Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lien Claimants attempted to collect on valid judgments they hold against Iran for their injuries arising out of terrorism sponsored by Iran. Lien Claimants seek to attach a $2.8 million judgment that the Ministry obtained in an underlying arbitration with an American company, Cubic. The district court granted Lien Claimants’ motion to attach the Cubic Judgment. The court held that the United States does not violate its obligations under the Algiers Accords by permitting Lien Claimants to attach the Cubic Judgment. The court also held that the Cubic Judgment is a blocked asset pursuant to President Obama’s 2012 Executive Order No. 13359 subject to attachment and execution under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610 note. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "The Ministry of Defense v. Frym" on Justia Law

This court has held that an immigration judge may use the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—“false in one thing, false in everything”—to find that a witness who testified falsely in one respect at a removal hearing is also not credible in other respects. The court concluded that the BIA may not do the same thing when considering a motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court explained that, in contrast to an immigration judge, the BIA is not a finder of fact, so it cannot make the kind of credibility determination inherent in a decision to apply the falsus maxim. The court granted the petition for review in this case because the BIA applied the falsus maximu in denying petitioner's motion to reopen. The falsus maxim cannot render petitioner’s affidavit “inherently unbelievable,” because the falsus maxim is discretionary rather than mandatory. View "Shouchen Yang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence of 46 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. The court concluded that the government did not breach defendant's plea agreement by not objecting when the district court granted only a two-level departure for fast track (rather than the four-level departure in the agreement). The court concluded that no plain error occurred where, unlike the plea agreement in United States v. Camarillo-Tello, defendant's plea agreement does not indicate the government “will recommend” the four-level departure for fast track. Rather, paragraph eight of her plea agreement provides “the parties stipulate and agree that the following guideline calculations are appropriate for the charge for which the defendant is pleading guilty.” That language is sufficiently distinct from the language obligating government action in Camarillo-Tello for the court to conclude no plain error occurred here. Therefore. the court enforced the appellate waiver and dismissed the appeal because the government did not breach defendant's plea agreement. View "United States v. Hernandez-Castro" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the EPA's Final Rule partially disapproving Arizona's regional haze State Implementation Plan (SIP) submission and promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) in place of the disapproved SIP elements. The court concluded that EPA reasonably concluded that Arizona’s cost and visibility impact analyses for Coronado suffered from significant analytical defects and that the SIP did not provide a reasoned explanation of the bases for the ultimate best available retrofit technology (BART) determination for Coronado; although Section 169A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7491(a)(1), affords the states substantial authority to determine BART controls, the combination of these defects provided EPA reasonable grounds upon which to disapprove Arizona’s BART determinations as to nitrogen oxides emissions limits at Coronado; and its partial disapproval of the SIP in this respect was not arbitrary or capricious. The court further concluded that EPA’s visibility improvement assessment was consistent with the statute and regulatory requirements, and supported by the record. Finally, EPA properly promulgated its FIP in the same rule as its partial disapproval of the SIP. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA" on Justia Law

Three masked intruders entered plaintiff's home, fatally shooting her husband and daughter, and shooting plaintiff in the arm. Plaintiff and her surviving daughter filed suit alleging that the United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2680(a), for damages arising out of the attack because the FBI negligently failed to disclose the information about the impending home invasion to local law enforcement, in contravention of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. The district court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the FBI’s decision whether or not to disclose information regarding potential threats is discretionary; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery; the FBI’s decision whether to disclose information is the type of decision that Congress intended to shield from FTCA liability; and the design-implementation distinction does not apply to permit suit against the government in this case. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that the government satisfied both prongs of the discretionary function exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the court appointed receiver for PEMGroup, filed suit against Stonefield, the CPAs who audited the financial statements for six of PEMGroup's fraudulent offerings, contending that Stonefield’s reports and related conduct materially misrepresented PEMGroup’s financial condition, allowing PEMGroup’s management to prolong the life of their scheme and to loot and to dissipate assets from PEMGroup. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims of professional negligence and aiding and abetting the wrongful conversion of PEMGroup's assets. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that to survive summary judgment, plaintiff would have to offer substantial evidence – meaning sufficient evidence to justify a verdict in his favor – that investors reasonably relied on Stonefield’s audits in order to show causation. In this case, before the district court and at oral argument, plaintiff admitted he did not submit direct evidence that investors relied on Stonefield’s audit reports or how PEMGroup used them. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mosier v. Stonefield Josephson, Inc." on Justia Law

Employer-Appellees required their employees to participate in tip pools. Unlike the tip pools contemplated by section 203(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(m), however, these tip pools were comprised of both customarily tipped employees and non-customarily tipped employees. In 2010, the court held in Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. that this type of tip pooling arrangement does not violate section 203(m), because section 203(m) was silent as to employers who do not take a tip credit. In 2011, shortly after Cumbie was decided, the DOL promulgated a formal rule that extended the tip pool restrictions of section 203(m) to all employers, not just those who take a tip credit. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that Cumbie foreclosed the DOL’s ability to promulgate the 2011 rule and that the 2011 rule was invalid because it was contrary to Congress’s clear intent. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada followed suit. Applying Chevron, the court concluded that Congress has not addressed the question at issue because section 203(m) is silent as to the tip pooling practices of employers who do not take a tip credit. There is no convincing evidence that Congress’s silence, in this context, means anything other than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands. In exercising its discretion to regulate, the DOL promulgated a rule that is consistent with the FLSA’s language, legislative history, and purpose. Having decided that the regulation withstands Chevron review, the court reversed both judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enjoin the application of Propositions 89 and 9 as to them. Proposition 89 amended the California Constitution to vest in the Governor constitutional authority to reverse, affirm, or modify grants of parole as to inmates convicted of murder. Proposition 9 amended the California Penal Code to increase the default period of time after which a prisoner would be scheduled for a parole hearing, after the denial of parole. California inmates who were sentenced to life terms with the possibility of parole for murders committed before the passage of the two Propositions contend that applying the Propositions to them creates a significant risk that their periods of incarceration will be longer than they would have been before the passage of the Propositions. The district court found in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that Johnson v. Gomez controls where Proposition 89 remains only a transfer of decisionmaking power, which does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that Johnson does not control the outcome of plaintiffs' challenge to Proposition 89 and the court reversed the district court's findings and injunction as to Proposition 89. The court also concluded that the district court committed legal error, among other things, by basing its findings principally on speculation and inference, rather than concrete evidence demonstrating that the petition to advance process failed to afford relief from the classwide risk of lengthened incarceration posed by Proposition 9. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Gilman v. Brown" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(2)(A), against various lenders and loan servicers, alleging that defendants certified that loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were free and clear of certain home owner association liens and charges when they were not. At issue was whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are officers, employees, or agents of the federal government for purposes of the Act. The court concluded that the district court properly held that a claim presented to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac is not presented to an “officer, employee or agent” of the United States. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private companies, albeit companies sponsored or chartered by the federal government. The court's prior decision in Rust v. Johnson, where it held that Fannie Mae was a federal instrumentality for state/city tax purposes, does not change the result, because Rust does not address Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac’s status under the False Claims Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Adams v. Aurora Loan Servs." on Justia Law

Petitioner, on trial for first degree murder of a police officer, challenged the prosecutor’s decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors. Applying the doubly deferential standard for reviewing a Batson v. Kentucky determination, the court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also concluded that the trial court’s decision to preclude petitioner from responding to the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for his strikes was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Sifuentes v. Brazelton" on Justia Law