Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gorlick sued Allied, a competitor in the auto parts market, alleging that Allied was receiving favorable prices from a manufacturer. The court concluded that Gorlick failed to show that Allied had actual knowledge, trade knowledge or a duty to inquire whether the favorable prices it received might be prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(f). The court also concluded that Gorlick failed to provide a plausible explanation for how the alleged agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor, concerning a product line without market dominance, caused harm to competition in the entire automotive exhaust product market. Even assuming that a vertical agreement existed and that it affected the price of the products at issue, there's no plausible showing of harm to competition in the market for automotive exhaust products as a whole. Therefore, the court concluded that Gorlick's claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Allied. View "Gorlick Distrib. Ctrs. v. Car Sound Exhaust Sys." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter, contending that the Ninth Circuit model jury instruction for involuntary manslaughter given by the district court was defective because it failed to tell the jury that "gross negligence," defined as "wanton or reckless disregard for human life," was required for a conviction. The court reversed the conviction, concluding that the jury was not properly instructed that involuntary manslaughter required finding gross negligence. In regards to evidentiary issues, the court concluded that the district court should have allowed defendant to testify about the victim's prior violent acts and the district court should have admitted three photographs that had been posted on the victim's MySpace page, showing the victim holding a sawed-off shotgun, as impeachment evidence. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican citizen, alleged that the Arizona crime of conviction, "attempt to commit smuggling" in violation of A.R.S. 13-2319, did not categorically fit the federal definition of an alien smuggling offense and thus ought not to have triggered a sixteen-level sentencing guidelines enhancement. On the merits, the parties agreed that defendant was improperly sentenced. However, the issue on appeal was the proper appellate remedy for defendant who was entitled to a resentencing but, having been deported, was unable to be present for a resentencing hearing. The court affirmed the sentence without prejudice, pursuant to United States v. Plancarte-Alvarez, to a later request by defendant, if and when he should return to the United States or waive his right to be physically present at resentencing, that his previous sentence be vacated and that he be resentenced in light of this opinion. View "United States v. Aguilar-Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for both receipt and possession of child pornography, alleging violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the conjunctive phrasing of the indictment created the possibility of multiplicitous convictions, and neither the government nor the district court did anything to remove that possibility. Therefore, the district court's entry of judgment on both counts, absent some assurance that the convictions were based on separate conduct, was error. However, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights and, thus, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Teague" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a C-5 quadriplegic, filed suit alleging unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and related California disability laws, claiming that Peter Piper Pizza prevented him from moving around the restaurant. At issue was whether any barriers interfered with plaintiff's ability "to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" of the restaurant. Plaintiff missed the period for disclosing his expert and, instead, incorporated the expert's pronouncements into his own presentation, putting forth the expert as a rebuttal expert. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that plaintiff lacked personal knowledge of the barriers he encountered and that his declaration was insufficient. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in discounting defendant's evidence as lacking personal knowledge and constituted improper expert testimony. The district court also erred in requiring a showing that removal of any barriers was "readily achievable." View "Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, et al." on Justia Law

The parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), limited the amount that plaintiff, a prisoner who qualified as a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, could recover from defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial. The court held that the fee cap in section (d)(2) did not apply to attorney's fees earned in conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials sought unsuccessfully to reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court. The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees on appeal and referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of such fees, as well as the amount of reimbursable costs. View "Woods v. Carey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Marvel for patent infringement and breach of contract, claiming that it had used his ideas in developing a Spider-Man role-playing toy called the "Web Blaster" without compensating him. The parties subsequently agreed to settle the case while appeals were pending and executed a Settlement Agreement. Thereafter, Marvel entered into a licensing agreement with Hasbro giving it the right to produce the Web Blaster. At issue was the calculation of royalties for subsequent iterations of the Web Blaster. The court joined its sister circuits in holding, pursuant to Brulotte v. Thys Co., that a so-called "hybrid" licensing agreement encompassing inseparable patent and non-patent rights was unenforceable beyond the expiration date of the underlying patent, unless the agreement provided a discounted rate for the non-patent rights or some other clear indication that the royalty at issue was in no way subject to patent leverage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Marvel, concluding that plaintiff could not recover royalties under the Settlement Agreement beyond the expiration date of the patent at issue. View "Kimble v. Marvel Enter., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and subsequently appealed his conviction. On appeal, defendant argued that the wiretap application, filed by Assistant District Attorney Dennis Christy (ADA Christy), was invalid. The court disagreed with defendant that the language "the principal prosecuting attorney" found in 18 U.S.C. 2516(2) could not and should not be read to include a state assistant district attorney. The court concluded that compliance with section 2516(2) necessarily required an analysis of the applicable state wire tap statute, here California Penal Code 659.50. The court also held that "the" attorney designated to act in the district attorney's absence specified in section 629.50 must be acting in the district attorney's absence not just as an assistant district attorney designated with the limited authority to apply for a wiretap order, but as an assistant district attorney duly designated to act for all purposes as the district attorney of the political subdivision in question. The court concluded that the record was insufficient for it to determine the precise nature of ADA Christy's authority at the time he applied for the disputed wiretap. Accordingly, the court remanded for further findings of fact. View "United States v. Perez-Valencia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and damages against the Bank after it filed an unlawful detainer action against her in state court without giving 90 days notice to vacate the foreclosed property. At issue on appeal was whether the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA), Pub. L. No. 111-22, 701-04, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-62, provided a private right of action. The court concluded that dismissal of the state unlawful detainer proceedings did not moot plaintiff's claim; the court agreed with the Third Circuit that the regulation of eviction proceedings "does not implicate an important state interest" under Younger v. Harris; but plaintiff had no cognizable interest under the PTFA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Logan v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law