually hold him jointly and severally liable for Commerce Planet’s restitution obligations. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment. If on remand the district court decides, in the exercise of its discretion, to hold Gugliuzza jointly and severally liable with Commerce Planet, it may reinstate the $18.2 million restitution award. Otherwise, the award must be limited to the unjust gains Gugliuzza himself received. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly followed the two-step burden-shifting framework for calculating restitution awards under section 13(b) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the amount of the award in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "FTC V. Commerce Planet, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, contending that his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when probation officers conducted two warrantless, suspicionless searches of his cell phone. The court rejected the government's contention that defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights where acceptance of the terms of probation, including suspicionless searches of his person and property, is one factor that bears on the reasonableness of the search, but it is not in itself dispositive. The court concluded that defendant had a privacy interest in his cell phone and the data it contained and that privacy interest was substantial in light of the broad amount of data contained in, or accessible through, his cell phone. Although defendant's privacy was somewhat diminished in light of his status as a probationer, it was not diminished or waived because he accepted as a condition of his probation a clear and unequivocal search provision authorizing cell phone searches (he did not) or because he subscribed to cell phone service using a different first name (he did). After balancing defendant's privacy interest and the government's interest in combating recidivism, the court concluded that the circumstances in this case were unreasonable. Further, the exception to the exclusionary rule in Davis v. United States for binding appellate precedent is inapplicable in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Lara" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), determining that defendant had three prior violent felony convictions. The court held that a conviction for felony riot under a Washington state statute, Wash. Rev. Code 9A.84.010, is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA sentencing enhancement because section 9A.84.010 is overinclusive and indivisible with respect to the term "force." Therefore, defendant's convictions under that statute are not predicate offenses supporting the application of the ACCA enhancement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Werle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the conviction under a constructive possession theory. However, the court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The court stated that it would be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate from comparison drugs that were not from activity related to the defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is involved. A 90% level of purity would more than suffice to support the jury’s quantity determination, if adequately connected to the drugs concerning which defendant had constructive possession. However, the government failed to include evidence connecting that purity level to defendant. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a mistrial was not necessary where an FBI agent mentioned the name of a gang and the district court, among other things, immediately sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Lemus" on Justia Law

After analyzing the effects of grazing domestic sheep in the Payette, the Service prepared a draft supplemental environmental impact statement (DSEIS), an update to the DSEIS, and a final supplemental environmental impact statement (FSEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD). The Service concluded that there is a significant risk of fatal disease to the small and insular populations of bighorn sheep in the Payette and decided in the ROD to close to domestic sheep grazing approximately 70% of the allotments on which grazing had been permitted. Wool Growers challenged the Service's decision. The court concluded that, because the lack of consultation of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) did not prevent the Service or the public from considering information about the uncertainties in transmission of disease from domestic to bighorn sheep such as ARS would have offered, and because information about the precise mechanisms of such transmission was not a basis of the Service’s decision, no prejudice resulted from the lack of consultation. The court also concluded that the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously or abuse its discretion by declining to supplement the FSEIS. Finally, the court rejected Wool Growers’ challenge to the modeling the Service used to analyze bighorn sheep home ranges and movement, and the potential impacts of various management alternatives. Because the Service committed no reversible error in preparing the FSEIS and ROD, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Deputies Conley and Pederson, while participating in a warrantless raid of a house, shot a homeless couple who resided in a shack in the backyard. The couple filed suit against the deputies under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that the deputies violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law when entering the shack, in the curtilage of the house, without a warrant where the district court correctly determined that the deputies conducted a search; the deputies did not demonstrate specific and articulable objective facts of an exigency that would meaningfully differentiate this case from clearly established law; the district court correctly determined that the deputies could not have reasonably believed that their search of the shack was consensual; and the deputies did not have the requisite suspicion of danger to justify a protective sweep. The court also held that the deputies violated the knock-and-announce rule, but the court's law in 2010 was not clearly established in this respect. To clearly establish the law going forward, the court held that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment when they failed to knock at the shack. The court held that officers must knock and reannounce their presence when they know or should reasonably know that an area within the curtilage of a home is a separate residence from the main house. The court agreed with the district court's award of damages under the provocation doctrine. Finally, the court rejected Pederson's argument that she cannot be held liable because she did not search the shack where she was an integral participant in the unlawful search. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed as moot plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Mendez v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, arguing that the district court erred by failing to ensure that his stipulation was knowing and voluntary. Defendant also challenged his sentence, contending that the district court erred in dismissing his court-appointed interpreter contrary to the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. 1827(f)(1). In this opinion, the court held that the district court dismissed the interpreter without adhering to the procedures required by the Act where defendant did not validly waive his right to an interpreter. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the conviction in a memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Murguia-Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 et seq., challenging FWS's designation of an area of Alaska’s coast and waters as critical habitat for the polar bear. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on two grounds: the district court faulted FWS for failing to identify specifically where and how existing polar bears utilize the relatively small portion of critical habitat designated as Units 2 and 3; and the district court faulted FWS for failing to provide Alaska with adequate justification for adopting a final rule not fully consistent with the State’s submitted comments. The district court vacated the entire designation. In this case, the standard FWS followed, looking to areas that contained the constituent elements required for sustained preservation of polar bears, was in accordance with statutory purpose and hence could not have been arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court concluded that FWS’s designation of Unit 2 as critical denning habitat was not arbitrary and capricious. Unit 2 contains areas requiring protection for both birthing and acclimation of cubs, and FWS adequately explained its treatment of the relatively few areas of known human habitation. The court also concluded that, with respect to Units 2 and 3, FWS's definition of the denning habitat was in accord with the statutory purposes and it was not arbitrary and capricious for FWS to include areas necessary for such related denning needs. The court further concluded that FWS provided adequate justification to Alaska pursuant to section 4(i) of the ESA. Finally, the court concluded that the district court court correctly upheld the no-disturbance zone as a part of Unit 3 because it provides refuge from human disturbance; FWS’s assessment of the potential economic impacts was not arbitrary and capricious; and the district court was correct in denying Alaska’s claim, although the court did not agree with the district court to the extent that it held that Section 7 of the ESA creates any independent duty to consult apart from the requirements of Section 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Jewel" on Justia Law