Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his mandamus petition, where he sought to compel the DOE to issue him a Stafford Loan. While plaintiff's immigration status was still pending, he obtained valid employment authorization, graduated from college, and was accepted to law school. Plaintiff then filed a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and requested a Stafford Loan to pay his tuition. The law school declined to find him eligible for any form of federal student aid and plaintiff was unable to obtain a Stafford Loan. The court held that, in these circumstances, the jurisdictional question merged with the merits question. Plaintiff's mandamus petition fell within the scope of the sue-and-be-sued clause of 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(2). Notwithstanding that clause, however, section 1082(a)(2)'s ani-injunction clause barred the suit for declaratory relief. The Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff's petition under 28 U.S.C. 1361. When plaintiff's Stafford Loan eligibility was reviewed, he did not provide any evidence from the INS or USCIS that he was in the United States for other than a temporary purpose. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's petition on the merits. View "Mashiri v. Dept. of Education, et al" on Justia Law

The state filed a civil petition against petitioner under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq., just before petitioner's confinement was expected to end. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court, claiming that his exceedingly lengthy detention violated his constitutional rights. However, that court denied the petition and the California appellate courts agreed. Meanwhile, petitioner remained in custody and his SVPA petition made no progress. Petitioner then filed a federal pro se habeas petition. The district court concluded that the doctrine of Younger abstention applied and dismissed petitioner's case. The court held that the district court's abstention and denial of the writ were inappropriate where the state's counsel indicated that a trial on the commitment petition could be completed within 90 days and that the state would not oppose an order granting an alternative writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. View "Knight v. Ahlin" on Justia Law

This case concerned allegations of corruption by a representative of the Railway during mandatory arbitration of a dispute relating to the discharge of a Railway employee, who was represented by the Union. The Union subsequently filed a petition for review in federal district court under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153(q). The district court granted the Railway's motion to dismiss. The court held that the district court erred with respect to jurisdiction because it failed to properly apply section 153(q). The district court also erred with respect to the merits because it evaluated the Railway's conduct as fraud - not corruption, and failed to draw inferences in the light most favorable to the Union. The court reversed and remanded the case to allow the Union to attempt to prove its allegations of corruption by clear and convincing evidence. View "United Transportation Union, et al v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A, and of making false statements to government officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the jury's foreperson was biased against him; the district court imposed an unconstitutional limitation on his cross-examination of the government's key witness; and the district court erred in admitting expert testimony offered by the government and excluding expert testimony offered by the defense. Defendant also sought review of the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court affirmed the judgment; dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the appeal of the dismissal of the section 2255 motion; and denied the government's motion to strike portions of the opening brief that cited to materials outside the record as moot. View "United States v. Hayat" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Greenpeace's public campaign to stop Shell from driling in the Arctic. Greenpeace appealed the district court's grant of Shell's motion for a preliminary injunction, which prohibited Greenpeace from coming within a specified distance of vessels involved in Shell's Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) exploration and from committing various unlawful and tortious acts against those vessels. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the action presented a justiciable case or controversy, that the district court had jurisdiction to issue its order, and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Shell Offshore, Inc., et al v. Greenpeace, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who has difficulty walking because of certain health problems, alleged that United did not provide her with adequate assistance moving through the airport on two airplane trips and that she suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result. The court held that the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq., and its implementing regulations preempted state and territorial standards of care with respect to the circumstances which airlines must provide assistance to passengers with disabilities in moving through the airport. The ACAA did not, however, preempt any state remedies that could be available when airlines violated those standards. The court also held that the ACAA and its implementing regulations did not preempt state-law personal injury claims involving how airline agents interact with passengers with disabilities who requested assistance in moving through the airport. Finally, the court held that a terminal used for transportation by aircraft was excluded from definition as a Title III-covered place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12181 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

In this copyright infringement suit, SOFA claimed that Dodger infringed its copyright in using a seven-second clip of Ed Sullivan's introduction of the Four Seasons on "The Ed Sullivan Show" and could not justify its unlicensed use of the clip as "fair use." The clip was used in Dodger's musical about the Four Seasons, "Jersey Boys," to mark a historical point in the band's career. The court held that, by using the clip for its biographical significance, Dodger has imbued it with new meaning and did so without usurping whatever demand there was for the original clip. Dodger was entitled to prevail on its fair use defense as a mater of law and to retain the attorney's fees award granted by the district court. View "SOFA Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Productions, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Respondent (the Warden) appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner. The court held that the California Supreme Court necessarily decided that it was not reasonably probable that either petitioner's conviction or sentence would have turned out differently had counsel objected to the brace (knee restraint) petitioner wore beneath his clothing during the trial. Given what "prejudice" means in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the strength of the evidence, the nature of the brace, the atrociousness of petitioner's crimes, and the quality of the mitigation, the court could not say that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Walker v. Martel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law