Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of five counts of lewd and lascivious acts by use of force for sexually abusing his stepdaughters and their cousin, appealed the district court's denial of petitioner's request for a Rhines v. Weber stay. In Rhines, the Supreme Court held that a district court has discretion to stay, rather than dismiss, a timely-filed “mixed” petition for habeas corpus relief - that is, a single petition that includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims. The court joined several of its sister circuits in holding that the Rhines stay-and-abeyance procedure is not limited to mixed petitions, and a district court may stay a petition that raises only unexhausted claims. In this case, the district court dismissed the petition on the assumption that it lacked authority to grant petitioner's request for a Rhines stay. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to decide the issue in the first instance. View "Mena v. Long" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for mail fraud, arguing that there was insufficient evidence on Counts 4 and 6 to show that the underlying mailings furthered his fraudulent scheme. Count 4 arises from the notice of disability award that SSA mailed to defendant's girlfriend. The court affirmed as to this count, concluding that the notice of disability award marked the last step before defendant's girlfriend would receive disability benefit payments, the goal of her fraudulent plan with defendant. The mailing was a contemplated, necessary step in its respective scheme. Count 6 pertains to the application summary that SSA mailed to defendant in January 2012. The court reversed as to this count because the underlying mailing was not part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, and because it did nothing to further the scheme. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Eglash" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Sarver filed suit against defendants, contending that Will James, the main character in the Oscar-winning film "The Hurt Locker," is based on his life and experiences and that he did not consent to such use and that several scenes in the film falsely portray him in a way that has harmed his reputation. The district court dismissed all of Sarver’s claims. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it had little basis to conclude that New Jersey is Sarver's legal domicile at the time the film was released. Even assuming arguendo that New Jersey was Sarver’s domicile, the court concluded that California contacts predominate, and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts section 145 factors weigh in favor of the application of California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. Under section 6 Second Restatement principles, California had the most significant relationship to this litigation, which was sufficient to overcome any presumption of Sarver's domicile. The court also concluded that defendants' anti-SLAPP motions were timely filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On the merits, the court concluded that the film and the narrative of its central character Will James speak directly to issues of a public nature, and Sarver has failed to state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. The film is speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment, which safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life - including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary - and transform them into art. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions. Finally, the court concluded that Sarver’s false light invasion of privacy, defamation, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and constructive fraud/negligent misrepresentation claims were properly dismissed. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Sarver v. Chartier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Energy Northwest, alleging claims of retaliation in violation of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851. The whistleblower retaliation provision of the Act protects energy workers who report or otherwise act upon safety concerns. In this case, plaintiff's single expression of a difference of opinion about the “Charlie” designation of one existing internal condition report lacks a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety concern. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Energy Northwest because plaintiff's conduct falls outside the scope of the Act's protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sanders v. Energy Northwest" on Justia Law

Lakeridge has one member, MBP. MBP is managed by a board of five members, one of whom is Kathie Bartlett. Bartlett shares a close business and personal relationship with Dr. Robert Rabkin. Lakeridge filed for bankruptcy and US Bank held a fully secured claim worth about $10 million and MBP held an unsecured claim worth $2.76 million. After MBP's board decided to sell its unsecured claim, Rabkin purchased the claim for $5000. US Bank subsequently moved to designate Rabkin's claim and disallow it for plan voting purposes. The bankruptcy court held Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider and that Rabkin did not purchase MBP's claim in bad faith. However, the bankruptcy court designated Rabkin’s claim and disallowed it for plan voting, because it determined Rabkin had become a statutory insider by acquiring a claim from MBP. Lakeridge and Rabkin both appealed, and US Bank cross-appealed. The BAP reversed the finding that Rabkin had become a statutory insider as a matter of law by acquiring MBP’s claim and affirmed the findings that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider and that the claim assignment was not made in bad faith. The BAP held that insider status cannot be assigned and must be determined for each individual “on a case-by-case basis, after the consideration of various factors.” Finally, the BAP held Rabkin could vote to accept the Lakeridge plan under 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(10), because he was an impaired creditor who was not an insider. The court affirmed the BAP's decision. View "US Bank v. The Village at Lakeridge, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for obstructing justice by lying under oath to a grand jury about his role in impeding an investigation. During trial, defendant testified and allegedly lied under oath again. The district judge applied an enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 based on defendant's trial testimony, without expressly finding that the testimony was willfully or materially false. The court agreed with the parties that the district court erred by enhancing the sentence without making the findings necessary to show that defendant's trial testimony was, in fact, perjury. The court rejected defendant's contention that, even if his trial testimony was perjurious, the obstruction enhancement cannot be applied. The court concluded that applying the obstruction enhancement to defendant's false trial testimony does not impermissibly penalize him twice for the same conduct if the district court finds that his trial testimony was false, willful, and material. The court remanded for the district court to make express findings as to the willfulness and materiality of defendant’s trial testimony in light of United States v. Castro-Ponce in order to determine whether the obstruction enhancement applies, and to resentence accordingly. Finally, the court denied defendant's request for reassignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and the Pima County Superior court found that Atkins v. Virginia did not preclude his execution, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied special action relief, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review. In 2010, this court remanded this case to the district court for the limited purpose of considering petitioner's Atkins claim and the district court denied the claim in 2012. The court concluded that a presumption of correctness does not apply to the state court's factual determination that petitioner was not intellectually disabled at the time of the offense and trial. The court held that the state court’s factual determination is not entitled to deference because it is not fairly supported by the record. Judge Reinhardt would hold that deference is not due for the additional and independent reason that the Pima County Superior Court rendered its finding that petitioner was not intellectually disabled under a constitutionally impermissible legal standard. Applying de novo review to determine whether petitioner has demonstrated intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence as required by Arizona law, the court held that he has met this burden where, considering his intellectual functioning test scores and his history of significantly impaired adaptive behavior, as the court must under Atkins and Hall v. Florida, the court found that the record in this case overwhelmingly demonstrates that petitioner satisfied the two substantive prongs of Arizona’s definition of intellectual disability both prior to age eighteen and at the time of the crime. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Smith v. Schriro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the California Constitution, and state tort law, alleging that he was wrongfully incarcerated by LASD based on the misapplication of a felony warrant issued in 1994 for Mario L. Garcia, who has the same date of birth as plaintiff. On appeal, LASD, and former LA Sheriff Lee Baca challenged the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, absolute (quasi-judicial) immunity, and immunity under two California statutes. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over defendants’ appeals from denial of state-law immunity because the district court’s denial determined rights collateral to those asserted in the action, and like the denial of qualified immunity, the district court’s decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment; LA County and LASD may only appeal denial of state-law statutory immunity; and Baca, in his individual capacity, may appeal denial of qualified immunity and of quasi-judicial immunity. The court also concluded that plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment violation and he is not entitled to qualified immunity where, at the time of plaintiff's incarceration, the standards for determining whether alleged police conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment were clearly established. In this case, although plaintiff’s arrest for driving under the influence was valid, the warrant on which he was later held matched only his first and last name and date of birth; plaintiff is nine inches taller and forty pounds heavier than the warrant subject; and, even a cursory comparison of plaintiff to the warrant subject should have led officers to question whether the person described in the warrant was plaintiff. Finally, because the facts plaintiff alleged go beyond the limits of quasi-judicial immunity, this immunity does not apply to Baca. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Garcia v. Cnty. of Riverside" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's finding of removability based on his two prior drug convictions. The court concluded that the IJ erred in concluding that petitioner’s two counts of drug possession would bar him from first-offender treatment under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA), 18 U.S.C. 3607(a). The court held that the two counts amount to a single “offense” under the FFOA because they arose out of a single event, composed a single criminal case, and triggered a single, undivided sentence. While petitioner was charged with possession of two different drugs, that alone does not change petitioner’s status as a first-time drug offender under the FFOA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Villavicencio-Rojas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, seeks adjustment of his immigration status under the “grandfathering” exception for beneficiaries of labor certification applications filed before April 30, 2001. Applying the Chevron framework, the court concluded that the statute at issue in this case, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), is ambiguous because Congress did not speak to the question of whether that section applies to substitute beneficiaries of labor certifications. The court concluded that it was permissible for the Attorney General, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1245.10(j), to interpret the statute to preclude beneficiaries substituted after the sunset date from obtaining grandfathered status. Therefore, the court concluded that 8 C.F.R. 1245.10(j) is entitled to deference. Because the BIA properly denied petitioner's application for adjustment, the court denied the petition for review. View "Valencia v. Lynch" on Justia Law