Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After filing for bankruptcy, plaintiff sought a discharge of his law student loans under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The bankruptcy court granted a partial discharge, but, on appeal, the district court reinstated the student loan debt in full as non-dischargeable. The district court ruled that plaintiff had not acted in good faith, which was one of the prerequisites for relief under section 523(a)(8). The court concluded that a good faith finding should be reviewed for clear error. The court also concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous where it relied on substantial evidence in the record and its factual inferences were permissible. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions. View "Hedlund v. The Educational Resources Inst." on Justia Law

Arizona House Bill 2036 (H.B. 2036), enacted in April 2012, forbids, except in a medical emergency, abortion of a fetus determined to be of a gestational age of at least twenty weeks. Arizona law separately prohibited abortions after fetal viability unless necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. The challenged provision at issue, Section 7 of H.B. 2036, extended the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that Arizona could not deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through fetal viability. The twenty-week law was therefore unconstitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzales v. Carhart. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Isaacson v. Horne" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Panama, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that he was not eligible for relief pursuant to former Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), because he was an aggravated felon, who filed his application for relief after November 29, 1990. The court held that the aggravated felony bar applied to petitioner's attempt to seek section 212(c) relief and denied the petition for review. View "Lawrence, et al v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Kohl's Department Store claiming that he bought merchandise from Kohl's that he would not have purchased had he not been misled by advertisements stating that the merchandise was marked down from a fictitious "original" or "regular" price. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff alleged that he "lost money or property" and, therefore, had statutory standing under California law to sue Kohl's to enforce California's prohibition on this deceptive marketing practice. In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that all a consumer needed to allege to establish standing to bring an Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq., or Fair Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500, et seq., claim was that (1) the defendant made a false representation about a product, (2) the consumer purchased the product in reliance on the misrepresentation, and (3) he would not have purchased the product otherwise. The court rejected defendant's argument that Kwikset was distinguishable because it involved a different type of unlawful misrepresentation than the one at issue here. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's UCL and FAL claims. For nearly identical reasons, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750, et seq., claims. The court also denied defendant's motion to certify both on the merits and because of the circumstances attendant to its filing. View "Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against NoteWorld alleging, among other things, violations under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and Washington state law. At issue on appeal was whether an entity could compel arbitration on the basis of an arbitration clause in a contract to which it was not a party. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that NoteWorld was not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary or through equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the court need not decide any other question on appeal and affirmed the judgment. View "Rajagopalan v. NoteWorld, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident charged with removal based on his alleged conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), petitioned for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner's conviction for endangerment under Arizona law constituted a CIMT. The Attorney General held in Matter of Silva-Trevino that an IJ could rely on evidence outside the record of conviction to determine whether a petitioner had been "convicted of" a CIMT. The court joined the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that Silva-Trevino was wrongly decided. The court held that a CIMT was a generic crime whose description was complete unto itself, such that "involving moral turpitude" was an element of the crime. Because it was an element of the generic crime, an IJ was limited to the record of conviction in determining whether an alien had been "convicted of" a CIMT. In this case, the court concluded that the IJ and BIA improperly considered evidence beyond the record of conviction in holding that petitioner was "convicted of" a "crime involving moral turpitude." Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olivas-Motta v. Holder" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the USDA's regulation of Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a plant genetically modified by the Monsanto Company and Forage Genetics International to be resistant to the herbicide glyphosate (Roundup). At issue was the Record of Decision (ROD) issued by APHIS, which unconditionally deregulated RRA on the ground that it was not a "plant pest" within the meaning of the term in the Plant Protection Act (PPA), 7 U.S.C. 7701-7772. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the statute did not regulate the types of harms that plaintiffs complained of, and therefore, APHIS correctly concluded that RRA was not a "plant pest" under the PPA. Once the agency concluded that RRA was not a plant pest, it no longer had jurisdiction to continue regulating the plant. APHIS's lack of jurisdiction over RRA obviated the need for the agency to consult with the FWS under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531, and to consider alternatives to unconditional deregulation under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. Accordingly, the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack " on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former member of the Mexican military, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court granted the petition with respect to petitioner's past persecution claim and remanded to the BIA to determine whether certain post-military incidents were attributable to the Los Zetas drug cartel, where petitioner assisted in transferring the arrestees, and whether the Mexican government was able to control Los Zetas as relevant to those in petitioner's particular social group. The BIA did not sufficiently consider Mexico's ability to control Los Zetas, so the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings on petitioner's claim of future persecution. Because the court rejected the BIA's finding on the lack of a causal nexus and remanded on the issue of the government's ability to control Los Zetas, the court also granted the petition on the withholding of removal claim and remanded to the BIA to reconsider petitioner's application; and the court remanded for the BIA to consider whether any torture petitioner was likely to endure if returned to Mexico would be with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. View "Tapia Madrigal v. Holder" on Justia Law

Objectors appealed the district court's orders granting final approval to a class action settlement between HP and a nationwide class of consumers who purchased certain HP inkjet printers between certain dates. Under section 1712 of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712(a)-(c), a district court could not award attorneys' fees to class counsel that were "attributable to" an award of coupons without first considering the redemption value of the coupons. A district court could, however, award lodestar fees to compensate class counsel for any non-coupon relief they obtained, such as injunctive relief. Because the attorneys' fees award in this case violated section 1712, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re: HP Inkjet Printer Litigation" on Justia Law

The Tribe sought to set aside a decision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) directing the Tribe to place the names of certain disenrolled individuals back on its membership roll. The BIA issued its decision pursuant to regulations providing for administrative review of adverse tribal enrollment actions where, as the BIA believed in this case, a tribe had authorized such review. The court concluded that the Tribe's governing documents did not grant the authority to the BIA to review appeals from disenrollment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Cahto Tribe v. Dutschke" on Justia Law