Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of a crack cocaine offense. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court affirmed the judgment, holding that it had jurisdiction to review section 3582(c)(2) discretionary decisions pursuant to United States v. Colson, which was not "clearly irreconcilable" with Dillon v. United States. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a reduced sentence where it properly considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and relied on facts supported by the record. View "United States v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, former President of the United Steel Workers Local 12-369, filed suit against defendants alleging claims of discrimination on the basis of race and gender, and retaliation for having engaged in protected speech under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq. The court concluded that, because the alleged retaliatory actions directed toward plaintiff impinged only upon her status as a union officer, she could not seek redress for these actions under section 609. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendants did not discriminate or retaliate against plaintiff given the district court's analysis of plaintiff's allegations, both as discrete incidents and as part of a broader course of conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USW Local 12-369 v. USW Int'l" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Somalia, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision dismissing her asylum claim for lack of timeliness. Petitioner filed petitions for review in this court following the denial of the motion to reconsider and the IJ's last background checks, but did not file a petition after the Board's initial decision denying her asylum application. The court held that petitioners must file their petitions for review within thirty days of the BIA's determination of their applicable claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In this instance, petitioner had a full and fair hearing of her claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on her behalf; a final order of removal existed regarding the asylum claiming following the BIA's decision on November 25, 2008, triggering the thirty-day rule; and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's denial of asylum because petitioner failed to timely petition for review. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for review. View "Abdisalan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., after the Trustees' of their pension plan determined that plaintiffs' respective post-retirement jobs as traffic flagger and snow plow operator fell into the same "job classification" as their former union jobs as skilled mechanics. Therefore, plaintiffs were precluded from working these jobs if they wanted to collect retirement benefits. The court concluded that common sense strongly suggested that a position flagging traffic or plowing snow was not in the same "job classification" as a skilled mechanic repairing heavy equipment utilizing special skills acquired over a long career. The court reversed the district court's judgment because it was unable to see how any sensible application of the skills and duties test to the established facts could support the Trustees' conclusion. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Tapley v. Locals 302 and 612" on Justia Law

Donald and Kristi Gravelet-Blondin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and Sgt. Shelton for excessive force and unlawful arrest, as well as malicious prosecution for the tasing and arrest of Donald. Kristi also filed suit under state law for the harm she suffered watching her husband's tasing and being threatened with tasing herself. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. The court concluded, inter alia, that Sgt. Shelton was not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established as of 2008 that the use of a taser in dart mode against a passive bystander such as Donald amounted to unconstitutionally excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to Sgt. Shelton and the grant of summary judgment to the City on plaintiffs' excessive force claim; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on the determination that probable cause existed for Donald's arrest; remanded for further proceedings on the unlawful arrest claim; and reversed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law claims. View "Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to four drug offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by associating with known felons. Under United States v. Miller, the court held that a defendant's term of supervise release did not begin when the Bureau of Prisons places him in home confinement as part of his federal sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the court affirmed the trial court's order revoking defendant's term of supervised release and imposing additional terms where the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's term of supervised release. View "United States v. Earl" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioners, convicted of first degree murder. The district court concluded that petitioners' Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court removed the only juror advocating for acquittal. The district court removed the juror for willful misconduct under California Penal Code 1089 because she offered her expert opinion on petitioners' mental health and violated the court's instructions by consulting a dictionary in order to obtain a medical definition that she presented to her fellow jurors during deliberations. The court concluded that, without the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent guidance in this area, the district court erred in applying a de novo review of petitioners' claims instead of applying the appropriate standard of review under section 2254(d). The court also concluded, inter alia, that the state court's determination that the trial court properly discharged the juror for cause was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Further, Petitioner DeMola failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in regards to her sentence. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanded for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree robbery, petitioned for review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, alleging prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor knowingly elicited and then failed to correct false testimony. The district court concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct violated Napue v. Illinois but upheld the conviction because the district court found that it was not reasonably likely that, absent the misconduct, petitioner would have obtained a more favorable verdict. The court concluded that, in rejecting petitioner's claim, the state court applied a harmlessness standard that was "contrary to" the harmlessness standard required by Napue. The Napue standard was different from the ordinary harmlessness standard, and was referred to in Napue and its progeny as a "materiality" standard. Even assuming that the state court applied the Napue materiality standard, its application of that standard would have constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dow v. Virga" on Justia Law

The Secretary appealed the district court's order certifying a nationwide class of Medicare beneficiaries and granting summary judgment in the beneficiaries' favor. The beneficiaries raised two claims: (1) the Secretary's practice of demand "up front" reimbursement for secondary payments from beneficiaries who have appealed a reimbursement determination or sought waiver of the reimbursement obligation was inconsistent with the secondary payer provisions of the Medicare statutory scheme; and (2) the Secretary's practice violated their due process rights. The court concluded that Patricia Haro had Article III standing on behalf of the class; John Balentine, as counsel for Haro, had Article III standing on his individual claim; and the beneficiaries' claims for injunctive relief were not moot and Article III's justiciability requirements were satisfied. The court concluded, however, that the beneficiaries' claim was not adequately presented to the agency at the administrative level and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). On the merits of Balentine's claim, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the secondary payer provisions was reasonable. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's injunctions, reversed the district court's summary judgment order, and remanded for consideration of the beneficiaries' due process claim. View "Haro v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

The district court found that the Secretary violated the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection when the Secretary declined to enter into a self-determination contract with the Tribe to fund law enforcement on the Los Coyotes Reservation. The court concluded that no reading of the ISDA authorized federal courts to grant relief when the Secretary properly denied a contract; the Tribe's argument that the BIA's failure to fund law enforcement on the Los Coyotes Reservation was a violation of the APA was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent; there was a meaningful distinction between Public Law 280 states and non-Public Law 280 states and such a distinction provided a rational basis for prioritizing law enforcement funding in non-Public Law 280 states; and the BIA's funding policy did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla v. Jewell" on Justia Law