Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1999. After the government initiated removal proceedings against him, Gonzalez conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal. He argued that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two sons, who planned to accompany him to Mexico. Gonzalez relied primarily on country conditions reports about crime and violence in Mexico, and also cited his sons' lack of fluency in Spanish, their separation from their older sister, and financial concerns.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Gonzalez's application for cancellation of removal, finding that he had demonstrated the requisite hardship. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the IJ's decision, concluding that Gonzalez had not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. The BIA was not persuaded that the general conditions of crime and violence in Mexico, which would apply to any qualifying relative, met the hardship standard. The BIA also rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would be targeted for criminal violence due to their perceived wealth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the hardship determination in cancellation of removal cases. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court noted that Gonzalez's other family members had lived in Mexico without harm and that a country conditions report that applies equally to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the conclusion that the hardship standard is met. The court also rejected Gonzalez's argument that the BIA failed to consider the record evidence. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied Gonzalez's petition for review. View "GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A group of innocent bystanders was injured when a fleeing suspect lost control of his car and crashed into them during a high-speed police chase. The plaintiffs, including the estate of a deceased individual and several injured parties, alleged that the police officers conducted the chase with the intent to harm the suspect and failed to provide or summon emergency services after the crash.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. The officers appealed, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs did not state a claim for a violation of their constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim by asserting that the officers conducted the high-speed chase with a purpose to harm the suspect, which exceeded any legitimate law enforcement purpose. The court also held that the law was clearly established that such conduct was unconstitutional, thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.Additionally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' state-created danger claim, holding that the officers' failure to summon or render emergency services after the crash, despite witnessing the injuries, constituted deliberate indifference to a known danger. The court concluded that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the officers' actions violated clearly established law, and therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim either. The court emphasized that its decision was based on the unique facts of the case and did not preclude the possibility of qualified immunity being granted at a later stage. View "Estate of Soakai v. Abdelaziz" on Justia Law

Rodney Woodland, a freelance artist and model, sued Montero Lamar Hill, also known as Lil Nas X, for copyright infringement. Woodland claimed that Hill posted photos on his Instagram page that were too similar to photos Woodland had posted on his own Instagram account. Woodland's photos, posted between August 2018 and July 2021, received between eight and seventy-five "likes." Hill's allegedly infringing photos were posted between March and October 2021 and received hundreds of thousands to millions of "likes."The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Woodland's claims, including copyright infringement, declaratory relief, accounting, and unjust enrichment. The court found that Woodland failed to allege facts showing a reasonable possibility that Hill viewed Woodland's photos on Instagram and that Hill's photos were not substantially similar to Woodland's. Woodland was granted leave to amend his complaint but ultimately failed to state a claim for copyright infringement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Woodland did not plausibly allege that Hill had "access" to Woodland's photos, as the mere fact that Woodland posted his photos on Instagram was insufficient to show that Hill had viewed them. Additionally, the court found that Woodland failed to show that Hill unlawfully appropriated his photos. The court explained that the Copyright Act protects only the "selection" and "arrangement" of individual elements in a photo, and the photos in question were not substantially similar in their selection and arrangement of elements. Thus, Woodland's copyright infringement claim was dismissed. View "Woodland v. Hill" on Justia Law

Yelp, a company that publishes consumer reviews, introduced a notification on its business pages for crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) in 2022, stating that these centers typically offer limited medical services. After objections from several state Attorneys General, including Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, Yelp replaced the notice with one stating that CPCs do not offer abortions or abortion referrals. Despite this change, Paxton initiated an investigation and sent Yelp a notice of intent to file suit, alleging that the original notice violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices – Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Yelp then filed a lawsuit in federal court, claiming First Amendment retaliation, and sought to enjoin Paxton from further action. The next day, Paxton filed a state court action against Yelp.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Yelp’s federal case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state judicial proceedings. The district court found that the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that the bad faith exception did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger’s bad faith exception did not apply because Yelp had not sufficiently established that the Texas civil enforcement action was brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid judgment or was facially meritless. The court also found that Yelp failed to show that Paxton’s enforcement action was motivated by a desire to harass or retaliate against Yelp for its support of abortion rights. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Yelp’s request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. View "YELP INC. V. PAXTON" on Justia Law

The case involves codefendant brothers Joshua and Jamie Yafa, who were convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their involvement in a "pump-and-dump" stock manipulation scheme. They promoted the stock of Global Wholehealth Products Corporation (GWHP) through various means, including a "phone room" and social media, to inflate its price. Once the stock price rose significantly, they sold their shares, earning over $1 million. Following the sale, the stock price plummeted, causing significant losses to individual investors. A grand jury indicted the Yafas, along with their associates Charles Strongo and Brian Volmer, who pled guilty and testified against the Yafas at trial.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced the Yafas, applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2B1.1. The court used Application Note 3(B) from the commentary to § 2B1.1, which allows courts to use the gain from the offense as an alternative measure for calculating loss when the actual loss cannot be reasonably determined. The district court found it difficult to calculate the full amount of investor losses and thus relied on the gain as a proxy. This resulted in a fourteen-level increase in the offense level for both brothers, leading to sentences of thirty-two months for Joshua and seventeen months for Jamie.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the term "loss" in § 2B1.1 is genuinely ambiguous and that Application Note 3(B)'s instruction to use gain as an alternative measure is a reasonable interpretation. The court concluded that the district court did not err in using the gain from the Yafas's offenses to calculate the loss and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA V. YAFA" on Justia Law

