Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Commissioner appealed the tax court's determination related to a deficiency in petitioners' federal income tax involving distributions from petitioners' variable universal life insurance policy. The Commissioner asserted that surrender charges could never be considered under I.R.C. 402(b)(2), and maintained that petitioners actually received the full stated policy values of their respective policies. The court affirmed the tax court's determination that the "amount actually distributed" when petitioners received ownership of the policies after their employer wound down their employees' benefit trust was "the fair market value of what was actually distributed." Further, the surrender charges associated with a variable universal life insurance policy could permissibly be considered as part of the general inquiry into a policy's fair market value. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision. View "Schwab v. CIR" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of receiving stolen property. On appeal, the state challenged the district court's grant of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition based on Batson v. Kentucky. At issue was whether the California courts' determination that a prosecutor had genuine, race-neutral reasons for striking four black jurors during voir dire was an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law. As a threshold matter, the court held that Cullen v. Pinholster allowed the court to consider photographs that showed the racial composition of a jury venire to the extent that those photographs merely constructed facts visible to the state trial court that ruled on petitioner's Batson challenge. Overall, the evidence presented, including comparative analysis, did not persuade the court that habeas relief was warranted under the court's doubly deferential standard of review. Although some of the prosecutor's justifications appeared thin at first glance, a more searching review revealed nothing in the record suggesting that the state court unreasonably found these reasons to be genuine and not pretextual. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner. View "Jamerson v. Runnels" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' allegations that defendants issued consumer credit reports with negative entries for debts already discharged in bankruptcy. On appeal, plaintiffs and objectors challenged the district court's approval of a class-action settlement that granted incentive awards to the class representatives for their services to the class. The settlement agreement conditioned payment of incentive awards on the class representatives' support for the settlement. These conditional incentive awards caused the interests of the class representatives to diverge from the interests of the class because the settlement agreement told class representatives that they would not receive incentive awards unless they supported the settlement. Moreover, the conditional incentive awards significantly exceeded in amount what absent class members could expect to get upon settlement approval. Because these circumstances created a patent divergence of interests between the named representatives and the class, the court concluded that the class representatives and class counsel did not adequately represent the absent class members. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's approval of the settlement. View "Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction pursuant to a conditional plea agreement for one count of felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant contended that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the handgun that formed the basis for his conviction because the discovery of that handgun was the product of an illegal search and seizure. The court rejected defendant's claim and affirmed the judgment of the district court because defendant was not seized before discarding the handgun and the handgun was not a fruit of the illegal backpack search. View "United States v. McClendon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that PacifiCare was not entitled to any reimbursement payments out of the wrongful death benefits paid by an insurance policy to them. PacifiCare counterclaimed, arguing that it was entitled to reimbursement under both the terms of its contract with the deceased (Count I) and directly under the Medicare Act (Count 11), 42 U.S.C. 1395. At issue was whether a private Medicare Advantage Organization (MAO) plan could sue a plan participant's survivors, seeking reimbursement for advanced medical expenses out of the proceeds of an automobile insurance policy. Because interpretation of the federal Medicare Act presented a federal question, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether that act created a cause of action in favor of PacifiCare against plaintiffs. The district court properly dismissed the causes of action arising under the Medicare Act for failure to state a claim where section 1395y(b)(2) did not create a federal cause of action in favor of a MAO and where, under section 1395y(b)(3)(A), the Private Cause of Action applied in the case of a primary plan which failed to provide for primary payment, which was not applicable in this instance. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim as well as its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count 1. View "Parra v. Pacificare of Arizona" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for distribution of controlled substances. At issue was the denial of defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to FBI agents during a meeting with his parole officer. The court concluded that, because the meeting was a custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings were required to allow the prosecution to use defendant's statements at trial. The agents engaged in a two-step interrogation prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert, deliberately delaying the giving of warnings to induce defendant's cooperation in an ongoing investigation. Although the target of the agents' inquiry was another suspect, the questioning necessarily elicited information that incriminated defendant. The mid-stream warnings provided after defendant incriminated himself were too little, too late. Therefore, the district court's failure to suppress the statements was in error. The confession was central to the conviction. Because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed the conviction. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 911 for making a false claim of citizenship. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that his misstatement was not willful because he suffered from a delusion that caused him genuinely to believe that he was a United States citizen. The court concluded that the given instructions, considered as a whole, were adequate in the circumstances of this case. Although defendant's requested instruction more clearly articulated the knowledge requirement, the given instruction was adequate under the circumstances because a "misrepresentation... deliberately made" suggested a knowing falsehood. Combined with the testimony and closing arguments at trial, which focused on what defendant knew, the jury was aware that his subjective belief was the dispositive issue. The court also concluded that there was no plain error in the prosecutor's questioning of defendant's expert witness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Anguiano-Morfin" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered whether San Rafael's mobilehome rent regulation violated the park owners' substantive due process rights, constituted a regulatory taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, or ran afoul of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment under the standards articulated in Kelo v. City of New London. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected the City's arguments that MHC's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by res judicata, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing MHC to amend its complaint. The court also concluded that the regulation did not constitute either a Penn Central or a private taking. Because the court reached the merits of the takings issue, the court need not resolve the question of ripeness. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in granting judgment on MHC's substantive due process claims; the district court did not err in submitting the breach of settlement contract claims to the jury, denying the motion for a directed verdict on that question, denying the motion for a new trial, or awarding attorneys' fees; and in its original lawsuit, MHC waived its claim for damages in order to have a bench trial on the constitutional claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's holding as to the Penn Central and private takings, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "MHC Limited Financing v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Trump University for, among other things, deceptive business practices. Trump University counterclaimed against plaintiff for defamation based on the statements in letters and Internet postings plaintiff had made. Plaintiff then moved under California's "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) law, California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, to strike the defamation claim. At issue on appeal was whether Trump University, a private, for-profit entity purporting to teach Trump's "insider success secrets," was itself a public or limited public figure so as to implicate the First Amendment. The court concluded that Trump University was a limited public figure for the limited purpose of the public controversy over the quality of the education it purported to provide, and to prevail here, must demonstrate that plaintiff acted with actual malice. Because the district court erred by failing to recognize Trump University's status as a limited public figure, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makaeff, et al v. Trump University" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 1993 of conspiracy to possess and of possessing with intent to distribute 2,915 kilograms of cocaine and was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment. The Sentencing Commission subsequently amended the Sentencing Guidelines to lower the offense level applicable to defendant, with an application note indicating that upward departures from the new level might be warranted in cases involving an excessive quantity of drugs. Defendant subsequently moved under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for a reduction of his sentence. The court held that section 3582(c) contained no jurisdictional bar for the district court to entertain a second motion. Any non-jurisdictional challenges to a second motion were waived by the government when it failed to object. The court also concluded that the district court erred in failing to explain at all its rejection of defendant's arguments based on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's contention that the upward departure under the amended Guideline's application note violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "United States v. Trujillo" on Justia Law