Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yi-Chi Shih, a UCLA electrical engineering professor, was convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by exporting monolithic microwave integrated circuits (MMICs) to China without a license. These MMICs, which amplify microwave signals, were used in collaboration with Chinese engineers for a military weapons development project. Shih misrepresented the export status of the MMICs to the U.S.-based foundry, Cree, to facilitate their manufacture and export.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially entered a judgment of acquittal on the IEEPA violation counts but later reinstated the conspiracy count upon reconsideration. At sentencing, the court applied a base offense level of 14, resulting in a 63-month sentence. Both parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reinstated the substantive IEEPA violation conviction and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court applied a base offense level of 26, concluding that Shih's conduct evaded national security controls, resulting in an 85-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the export controls Shih evaded were implemented for national security reasons, as the relevant Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) listed national security as a reason for control. The court rejected Shih's argument that the controls were solely for foreign policy reasons and his attempt to characterize his conduct as a mere recordkeeping offense. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the higher base offense level of 26 was appropriate and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA V. SHIH" on Justia Law

CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd. sought discovery from Apple Inc. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for use in a prospective patent infringement lawsuit in Germany. CPC aimed to obtain documents describing the functionality of Apple’s biometric security technology. The district court granted CPC’s application, allowing them to serve a subpoena on Apple, but the scope of the discovery and the specific documents Apple must produce remained unresolved.Initially, a magistrate judge denied CPC’s application, finding the discovery requests unduly burdensome. CPC sought review, and the district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision under a clear error standard. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court should have reviewed the magistrate judge’s decision de novo, as the ruling on a § 1782 application is dispositive. The case was remanded, and the district court, applying de novo review, granted CPC’s application. Apple objected, particularly concerned about the potential requirement to produce source code, but the district court’s order did not definitively resolve these objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the district court’s decision was not final because the scope of discovery and the specific documents Apple must produce were still undetermined. The lack of a final judgment meant that the Ninth Circuit could not evaluate the Intel factors used to determine whether discovery was warranted under § 1782. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the district court to resolve the remaining discovery issues. View "CPC PATENT TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the "metering" policy implemented by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Under this policy, asylum seekers without valid travel documents were turned away when ports of entry were deemed at capacity. Plaintiffs, including an immigrant rights organization and individual asylum seekers, argued that this policy unlawfully prevented them from applying for asylum. They also challenged the subsequent application of the "Asylum Transit Rule," which required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country before seeking it in the U.S., to those turned away under the metering policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found the metering policy unlawful under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates that courts compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to those turned away under the metering policy before the rule took effect. The court also ordered the government to unwind past asylum denials based on the rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA § 706(1) and due process claims but did not reach the APA § 706(2) claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the metering policy violated § 706(1) of the APA, holding that noncitizens stopped at the border are eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and that border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court also affirmed the classwide declaratory relief but vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim, deeming it unnecessary. The court affirmed the negative injunctive relief prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to class members but vacated the portion of the injunction requiring the government to reopen or reconsider past asylum denials on its own initiative, as it violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). View "AL OTRO LADO V. AMAYORKAS" on Justia Law

A mother and her child from El Salvador sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. They claimed persecution by the M-18 gang, which had murdered the child's father, Carlos, and subsequently threatened their lives. After the father's murder, the gang members, including one of the convicted murderers, began following and threatening the child, Javi, demanding he join the gang or face death along with his family. The threats and subsequent break-in by armed men at their home led them to flee to the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the mother’s testimony credible but denied their applications, concluding that the threats and harassment did not amount to past persecution and that the feared harm was due to generalized violence rather than a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the experiences did not rise to the level of persecution and that the gang's motives were not sufficiently linked to the family's relationship to Carlos.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the threats and harassment, combined with the gang's capability and willingness to carry out the threats, constituted persecution. The court also found that the BIA erred in not considering the psychological harm suffered by Javi, who was diagnosed with PTSD, and in failing to account for his young age. Additionally, the court determined that the gang's motives included targeting Javi because of his relationship to Carlos, satisfying the nexus requirement for both asylum and withholding of removal.The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part, recognizing the past persecution and the protected ground nexus, and remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether the persecution was by forces the government was unable or unwilling to control, or if there was a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "CORPENO-ROMERO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

In January 1996, Hoang Ai Le and his co-conspirators planned to steal computer chips from Diamond Flower Electric Instruments (DFI). The plan involved two teams: an "entry" team to invade the home of a DFI employee to obtain alarm codes, and a second team, led by Le, to use those codes to access DFI and steal the chips. The entry team invaded the home of Zhou Shi Wen, mistakenly believing he had the codes. They tortured Wen and tied up his family and a friend, but Wen did not have the codes. The plan was abandoned, but the entry team still stole $1,500 in valuables from Wen's home.A jury convicted Le in 2007 of Hobbs Act conspiracy and a related firearm offense. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Le appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, which governs inchoate offenses, rather than § 2B3.1, which governs completed robberies. The Ninth Circuit agreed and remanded for resentencing. On remand, Le sought a three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), which applies to incomplete conspiracies. The district court denied the reduction, finding that the conspirators were "about to complete" the robbery and that the failure was due to circumstances beyond their control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the conspirators were "about to complete" the robbery, as they had already taken significant steps, including torturing Wen and positioning themselves to proceed to DFI. The court also found that the failure of the robbery was due to Wen's lack of knowledge of the alarm codes, which was beyond the conspirators' control. Therefore, Le was not entitled to the three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2). The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. LE" on Justia Law

