Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and other charges and sentenced to death. This court subsequently found that the Arizona Supreme Court had erred in not considering certain mitigation evidence, because it found such evidence was not connected to petitioner’s actions at the time of the murder. The court reversed and remanded to the district court to issue a conditional writ ordering petitioner's release from his death sentence unless the State were to initiate proceedings either to correct the constitutional error or to vacate the death sentence and impose a lesser sentence. The district court so ordered and the state court affirmed the death sentence. Petitioner then moved the district court for an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Arizona Supreme Court was powerless to correct the constitutional error, because the law had changed since Styers I. Petitioner made a Ring v. Arizona claim before the state court, arguing that the conditional writ of habeas corpus required that petitioner be re-sentenced and that a jury must find the aggravating factors rendering him eligible for the death penalty. The state court denied the claim on the ground that petitioner's sentence was final. The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus necessarily renders non-final a conviction or sentence that was predicated on constitutional error, and the conditional writ of habeas corpus in this case did not vacate petitioner’s death sentence. Therefore, the court concluded that the state court's determination that petitioner's sentence remained final at the time of the second independent review was not contrary to federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally, the state court considered the mitigating evidence and decided to give it little weight. Neither Tennard v. Dretke, nor Eddings v. Oklahoma, requires more. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Styers v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Attorney General of California’s collection of IRS Form 990 Schedule B, which contains identifying information for their major donors, arguing that the nonpublic disclosure requirement is unconstitutional as applied to them because it impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights to free speech and association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The district court entered preliminary injunctions preventing the Attorney General from demanding plaintiffs’ Schedule B forms pending a trial on the merits. The court concluded that an injunction properly tailored to plaintiffs’ concerns would address the risk of public disclosure by enjoining the Attorney General and her agents from making Schedule B information public, pending a decision on the merits of plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges. However, plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to an injunction preventing the Attorney General from demanding their Schedule B forms, enforcing that demand, and using the forms to enforce California law. Accordingly, the court vacated the injunctions with instructions to enter new orders preliminarily enjoining the Attorney General from publicly disclosing, but not from collecting, plaintiffs’ Schedule B forms. View "Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of seven counts of making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014, and six counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a). Defendant's convictions stemmed from a tax evasion scheme in which defendant used false identities to open bank accounts in order to obtain cashier's checks to buy gold. The court joined the Fourth Circuit in holding that section 1014 does not contain any requirement of a risk of loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the University and university officials alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment after the University denied his application to become a student teacher. The court held that, in the context of a public university’s professional certification program, the university may evaluate the student’s speech, made in the course of the program, in determining the student’s eligibility for certification without offending the First Amendment under certain circumstances. In this case, the court concluded that the University did not violate plaintiff's First Amendment rights because its decision related directly to defined and established professional standards, was narrowly tailored to serve the University’s core mission of evaluating plaintiff’s suitability for teaching, and reflected reasonable professional judgment. Further, because the University provided adequate procedural protections in denying plaintiff’s application, neither it nor its agents violated plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the University. View "Oyama v. Univ. of Hawaii" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and a special finding that the quantity of heroin was at least one kilogram. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to apply the multiplier method given the facts of this case; the district court did not err in disregarding the circumstantial evidence of the secret storage compartment in defendant’s vehicle, capable of holding 30 pounds of drugs; and the testimonial and physical evidence cannot support a finding of one kilogram. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred by concluding that the pattern of transactions constituted circumstantial evidence that defendants must have agreed to distribute as much heroin as they could and that the distribution would have continued in a similar fashion; it would be speculative to infer that defendants agreed to any future transactions such that they would reach the one kilogram mark; and the court's conclusion is further supported by the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. Hickman. Because this error was not harmless, the court reversed the jury’s quantity finding, vacated defendant’s sentence on all counts, and remanded for resentencing. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's evidentiary ruling permitting the government to ask defendant's sister about his prior state convictions for drug trafficking and escape. View "United States v. Navarrette-Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant, an undocumented alien, was convicted in 2009 of violating California narcotics laws and was subsequently placed in administrative removal proceedings. Defendant was subsequently ordered removed in 2010 and was criminally charged with illegal reentry in 2011. The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and defendant was convicted of illegal reentry. The court held that the ICE agent who conducted defendant’s administrative removal proceeding violated her due process rights by telling her that an attorney would not have been able to help her when she was facially eligible for a U-visa, a form of hardship relief available to a person convicted of an aggravated felony. The court also held that defendant was prejudiced by the due process violation because it was plausible that defendant would have obtained a U-visa had she applied for one in 2010, notwithstanding the fact that she had already been placed in administrative removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment and vacated the conviction. View "United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In Appeal No. 15-50033, the government challenged the district court’s pretrial order granting motions in limine to exclude certain pieces of evidence in a case in which Defendant DeCinces, Mazzo, and others are charged with insider-trading offenses relating to the stock of Advanced Medical Optics. In Appeal No. 15-50058, Mazzo challenged the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a securities fraud charge under 18 U.S.C. 1348 for failing to state an offense and for violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. In regard to Appeal No. 15-50033, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731 to entertain the government's interlocutory appeal where the district court's order granting the motions in limine was sufficiently final, and the district court abused its discretion when it granted the motions in limine excluding the IntraLase and Bausch and Lomb evidence. In regard to Appeal No. 15-50058, the court concluded that it lacked pendant appellate jurisdiction over Mazzo's interlocutory appeal, and the court lacked jurisdiction over Mazzo's interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of defendants' motions in limine in Appeal No. 15-50033 and dismissed Appeal No. 15-50058. View "United States v. DeCinces" on Justia Law

PRO filed suit against QMC, alleging that QMC's adoption of a closed-facility model was a pretext to prevent PRO physicians from competing with QMC. PRO sought injunctive relief against QMC, arguing that QMC's review and use of patient records violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d, and the Hawaii Constitution. The district court denied the injunction. In light of Devose v. Herrington, the court held that there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint. This requires a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself. In this case, PRO’s motion for injunctive relief does not have a relationship or nexus to the underlying complaint. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly refused to grant the relief requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pacific Radiation Oncology v. Queen's Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of North Korea, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of asylum under the firm resettlement doctrine. The court held that section 302 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, 22 U.S.C. 7842, does not preclude a finding that a North Korean has “firmly resettled” in South Korea, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 C.F.R. § 208.15, even though he otherwise meets the requirements of firm resettlement. Consequently, section 7842 does not affect the BIA's conclusion that petitioner has resettled in South Korea and therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sung Kil Jang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of forcible rape of a minor and eight counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor. The court affirmed the district court's grant of petitioner's writ of habeas corpus where an interrogating officer read him his Miranda rights and confirmed that petitioner understood those rights. The officer then asked if petitioner wanted to talk to him and petitioner answered, "no." The court held that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) does not bar habeas review of petitioner’s Miranda claim, and the court concluded, on de novo review, that petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated when his interrogation tape was played and his apology letter was read at trial. In this case, the state court's decision that the "no" response was ambiguous and equivocal in light of other statements is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, and it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court further concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus. View "Garcia v. Long" on Justia Law