Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a professor, filed suit alleging that university administrators retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment for distributing a short pamphlet and drafts from an in-progress book. The court held that there was an exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos for teaching and academic writing. Pickering v. Board of Education governed such teaching and writing by publicly employed teachers. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff prepared and circulated his pamphlet pursuant to official duties; reversed its determination that the pamphlet did not address matters of public concern; concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the in-progress book triggered retaliation; and held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity given the uncertain state of the law in the wake of Garcetti. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Demers v. Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Apple alleging federal and state antitrust claims. Plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTS music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered iTS music and the iPod compatible only with each other. Plaintiff also alleged claims that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player (PDMP) and music download markets, which inflated Apple's music prices and deflated the value of the iPod. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's July 2009 order denying her motion to certify a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that, because plaintiff abandoned the individual claim for which she sought class certification, the issue of whether the district court erred in denying her motion to certify that claim for class treatment was waived. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's monopolization claim for damages based on the theory of diminution in iPod value on the ground that it was barred by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois; properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for damages based on supracompetitive music prices; and properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief where plaintiff's alleged inability to play her music freely was not an "antitrust injury" that affected competition and could, therefore, not serve as the basis for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Somers v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Drakes Bay challenged the Secretary's discretionary decision to let Drakes Bay's permit for commercial oyster farming expire according to its terms. Drakes Bay subsequently sought a preliminary injunction under Section 124 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and various federal regulations. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider whether the Secretary violated constitutional, regulatory, or other legal mandates or restrictions. On the merits, the court concluded that a preliminary injunction was not warranted where the likelihood of success on the merits of these claims was too remote to justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. Congress left the decision to grant or deny an extension to the Secretary's discretion; the Secretary neither violated any statutory mandate nor did he misapprehend his authority under the various statutes raised by Drakes Bay; even if NEPA compliance was required in this instance, the Secretary conducted an adequate NEPA review process; and Drakes Bay lacked standing to challenge the publication of the notice in the Federal Registrar. Further, Drakes Bay has failed to show that the balance of the equities weighs in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Dandino petitioned under 49 U.S.C. 521(b)(9) for review of an order of the FMCSA affirming a civil penalty to Dandino for transporting goods after the agency had revoked its operating authority and before that authority was reinstated. The court held that, for purposes of section 521(b)(9), when a final agency order was mailed to a party, and there was no proof of actual receipt, there was a rebuttable presumption that the order was received within three days of mailing. Applying this holding to these circumstances, the court concluded that Dandino's petition was timely. However, on the merits, the court concluded that Dandino's concession that it operated "without the required operating authority" was dispositive of its petition on the merits. The court rejected Dandino's remaining claim and dismissed the petition for review. View "Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foie gras producers and sellers, appealed the district court's denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of California from enforcing California Health & Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 banned the sale of products that were the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. The court dismissed the State of California and Governor Brown from the lawsuit because they were immune from suit. The court concluded that the only product covered by section 25982 at issue in this appeal was foie gras; plaintiffs' Due Process Clause challenge failed because section 25982's definition for force feeding was not vague and the statute gave fair notice of prohibited conduct; and section 25982 did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not discriminatory, did not directly regulate interstate commerce, and did not substantially burden interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to raise a serious question that they were likely to succeed on the merits. View "Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards v. Harris" on Justia Law

This case arose when the EPA sent two letters to Anderson notifying Anderson of its potential liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., for environmental contamination of the Portland Harbor Superfund Site. Anderson's general liability insurer, St. Paul, declined to provide Anderson with a legal defense. St. Paul argued that the letters sent to Anderson were not "suits" because they were not filed in a court of law. The court held that the letters were "suits" within the meaning of the policies; the letters alleged facts sufficient to alert Anderson to its potential liability for environmental contamination under CERCLA; and, therefore, St. Paul breached its duty to defend Anderson. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Anderson and also affirmed the attorney's fee award in Anderson's favor in light of the court's holding on the merits. View "Anderson Bros. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their sentences after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess an unregistered firearm. Defendants had purchased a grenade launder from an undercover ATF agent. In consolidated appeals, at issue was the definition of a missile under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(f). Adopting the common meaning of the word missile, the court held that the definition of a missile, under the sentencing guidelines, was a self-propelled device designed to deliver an explosive. The court concluded that the 40-mm cartridges in this case did not qualify as missiles, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise and enhancing defendants' base offense level by fifteen levels. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former prison guard in India, challenged the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal because he had assisted in the persecution of others on account of political opinion. The court granted the petition for review, concluding that the decisions of the IJ and BIA reflected a misunderstanding and misapplication of relevant precedent. The court remanded under INS v. Ventura to consider whether petitioner purposefully assisted in the alleged persecution. In doing so, the BIA should consider in particular whether the work of a sentry on the perimeter of an intelligence facility was integral not only to the functioning of the facility but also to the persecution that occurred inside of it, and the differences between the role of a Nazi guard at a Nazi concentration camp and petitioner, an individual working for a legitimate arm of a recognized government at a legitimate prison facility. View "Kumar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegally storing hazardous wastes without a permit in violation of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6928(d)(2). The hazardous wastes at issue were used toluene and excess methanol. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court properly instructed the jury that, for purposes of the RCRA, "disposal" of hazardous waste begins not with an individual's subjective decision to dispose but with an act of disposal. View "United States v. Humphries" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of using a thermal lance to cut open the back of an ATM in order to steal the money it contained. Under 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1), a mandatory ten-year consecutive sentence was imposed on anyone who "uses fire... to commit any felony." The enhancement was increased to twenty mandatory consecutive years for a second offense. Rejecting the government's definition of "fire," the court concluded that the use of a thermal lance tool - designed to cut through metal using extreme heat - did not fall within the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of "uses fire." Further, the purpose, context, and history of the statute make clear that it was not intended to apply to the use of a tool such as the thermal lance that was not designed to cause fire. Finally, application of the rule of lenity was required in these circumstances where defendants did not have "fair warning" that their conduct was subject to the enhancement penalty of section 844(h)(1). Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions under section 844(h)(1) and reversed as to the conspiracy counts as well. The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law