Theresa Brooke, a woman with disabilities who uses a wheelchair, visited the Ramada by Wyndham Burbank Airport hotel in August 2023. She alleged that architectural barriers at the hotel deterred her from entering. Brooke sued the hotel's owner, Tsay JBR, LLC, for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. She sought injunctive relief under the ADA and statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brooke, finding that Tsay JBR had violated the ADA due to the lack of an access aisle in the hotel's passenger loading zone. This ADA violation also constituted a violation of the Unruh Act. However, the court found that there was a factual issue regarding whether Brooke personally encountered the violation or was deterred by it, which is necessary for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. The district court scheduled a bench trial, concluding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial did not apply to claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Tsay JBR's petition for a writ of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles parties in federal court to a jury trial on claims for statutory damages under section 52(a) of the Unruh Act. The court determined that Brooke's claim was legal in nature, both in terms of its historical analog to 18th-century English public accommodations law and the punitive and deterrent nature of the statutory damages sought. The court directed the district court to set the matter for a jury trial. View "TSAY JBR LLC V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Erika Marie Plancarte pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport an alien into the United States. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a 90-day imprisonment sentence. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, Plancarte illegally transported a woman and her three children into the U.S., using false documents. She was arrested after admitting to the smuggling.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California received a presentence report (PSR) that contained ambiguities about the relationship between the woman and the children. Plancarte requested a non-custodial sentence, while the government adhered to the plea agreement, recommending 90 days of custody. The government also clarified the PSR's ambiguities and highlighted Plancarte's criminal history and recidivism, arguing that previous sentences had not deterred her behavior. Plancarte argued that the government breached the plea agreement by including additional commentary and referencing her criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement. The government’s references to Plancarte’s criminal history and its clarification of the PSR were permissible and did not undermine the plea agreement. The court found that the government’s comments were made in good faith and were consistent with advocating for the agreed-upon sentence. The court also noted that the government was not required to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was enforced, and the appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PLANCARTE" on Justia Law

County officials in Trinity County, California, obtained warrants to take Patricia and Stanley Miroth's children into protective custody, leading to the termination of their parental rights by a state court. The Miroths alleged that the officials failed to provide required social services and committed fraud in the state child custody proceedings, which led to the termination of their parental rights. After unsuccessful appeals in state court, the Miroths filed a federal lawsuit seeking money damages for these alleged wrongs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The district court found that the Miroths were essentially seeking relief from the state court judgments and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the Miroths' claims did not seek relief from or reversal of the state court's order. Instead, they sought money damages for alleged legal wrongs by adverse parties that preceded the state court's order. The court emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where the federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by a state court judgment and seeks relief from that judgment. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MIROTH V. COUNTY OF TRINITY" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) seeking a preliminary injunction to block Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard, Inc., a major video game developer. The FTC argued that the merger would likely violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition in the U.S. markets for gaming console devices, gaming subscription services, and gaming cloud-streaming services. The FTC's primary concern was that Microsoft would make Activision's popular game, Call of Duty, exclusive to its Xbox console, thereby harming competition.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the FTC's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held a five-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that the FTC had not raised serious questions regarding whether the proposed merger would likely substantially lessen competition. The court found that Microsoft lacked the incentive to make Call of Duty exclusive to Xbox, as doing so would harm its financial interests and reputation. The court also noted that Activision Blizzard had historically resisted putting its content on subscription services, and there was insufficient evidence to show that this would change absent the merger.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision and affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court agreed that the district court applied the correct legal standards and did not abuse its discretion or rely on clearly erroneous findings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTC failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its Section 7 claim. The court concluded that the FTC had not demonstrated that the merger would likely substantially lessen competition in the relevant markets. View "FTC V. MICROSOFT CORPORATION," on Justia Law

Ronald Myers pleaded guilty in 2005 to possessing an implement for counterfeiting state securities and transporting a stolen motor vehicle across state lines. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $40,406 in restitution. Myers completed his sentence in 2010 but was reincarcerated in 2013 on other charges. Since then, over $30,500 has been deposited into his inmate trust account, mostly from family and friends, with a smaller portion from prison wages. Myers still owes over $35,000 in restitution.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted the government's motion to turn over funds from Myers's inmate trust account to apply to his restitution obligation. The court rejected Myers's request for an evidentiary hearing to determine which funds were prison wages, concluding that the government had provided sufficient evidence of the account's composition. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), applies to substantial aggregated sums from multiple sources, not just one-time financial windfalls.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that § 3664(n) applies to substantial resources from any source, including gradual accumulations from family and friends, and not just to one-time windfalls. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing, as the existing documentary evidence was sufficient. The court concluded that the turnover order did not contravene the judgment's restitution provisions and was consistent with the MVRA's goal of ensuring prompt restitution to victims. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law