Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On October 10, 2007, defendant was sentenced to 121 months in custody after pleading guilty to distributing 83.2 grams of crack cocaine. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant sentenced for a crack cocaine offense before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, was enacted was eligible for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court held, consistent with all circuits to have addressed the issue, that the FSA's lowered mandatory minimums were not available to such individuals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that the FSA did not apply retroactively to defendant. View "United States v. Augustine" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the application of a "sophisticated means" enhancement imposed by the district court, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2T1(b)(2), in determining their sentences following convictions for tax fraud. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that conduct need not involve highly complex schemes or exhibit exceptional brilliance to justify a sophisticated means enhancement. In this instance, the court concluded that defendants' effort to conceal income by using a bank account with a deceptive name was sufficiently sophisticated to support application of the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Defendants, PG&E and Pacific Bell, own and maintain utility poles throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. Plaintiff filed this action against both companies, alleging that the poles discharged wood preservative into the environment in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CWA because discharges of stormwater from the utility poles were neither a "point source discharge" nor "associated with industrial activity" and where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the RCRA because wood preservation that escaped from the utility poles was not a "solid waste." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. View "Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E" on Justia Law

Tribal authorities of the Tohono O'odham nation charged LKAV, age 17, with murder in May 2009. In November 2011, the United States moved to commit LKAV pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 to an adult medical facility for psychiatric treatment. The court held that when the United States charges a juvenile with an act of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031-42, the district court must follow 18 U.S.C. 5037(e) if it committed the juvenile for a study of the juvenile's competency to stand trial. Because the district court in this case instead committed LKAV under 18 U.S.C. 4241(d), the court reversed the judgment. View "United States V. LKAV, Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who pleaded nolo contendere to assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 364 days in county jail but probation was imposed instead, petitioned for review of the BIA's holding that he was removeable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of at least one year's imprisonment could have been imposed. The court concluded that its holding in Gonzales v. Barber - that assault with a deadly weapon under California Penal Code section 245(a)(1) is a crime involving moral turpitude - remained good law. Because CPC 17(b) did not apply and because the minute order designated petitioner's conviction as a felony, the court held that petitioner's conviction was a felony. The felony sentencing provisions of section 245(a)(1) allowed for imprisonment for more than one year. Accordingly, petitioner's conviction was a conviction for a "crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed." Therefore, the court denied the petition. View "Ceron v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Title VII action against her former employer, West Coast, claiming sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to West Coast and plaintiff appealed. Because the court concluded that the evidence, viewed favorably to plaintiff, did not show sexual harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of plaintiff's employment and subject her to an abusive environment, the court affirmed the judgment for West Coast on her sexual harassment claim. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to raise a material question of fact as to whether plaintiff's July 14 complaints - which the court already said could be protected activity - were a but-for cause of her termination. Therefore, the court believed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Westendorf v. West Coast Contractors of NV" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to an information charging that he was "found in" the United States on or about November 25, 2009, after he had been previously deported. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) could be applied to a deportee "found in" the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, while he was imprisoned. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Reyes-Ceja" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the district court's denial of restitution to them and others who asserted that they have been harmed as a result of the offenses for which Frederick Scott Salyer had been convicted. Petitioners petitioned for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. The court concluded that the district court committed legal error in denying restitution because of Salyer's claimed financial status and the potential availability of civil remedies. To the extent that the district court's denial of restitution rested on a determination that complex issues of fact would complicate or prolong the sentencing process, the record was unclear as to whether the district court conducted the balancing test required by 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(3) and determined from facts on the record that the burden on the sentencing process of determining restitution would outweigh the need to provide restitution to victims. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded with instructions. View "In re: Morning Star Packing Co. v. USDC, Sacramento" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Robert Silverman and his law firm on behalf of a class of Filipino teachers recruited to work in several school districts in Louisiana. Plaintiffs alleged that Silverman aided and abetted a human trafficking scheme in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589, 1590, 1592, 1594, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968; breached his fiduciary duties to members of the plaintiff class; and committed legal malpractice through his role in procuring H-1B non-immigrant visas for the teachers. Silverman brought this interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of his special motion to strike plaintiffs' second amended complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' state law claims violated California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, and invoked Noerr-Pennington immunity against all of plaintiffs' claims. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the denial of a motion for Noerr-Pennington immunity from liability was not an immediately appealable collateral order. The court further held that it did not have pendent jurisdiction over the Noerr-Pennington issue and did not reach the merits of this issue. View "Tanedo, et al v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Lancaster under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief from the City's policy of permitting prayers that mention Jesus. Plaintiffs argued that both the invocation at issue and the City's prayer policy amounted to an establishment of religion. The invocation did not proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the City, through its prayer practice, placed its official seal of approval on Christianity where the City has taken every feasible precaution to ensure its own evenhandedness. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly determined that neither the invocation at issue nor the City's prayer policy constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion. For the same reasons that plaintiffs' First Amendment claim failed, their state claim failed as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rubin, et al v. City of Lancaster" on Justia Law