The case involves a trademark infringement dispute between two Arizona-based personal injury law firms. The plaintiff, Lerner & Rowe, PC, owns three registered trademarks, including the name "Lerner & Rowe." The defendant, Brown, Engstrand & Shely, LLC, doing business as The Accident Law Group (ALG), used a marketing strategy called "conquesting" by purchasing the term "Lerner & Rowe" as a Google Ads keyword. This caused ALG's advertisements to appear when users searched for "Lerner & Rowe" on Google.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of ALG on Lerner & Rowe's claims of trademark infringement and unjust enrichment but denied summary judgment on the unfair competition claims. ALG moved for reconsideration, and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment on all claims. Lerner & Rowe appealed the ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lerner & Rowe failed to establish that ALG's use of the "Lerner & Rowe" mark was likely to cause consumer confusion. The court found that while the strength of the mark favored Lerner & Rowe, the evidence of actual confusion was de minimis, the reasonably prudent consumer's degree of care and the labeling and appearance of ALG's advertisements weighed in favor of ALG. The court concluded that Lerner & Rowe did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, which is essential for a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. The judgment was affirmed. View "LERNER & ROWE PC V. BROWN ENGSTRAND & SHELY LLC" on Justia Law

A mother and her two minor children, who entered the United States seeking asylum, were scheduled for an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in Seattle, Washington. On their way to the hearing, they encountered two major car accidents, causing them to be two hours late. Upon arrival, they attempted to have their case heard but were unsuccessful. The IJ ordered them removed in absentia. They promptly moved to reopen the case, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified their late arrival.The IJ denied the motion, stating that ordinary traffic delays do not constitute exceptional circumstances and that the mother failed to make a prima facie case for asylum. The IJ did not address the minor children’s claims or their eligibility for derivative citizenship through their father. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the petitioners failed to establish exceptional circumstances and that the children did not demonstrate eligibility for adjustment of status through their newly naturalized father.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJ and BIA abused their discretion by not considering the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that the petitioners did everything reasonably possible to attend their hearing, including leaving home early and documenting the extraordinary traffic caused by the accidents. The court also found that the IJ and BIA failed to consider the petitioners' lack of motive to evade the hearing and the unconscionable results of the in absentia removal order, particularly for the minor children eligible for derivative citizenship.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the facts amounted to exceptional circumstances warranting reopening of the in absentia removal order. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MONTEJO-GONZALEZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Rose Court, LLC's predecessor defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by real property. Rose Court filed and voluntarily dismissed multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts challenging the lender's foreclosure efforts. After the foreclosure sale, Rose Court initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), alleging fraudulent transfer of the property.The bankruptcy court dismissed Rose Court's claims and denied its motion to amend the complaint to assert a fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim, citing the two-dismissal rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B). This rule applies when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the same claim twice, making any subsequent dismissal an adjudication on the merits. The court found that Rose Court had previously dismissed similar claims in state and federal court actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Rose Court then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of leave to amend.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that the two-dismissal rule barred Rose Court from asserting the same fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim for a third time. The court adopted a transactional approach, determining that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same set of facts. The court also declined to address Rose Court's new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it should be allowed to amend to assert a new wrongful-foreclosure claim based on interference with its right to reinstate the loan. View "ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC." on Justia Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, who has been on death row for over four decades for the 1981 murder of fellow inmate David Dale Jensen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Creech alleged that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office introduced fabricated or misleading evidence at his clemency hearing. He sought to recuse U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford from presiding over his underlying § 1983 suit, arguing that Judge Brailsford and Ada County Prosecutor Jan Bennetts are close friends, which could affect the judge's impartiality.The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Creech’s motion to preliminarily enjoin his execution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Creech continued to litigate his § 1983 claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. He then moved to disqualify Judge Brailsford, citing her friendship with Bennetts. Judge Brailsford denied the recusal motion, stating that although she and Bennetts were close during their clerkship, they had since lost touch and a reasonable person would not question her impartiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Creech’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the longstanding friendship between Judge Brailsford and Bennetts, combined with the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involving Bennetts, could lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. The court emphasized that public confidence in the judiciary requires that any appearance of bias be addressed promptly. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge. View "Creech v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Boise" on Justia Law

A longshoreman, Robert Tower, who worked at the Port of Seattle, experienced hearing loss in one ear and bilateral tinnitus due to occupational noise exposure. An audiogram revealed a 9.375% hearing loss in his left ear and 0% in his right ear, with additional tinnitus. Tower sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming benefits for hearing loss in both ears due to the tinnitus.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Tower was only entitled to compensation for hearing loss in one ear under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), rejecting the claim for bilateral hearing loss compensation. The Benefits Review Board vacated this decision, holding that Tower should be compensated for hearing loss in both ears under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) due to the tinnitus, which the AMA Guides suggest should be added to a binaural hearing impairment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Longshore Act does not permit monaural hearing loss to be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) for bilateral hearing loss, even when the claimant also has tinnitus. The court emphasized that the Act distinguishes between monaural and binaural hearing loss and that tinnitus, while a significant condition, does not convert a monaural hearing loss into a binaural one for compensation purposes. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, noting that Tower should be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A) for his monaural hearing loss. The court did not express a view on whether tinnitus might be compensable under the catch-all provision, 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). View "TOTAL TERMINALS INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS" on Justia Law