Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a California state inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant and other prison officials, alleging that they had violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to name two physicians in his grievance. The court held that a prisoner exhausts “such administrative remedies as are available,” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e, despite failing to comply with a procedural rule if prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process. When prison officials opt not to enforce a procedural rule but instead decide an inmate’s grievance on the merits, the purposes of the PLRA exhaustion requirement have been fully served: prison officials have had a fair opportunity to correct any claimed deprivation and an administrative record supporting the prison’s decision has been developed. In this case, plaintiff's grievance plainly put prison officials on notice of the nature of the wrong alleged in his federal suit because prison officials had full notice of the alleged deprivation and ample opportunity to resolve it. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Smith" on Justia Law

CAS appealed the district court's denial of its motion to intervene and unseal documents filed in a putative class action between Chrysler and certain named plaintiffs. In this case, the district court found that the motion for preliminary injunction here was nondispositive, applied the good cause standard to the documents filed under seal, and concluded that good cause existed to keep them from the public’s view. The court held, however, that a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming a strong presumption by meeting the compelling reasons standards where a court may seal records only when it finds compelling reasons and articulates the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture. The court must then conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret. When deciding what test to apply, the court sometimes deployed the terms "dispositive" and "non-dispositive." Public access to filed motions and their attachments did not depend on whether the motion was technically “dispositive;” but rather, public access turned on whether the motion was more than tangentially related to the merits of the case. Because the preliminary injunction motion here was more than tangentially related to the merits of the case, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider the documents under the compelling reasons standard. View "The Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group" on Justia Law

Eden Place appealed the BAP's decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s determination that Eden Place violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by evicting debtor from a residential property. After considering the court's applicable precedent, SS Farms, LLC v. Sharp, and the clear language of the statute, the court held that the bankruptcy court’s order that Eden Place violated the automatic stay was final and appealable. On the merits, the court concluded that the unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession entered pursuant to California Code Civil Procedure 415.46 bestowed legal title and all rights of possession upon Eden Place. Accordingly, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred when it ruled that Eden Place violated the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and reversed the bankruptcy court order. In this case, debtor had no legal or equitable interest remaining in the property after issuance of the unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession in state court. View "Eden Place v. Perl" on Justia Law

The purchaser of viatical settlements paid approximately $507,000 for life settlements with the debtor and received $9,000,000 in death benefits when he died shortly thereafter. The bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary proceeding to recover the market value of the life settlements. The court held that debtor's interests in the term life insurance policies, including the secondary market value of the policies and resulting life settlements, constitute a recoverable “interest of the debtor in property” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1). In this case, debtor had a legal and equitable interest in the property at issue within the meaning of section 541(a), the property was not excluded from the estate under section 541(b), and the property was not the subject of a proper exemption in this case. The court further concluded that the district court properly held that the trustee's avoidance action was not time-barred because debtor's fraudulent concealment equitably tolled the statute of limitations from commencing. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the bankruptcy court should have granted the trustee leave to amend her avoidance action. View "Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp" on Justia Law

RDN filed suit challenging the constitutionality of California Business and Professions Code Section 25503(f)–(h), which forbids manufacturers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages from giving anything of value to retailers for advertising their alcoholic products. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., requires heightened judicial scrutiny of content-based restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech regarding lawful products, rather than the intermediate scrutiny applied to section 25503 in Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh. Accordingly, the court concluded that Actmedia is clearly irreconcilable with Sorrell. The court therefore reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded on an open record for the district court to apply heightened judicial scrutiny in the first instance. View "Retail Digital Network v. Appelsmith" on Justia Law

Petitioner was awarded benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 928(a), for injuries he sustained while working for PacificRim. On appeal, petitioner challenged the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's award of attorney's fees under the Act. The court concluded that the proxy market rate relied upon by the ALJ does not adequately reflect market rates for Portland, Oregon, the relevant community, because it is based entirely on data not tailored to Portland, even though reliable information about attorney billing rates in Portland was readily available. Therefore, the court held that the Board erred in affirming the attorney’s-fee award based on a proxy market rate not tailored to the “relevant community.” Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shirrod v. OWCP" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over interests in mining claims originally owned by Guy Anderson and bequeathed to his six children upon his death. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing all defendants to be joined in a single partition action. In this case, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that a single partition action was the most expeditious way of resolving this dispute, and in allowing all defendants to be joined in that action. The court also concluded that the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Cuprite and ordered partition by sale to Freeport; the district court properly concluded that partition by sale was more appropriate than partition in kind; and accepting the current offer or any better terms that could be had was a reasonable way for the district court to structure the partition sale, and does not violate any terms of the operative statute. Finally, the court concluded that, regardless of whether an Arizona state court would have been required to hold a trial, the district court correctly resolved the summary judgment motion according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cuprite Mine Partners v. Anderson" on Justia Law

FTB initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on residential real property and sold the property at a foreclosure sale to DM. On appeal, DM challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for FTB. The court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DM could have discovered the defect at issue - lack of a utilities easement - prior to the foreclosure sale, which is the relevant inquiry under Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank. Nonetheless, the district court did not err in concluding on summary judgment that DM is not entitled to the equitable remedy of rescission where DM had a duty to investigate wrongdoing and FTB’s status as a foreclosing lender does not alter this conclusion because a foreclosing lender has the same duties of disclosure regarding the property as any other seller. Therefore, the court concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact that DM was put on inquiry of wrongdoing at the time it discovered the lack of electricity, and therefore is deemed to know all facts that could be discovered from a reasonable investigation. Finally, the court concluded that because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether DM’s two-year delay deprived it of the equitable remedy of rescission, FTB is entitled to summary judgment on that issue. View "DM Residential Fund v. First Tennessee Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioners David and Miguel Correo-Ruiz, citizens of Mexico and brothers, challenged the BIA's holding that individuals like petitioners, who entered the United States unlawfully and then applied for adjustment of status under a provision of the immigration laws permitting non-citizens to become lawful permanent residents, are categorically ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). In Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, the court upheld the BIA’s interpretation of the law and adopted a five-factor test for determining whether In re Briones may be applied retroactively in a given case. Petitioners assert that they incurred legal expenses pursuing section 1255(i) relief during the 21-month period between Acosta v. Gonzales and Briones. In Garfias-Rodriguez, the court suggested that incurring such expenses could potentially tilt the second and third factors in the petitioner’s favor. Because the record does not reflect the amount of the expenses petitioners incurred during the relevant 21-month window, the court remanded to the BIA with instructions to grant the brothers an opportunity to supplement the record. The BIA can then assess in the first instance, under the five-factor test, whether Briones may be applied retroactively in this case. The court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Correo-Ruiz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a copyright dispute between Adobe and defendant and his software company, SSI. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of both Adobe's copyright and trademark claims. Although a copyright holder enjoys broad privileges protecting the exclusive right to distribute a work, the first sale doctrine serves as an important exception to that right. Under this doctrine, once a copy of a work is lawfully sold or transferred, the new owner has the right “to sell or otherwise dispose of” that copy without the copyright owner’s permission. In this case, the court concluded that the district court correctly held that Adobe established its registered copyrights in the disputed software and that defendant carried his burden of showing that he lawfully acquired genuine copies of Adobe’s software, but that Adobe failed to produce the purported license agreements or other evidence to document that it retained title to the software when the copies were first transferred. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to strike and excluding evidence purporting to document the licenses. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly analyzed the trademark claim under the nominative fair use defense to a trademark infringement claim instead of under the unfair competition rubric. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Christenson" on Justia Law