Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taxpayers received and then sold stock derived from the demutualization of five mutual life insurance companies from which they had purchased policies. At issue was whether a life insurance policyholder has any basis in a mutual life insurance company’s membership rights. The court held that taxpayers who sold stock obtained through demutualization cannot claim a basis in that stock for tax purposes because they had a zero basis in the mutual rights that were extinguished during the demutualization. The district court skipped a critical step by examining the value of the mutual rights without evidence of whether the taxpayers paid anything to first acquire them. The district court also erred when it estimated basis by using the stock price at the time of demutualization rather than calculating basis at the time the policies were acquired. Consequently, the court concluded that the IRS properly rejected taxpayers' refund claim in this case where they offered nothing to show payment for their stake in the membership rights, as opposed to premium payments for the underlying insurance coverage. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the government's motion for summary judgment. View "Dorrance v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his civil rights action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). A motions panel granted plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis (IFP) status on appeal. Defendant filed a motion to revoke plaintiff's IFP status under the "three strikes" provision of the Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Defendant cites the Supreme Court's recent decision in Coleman v. Tollefson, where the Supreme Court left open the question presented in this case. The court held that a prisoner is entitled to IFP status on appeal from the trial court's dismissal of a third complaint instead of in an attempt to file several additional complaints. In Thaut I, failure to exhaust was not “clear on the face of the complaint,” and the magistrate judge considered a declaration about the prison grievance system submitted by defendant Thaut when making her decision. The court concluded that Thaut I was not dismissed for failure to state a claim, but was rather a grant of summary judgment to defendant. Consequently, it was not a strike under the PLRA. The court concluded that Thaut II and Thaut III constitute two strikes. The court denied defendant's motion to revoke the IFP status on appeal, holding that dismissal of the complaint in the action underlying this appeal does not constitute a “prior occasion” under the PLRA, and plaintiff had not accumulated a third strike before he filed this appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to revoke plaintiff's IFP status. View "Richey v. Dahne" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s ruling that no Miranda violation occurred was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. In this case, the state court unreasonably applied Miranda v. Arizona and Davis v. United States by concluding that petitioner's invocation of the right to counsel was ambiguous or equivocal. The state court also contravened or unreasonably applied Smith v. Illinois when it used petitioner’s post-invocation responses to cast doubt on the clarity of his request for counsel. The court concluded, however, that the state court's finding that any Miranda violation was harmless was not unreasonable in light of a witness's statements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mays v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of the production of child pornography, transportation of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, and obstruction of justice. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as time barred. Under section 2255(f), there is a one-year period of limitation to file a collateral attack on a federal conviction that runs from the latest of four events, including the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. The court held that when a judgment imposes a sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a section 2255 motion does not restart when the specific amount of restitution is later entered. In this case, defendant waived his claim for equitable tolling. Even assuming defendant's counsel did give erroneous advice on the filing deadline, this is not the kind of extraordinary circumstance that compels equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that police officers' warrantless entry into a warehouse during a musical event and fundraiser, and their subsequent search and detention of everyone inside, violated the attendees' First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants with respect to the warrantless-search claims and with respect to the unreasonable-seizure claim of Plaintiff Javier Cortez. The court agreed that the majority of the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the warrantless entry, concluded that the district court’s holding that Cortez is subject to the Heck bar was correct, and rejected all of plaintiffs’ claims of error regarding the jury instructions given at trial. However, the court concluded that Plaintiffs Cortez and Elizabeth Lopez, who were organizers of the event and thus were in possession of the warehouse on the night at issue, have standing to challenge the officers' entry into the warehouse. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to that issue. The court remanded the warrantless-entry claims for trial. View "Lyall v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and his children against police officers, four DHS officials and the City, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that DHS and the officers took custody of his children without reasonable cause. The court concluded that the factual issues do not preclude the court from hearing the officers' appeal and rejected plaintiff's claim under Johnson v. Jones. In this case, the undisputed facts provide a sufficient basis to determine whether the officers’ reliance on DHS’s determination violated any clearly established right of plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the officers were not incompetent in believing that they were legally authorized to act in reliance on DHS’s determination. And even if the officers were mistaken in their belief that they could remove the children at the direction of DHS without court authorization, their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's order denying qualified immunity to the officers and remanded. View "Sjurset v. Button" on Justia Law

Defendants Lloyd, Keskemety, Nelson, Baker, and Greenhouse appealed their convictions and sentences for selling unregistered securities when they worked in "boiler rooms" soliciting investments in partnerships to finance the production and distribution of movies. The court affirmed Lloyd's sentence but concluded that Keskemety’s sentence for managing the Florida telemarketing boiler room improperly included fraud losses from the California boiler room that Lloyd managed. Therefore, the court vacated Keskemety's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reversed Nelsons' conviction based on evidentiary rulings, vacated the sentence, and remanded. The court affirmed Baker's conviction due to the overwhelming evidence against him, making the evidentiary errors harmless, but the court vacated Baker’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because of an error in calculating the Guidelines sentence. Finally, the court found no error as to Greenhouse's sentence and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Cascadia appealed from the district court's denial of their motion seeking to enjoin the Douglas Fire Complex Recovery Project in the southern Oregon Klamath Mountains. Cascadia conceded that the Service identified the relevant scientific data but argues that compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(3), requires more than merely restating the scientific data. In view of the deference owed to the agency’s determination, and the record evidence of reliable data, the court concluded that the district court’s rejection of Cascadia’s challenge was not an abuse of discretion, legally erroneous, or factually erroneous. The record reflects that the Service indeed relied upon the data of several surveys from an array of surveyors regarding the effect that barred owls have on the spotted owl. Further, the record does not support a finding that the Service failed to use the best available scientific information regarding the effect the wildfire had on the spotted owl’s habitat use, or a finding that the Service’s conclusions were arbitrary. Finally, the court rejected Cascadia's contention that the Service failed to adequately utilize the best scientific information necessary to ensure spotted owl recovery when evaluating the Project and rendering its jeopardy determination. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Thrailkill" on Justia Law

The Union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Medical Center and dismissal of the Union's petition to compel arbitration. At issue was when the Union requested arbitration, and when the Medical Center unequivocally and expressly rejected that request. The court held that it is a breach of the duty of good faith performance under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, for an employer to fail to respond within a reasonable time to a union’s communication which seeks to abide by a grievance process set forth in a collective bargaining agreement. In this case, it was not reasonable for the Medical Center to wait in silence for more than five months following the Union’s letter demanding arbitration, and then claim in litigation that the Union missed the statute of limitations. The Medical Center's delay of five months is a length of time nearly as long as the six months statute of limitations itself. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part, and vacated in part. View "SEIU v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for 32 counts of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1347. Defendant challenged the Second Superseding Indictment on several grounds. The court rejected defendant's statute of limitations claims, concluding that the district court did not err by allowing the government to proceed on revised Count 41 where the alleged scheme was executed less than five years before the original indictment was filed. So long as the “indictment was written so as to allege only one execution of an ongoing scheme,” the court held that the government may charge a single health care fraud scheme in violation of section 1347 even when several acts in furtherance of the scheme fall outside the statute of limitations. The court rejected defendant's other challenges to the indictment, concluding that Count 41 did not improperly broadened the charges against him; Count 41 did not allege an execution of a fraudulent scheme, and the Second Superseding Indictment did not improperly expand the indictment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Holden" on Justia Law