Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor was required to make contributions to the Carpenters Pension Trust Fund pursuant to a multiemployer bargaining agreement (the Agreement). When the Agreement expired, debtor no longer was a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement and stopped making payments. The Fund subsequently filed suit because debtor was still doing work covered by the Agreement and was subject to withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.C. 1381. Debtor then filed for bankruptcy and sought a discharge of his debt to the Fund. The Fund filed a complaint under 11 U.S.C. 523(c) to prevent discharge, seeking to establish that the debt qualified as one created via defalcation by a fiduciary under section 523(a)(4). The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dischargeability of the Fund's claim against debtor; debtor was not a fiduciary of the Fund because the unpaid withdrawal liability was not an asset of the Fund; and debtor's failure to challenge the withdrawal liability amount in arbitration did not act as a waiver of his right to discharge the debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Moxley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, was found removable because he had committed a theft offense that qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). At issue was whether the government proved that petitioner was convicted of a qualifying felony theft offense. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court concluded that petitioner was clearly and unambiguously charged as a principal who personally drove or took the vehicle of another, without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of it under California Vehicle Code section 10851(a). Further, the BIA has held that section 10851(a) was a categorical theft offense even though, in some circumstances, it criminalizes taking a vehicle temporarily. The court has also defined a "theft offense" to include taking property without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of the property, even if the deprivation is less than total or permanent. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to add a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k, against former outside directors of Peregrine. The district court denied leave to amend the complaint, concluding that amendment would be futile because the "negative causation" defense barred plaintiff's proposed claim. The court concluded that Section 11 imposed broad liability without regard to reliance or fraudulent intent for any material misstatements or omissions contained in a registration statement for the first year that the registration statement was available. In this instance, plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the material misstatements at issue caused his losses, and thus amending the complaint would not be futile. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hildes v. Arthur Andersen LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a former Maricopa County Board of Supervisors member and his spouse, filed suit against defendants, former prosecutors and their spouses, alleging that defendants initiated a frivolous federal civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., suit against plaintiffs. The suit was part of an ongoing "political war" in Maricopa County. The prosecutors claimed that they were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from any claims arising out of their filing of the civil RICO action. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were not sufficiently "analogous to those of a prosecutor." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motions to dismiss based on these claims. View "Stapley v. Pestalozzi" on Justia Law

The district court granted petitioner's petition for a 28 U.S.C. 2254 writ of habeas corpus, concluding that petitioner had ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that California's Court of Appeal's application of the Strickland v. Washington standard was unreasonable. The district court also concluded that the Court of Appeal's factual findings in support of its decision were unreasonable. Counsel failed to timely object to an unsworn witness's testimony, knowing at the time that the witness had decided to change his story, and, therefore, counsel waived any objections he might of had to the testimony. The court affirmed, concluding that the Court of Appeal's conclusion that counsel's decision not to object in a timely fashion was acceptably tactical and not error was objectively unreasonable; the Court of Appeal's factual determinations were unsupported by the record and thus demonstrably and clearly erroneous; and petitioner was prejudiced by these errors. View "Griffin v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to 46-months in prison. The principal issue on appeal concerned U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), which assigned criminal history points for crimes that were committed when the defendant was a juvenile. The court concluded that consideration of juvenile criminal history in determining the sentence for an adult convicted of a crime did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court also concluded that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to determine that defendant's prior attempted burglary conviction was for a "crime of violence" did not survive the Supreme Court's recent decision in Descamps v. United States. Further, the government has never contended in this litigation that the burglary statute was categorically a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the "crime of violence" enhancement. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly filing false federal income tax returns. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's revocation of her probation. The court concluded that the record demonstrated defendant's fugitive status. Because defendant's fugitive status tolled her Probation Term from July 2010 until she was found and arrested by federal authorities in April 2012, the time added to her Probation Term extended it well beyond its original expiration date. Consequently, the Revocation hearing occurred during defendant's Probation Term and the district court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the CDCR and others after she was terminated from her independent contractor position as a nurse and was unable to find other work within the CDCR. The court held that a state agency did not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors could ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more was required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of property claim where her orientation documents did not contain any such assurances. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of liberty claim where her liberty interest was in her profession as a nurse, not her placement with a particular employer. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Defendant Hill where plaintiff's allegations concerning him were conclusory and implausible on their face. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blantz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the EPA's permit allowing Shell to construct, operate, and conduct "pollutant emitting activities" associated with a drill vessel (the "Kulluk") in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska's North Slope. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) Decision was not entitled to Chevron deference; Section 7661c(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661c(e), was ambiguous, and the EPA's interpretation was reasonable under the applicable statutes' plain language; the court owed Chevron deference to the EAB Decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the "Kulluk;" and the EPA permissibly granted a 500-meter exemption to the "Kulluk" from "ambient air" standards. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law